














82: Current Moral Problems
Tom recenzowali:
prof. zw. dr hab. Wojciech Bołoz, prof. UKSW dr hab. Ewa Podrez, 
prof. UKSW dr hab. Ryszard Moń 
Rada Naukowa
Wojciech Bołoz (UKSW), Ireneusz Chrząścik (WM, AP), Zdzisław Ciećko (WM, UWM), Józef 
M. Dołęga (UKSW, WM) – przewodniczący, Stanisław Dziekoński (UKSW), Wojciech Kalinowski 
(WSDE, UMW), Tadeusz Klimski (UKSW, WM), Mariusz Kluska (AP, WM), Józef Krajewski 
(WM), Anna Lemańska (UKSW), Ryszard Moń (UKSW), Mieczysław Ozorowski (UKSW), Ewa 
Podrez (UKSW), Janusz Popko (AMB), Janusz Rozłucki (MW, UWM), Zbigniew Sareło (UKSW, WM), 
Jerzy Sikora (UKSW, KUL), Jarosław Sokołowski (UKSW) – sekretarz rady, Dariusz Śleszyński 
(SHU), Janusz Toruński (WM, AP), Stanisław Urbański (UKSW), Andrzej M. Woźnicki (USF).
Współpracujący z Radą Naukową
Janusz Aptacy (UKSW), Paweł Bejger (RGK), Karol Bujnowski (WSDE), Jacek W. Czartoszewski 
(UKSW), Edrwad Grott (UKSW, WM), Wojciech Guzewicz (WSDE), Marek Jadczak (RGK), 
Ryszard Kowalski (WM, AP), Jan Krupka (WSDŁ), Andrzej Jaśko (WSDE), Antoni Skowroń-
ski (UKSW), Stanisław Strękowski (WSDE, UKSW), Sławomir Śledziewski (WSDŁ), Paweł 
Tarasiewicz (WSDE, KUL), Kęstutis Żemaitis (Kowno Litwa).
Redakcja
Józef M. Dołęga – przewodniczący, Jacek W. Czartoszewski, Ireneusz Chrząścik, Jerzy Sikora, 
Jarosław Sokołowski – sekretarz redakcji.
Redakcja Techniczno-Komputerowa





© Copyright by Wszechnica Mazurska w Olecku 
© Wydział Filozoﬁi Chrześcijańskiej UKSW w Warszawie.
ISBN-978-83-60727-21-8
Adres Redakcji EPISTEME
1. Wszechnica Mazurska, pl. Zamkowy 5, 19-400 Olecko tel./fax (0-87) 520 31 33, 
  e-mail: wm@wm.olecko.pl  
Konto: PKO BP SA Centrum Ełk Oddział w Olecku 58 10204724 100990038  
(z dopiskiem Wydawnictwo AUM – Episteme)
2. Redakcja „Martyrii”, ul. 3 Maja 10, 19-300 Ełk (Jerzy Sikora)  
tel./fax (0-87) 610 01 05, e-mail: martyria@diecezja.elk.pl
3. Redakcja „Głosu Katolickiego”, pl. Papieża Jana Pawła II nr 1, 18-400 Łomża  
(Marek Jadczak), tel. (0-86) 216-62-85, fax 216-35-34, e-mail: glos@gloskatolicki.pl
Skład komputerowy: Marek Jadczak – Redakcja „Głosu Katolickiego”.
Druk: Drukarnia Libra-Print, al. Legionów 114B, 18-400 Łomża, tel. (086) 473-77-84.
5Table of contents
Preface ........................................................................................................... 7
Juraj Šúst, Liberal Toleration, Rights and Moral Individualism ............... 9
Krzysztof Wasilewski, Communitarian Common Good and Its 
Aristotelian Origins ............................................................................ 19
Peter Grešša, MacIntyre’s View of Telos as A Critical Response  
to Hume’s Thesis  .................................................................................. 29
Maciej Konrad Kraszewski, Responsibility as Understood  
by Martin Buber ................................................................................... 41
Karolina Dominik, The Experience of Self in the Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur ................................................................................................. 49
Adriana Joanna Warmbier, The Role of The Other (l’autre)  
in the Constitution of Subjectivity and Identity in Paul Ricoeur’s 
Philosophy ............................................................................................ 59
Andrzej Waleszczyński, The Category of Care and The Role of Felings  
in Virginia Held’s Ethics ...................................................................... 71
Dominika Dzwonkowska, Reverence for life vs. responsibility for life:  
the ethics of Albert Schweitzer and Hans Jonas ................................. 77
Żaneta Oczkowska, All Animals Are Equal – Do We Need The New
Ethics? .................................................................................................. 87
Zuzana Brt’ková, Double Eﬀect Reasoning and The Question  
of Surgical Separation of Conjoined Twins ........................................ 97
Lenka Drličková, Paweł Urgacz, Responsible Business ........................ 109
Wydawnictwo Wszechnicy Mazurskiej – seria Episteme ................... 123 

7Preface
 It is a commonplace that one matures slowly to serious research, by 
reading, writing, and above all by participation in the exchange of ideas; 
hence the great emphasis placed today on participation in academic 
conferences. The organisation of an international conference by doctoral
students of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw is 
praiseworthy for the same reason. The conference took place on the
thirteenth of May, 2008, and examined some of the ethical problems with 
which contemporary philosophy is concerned. One of its fruits is this 
volume. 
 A hugely diverse range of questions were tackled by the speakers, 
a diversity which can be construed as both a strength and a weakness of 
the event. No subject was treated in greater depth, but the participants 
were able to acquaint themselves with the interests of young scholars, 
and to present, if only in outline, something of the current state of 
contemporary philosophy. The papers were of quite good quality
for graduate students. Some concerned the thought of well-known 
philosophers, others covered less familiar territory such as the ideas of 
Virginia Held. There were also questions of the practice of the moral
life, especially those at the juncture of ethics, ecology and business, for 
example moral doubts raised in connection with food, or matters of the 
environment in which we live.
 Young scholars from Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic took 
part in the conference. This is worth noting, as it permitted the exchange
of views from within this region of Europe which is connected by 
a common history quite diﬀerent from that of the other countries of our
continent. It permits us to hope that these same scholars will in the future 
undertake some common research project.
 Despite the great variety in its subject matter, certain common strands 
of thought can be found in this volume. One is that of freedom and the 
responsibility that rests on man and society alike not just for human 
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life but for that of the whole environment. Another question which 
interested many participants is the relationship between what we call the 
good of the individual and the common good. Many speakers held the 
conviction that contemporary ethics is, more or less clearly, based on or 
inspired by tradition, especially the Aristotelian tradition, as becomes 
clear in writers such as Alistair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur. The third
question connecting some of the papers is whether we need a new ethics 
of some kind, which would take into consideration the challenges of the 
present day (animal rights, environmental demands, business conditions, 
feminist movements) or whether it would be enough if we were to deﬁne
the subject of ethics in such a way that it would include not only man and 
his good. 
 The arguments presented here, whatever opposition they may provoke,
are without doubt worthy of attention. The authors have demonstrated
great care in their work and a good knowledge of the relevant literature. 
 I hope, therefore, that this volume will not only orient the reader in 
some ongoing ethical discussions, but also that he will ﬁnd articles that
broaden his philosophical knowledge and perhaps encourage him or her 





University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia
Liberal Toleration, Rights and Moral 
Individualism
 Probably most of us in the current liberal democracies tolerate things 
like abortion, homosexual marriage, assisted suicide, promiscuous sexual 
lifestyles and so on, because we tend to think that at least part of morality 
is a matter for the individual‘s conscience. Each person, we think, needs to 
decide the big questions of life for him or her self. It is against the dignity 
of human beings to compel people to decisions which are not theirs. Not 
to allow, say, a right to abortion would mean to show disrespect to people 
because each one of us is a unique creator of his or her own happiness. 
Because we understand people as moral persons, we believe that they 
have the capacity to form their own moral decisions and to act according 
to them. To force them to act in a certain way would mean to show them 
disrespect as moral subjects.
 The aim of this paper is to show that the arguments for toleration just
presented, though mainstream, are false. I divide my argument into two 
parts. First, I will sketch out the positions according to which people are 
diﬀerent in their life-styles and therefore a unitary vision of the good for
the whole of society is not possible. Due to the fact that we are diﬀerent,
we should tolerate life-styles which are not like ours, unless these interfere 
with people’s rights. In the second part, I show why I think that this 
argument from rights for toleration tends to be inadequate. Even though 
there is no necessary connection between rights-based justiﬁcation of
toleration and moral individualism, rights-based justiﬁcations tend to
presuppose an individualistic moral outlook. I will use some arguments 
by Joseph Raz to show that this moral outlook is false. Individual well-
being is not possible if isolated from the good of society. Or, to use more 




 We need on the one hand, therefore, to stop understanding 
individualistically arguments made for toleration on the basis of rights. 
On the other hand, we have to see rights as protecting not only individual 
freedom but also those collective goods which give individual freedom its 
meaning.
I.I
 „A tolerant society is one which allows persons the freedom to act on 
their own self-chosen values”1. The value of equal respect is the reason for
a tolerant society. „That is, persons have to respect one another as equals,
this respect implying that each person recognizes others as capable and 
competent to form their own projects and plans of life”2. The opposite
of a tolerant society is a paternalistic society, in which some personal 
choices have less weight than others, perhaps because they are considered 
by government as not right or not good. According however to supporters 
of the tolerant society, paternalism does not respect the obvious fact that 
people are diﬀerent. „Nothing is more obvious than that people diﬀer
from one another. Some are pious, others are irreverent. Some prefer one 
sexual partner, others prefer a variety. Some are committed to developing 
their skills and talents to the maximum extent possible, and others are 
content to allow their lives to pass with passive intoxication of alcohol, 
television or other sources of gratiﬁcation. Some seek active involvement
in the aﬀairs of the community; others prefer to cultivate their own 
gardens. And some have very strong views about the way in which their 
society is to be organized, whilst others are prepared to let every one go 
their own way”3. 
  Robert Nozick, the famous philosophical opponent of the Rawlsian 
theory of justice, agrees: „People are diﬀerent. They diﬀer in temperament,
interests, intellectual ability, aspirations, natural bent, spiritual quests, 
1  A. Weale, Toleration, individual diﬀerences and respect for persons, in: Aspects of Toleration. 
Ed. J. Horton, S. Mendus, London And New York, 1985, 29. 
2  Ibidem, 29. 
3  Ibidem, 16. 
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and the kind of life they wish to lead. They diverge in the values they have
and have diﬀerent weightings for the values they share. (They wish to
live in diﬀerent climates – some in mountains, plains, deserts, seashores,
cities, towns.)”4.
 It seems that variety of life styles implies the individualistic conclusion 
that there is not one ideal of the good for everybody. As Nozick says, 
„There is no reason to think that there is one community which will serve
as ideal for all people and much reason to think that there is not”5. Appiah 
agrees: „There is no general answer to the question how one should live
one’s life: not everyone should be a priest or a poet or a pipe ﬁtter. There
are lives worth living that focus on family, and others that center on work. 
Liberals are pluralists about human ﬂourishing, holding that there are
many ways for human beings to live good lives and many projects worth 
pursuing”6.
  In case those lines have left us still sceptical about the diversity of
lifestyles, Nozick gives us a list of famous people who diﬀer radically from
each other over how one should lead one’s life: „Wittgenstein, Elisabeth 
Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Merton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsburg,
Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso,
Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heﬀner, Socrates, Henry Ford...”7. 
I.II
 The question is, if there is no one ideal way of conducting a human
life, if we live and have to live in a pluralistic society, does this mean that 
there are no restrictions concerning how one may live? No. There are
certain limits on how to live because people are social beings that live in 
societies. These limits, which we usually call rights, restrict our individual
4  R. Nozick, Anarchy, state, and utopia, Oxford 1993, 309.
5  Ibidem, 310.
6  A. K. Appiah, Liberal education: the United States example, in: The Citizenship and Education 
in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities. 
Ed. K. Mcdonough, W. Feinberg, Oxford 2005, 56.
7  Ibidem, 310.
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pursuit of our interests and goals because of our common goal of minimal 
social cooperation and harmony. Citizens are free to make choices of any 
kind so long as they do not interfere with the equal rights of others. So 
to respect other people we need to respect their rights. Respect of others 
is realized by respecting their rights which we can picture as walls of 
individual personal freedom that cannot be crossed without consent. 
 Now, rights give us a reason for toleration. You or I may personally 
consider the decisions of other people to be plainly wrong or immoral. 
This kind of attitude to others is natural if people live according to
diﬀerent ideals of life. If their life-styles diﬀer, their opinions as to the best
life to live diﬀer as well. The important point is, however, that so long as
the decisions of a given person do not interfere with the rights of others, 
then to respect that person we need to tolerate him and not interfere with 
his decisions. I might personally think that deciding to abort is wrong 
or immoral. However, because women have certain rights (for example 
personal freedom, maybe even a right to abortion), to respect them as 
equal human beings I need to tolerate them and therefore overcome my 
inclination to interfere with their decisions. 
 This attitude towards others is, in a tolerant society, appropriate not
only within personal relations, but also – and not less – in political ones. 
As Appiah says: „I as a liberal, regard it as proper for the state to allow 
you to do what is, in my judgment, plainly wrong, provided that in doing 
so, you interfere with no one’s rights and have freely chosen to do it in 
pursuit of your aims and in the light of your own knowledge, your best 
understanding”8. Although I think that marriage is reserved only for 
heterosexual couples, I am not going to urge the state to interfere with 
your decision to marry a partner of the same sex if you are convinced that 
it is a good thing for you to do, but you must not interfere with my right 
and the rights of others to decide the question of marriage diﬀerently.
8  Ibidem, 59. 
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II.
 This paper shows that the arguments presented in part I are
inadequate to justify liberal toleration. A rights-based justiﬁcation
of toleration inﬂuenced by an individualistic moral vision clearly
presupposes the division of morality into two independent parts. One 
part of morality relates to each individual uniquely and is connected with 
the most important personal goals and interests (questions of abortion, 
type of marriage and so on). The second, objective, part relates to all
individuals equally and deﬁnes their rights (and duties) to each other. If
two separate kinds of morality really were to exist, it would imply that the 
value of individual goals is independent of what other people consider 
valuable. It would mean that individuals could realize their well-being 
irrespective of the well-being of others. This is, however, impossible (as
will be shown later). If we do not relate the principles of individual and 
of inter-personal action to each other, than we will be unable to identify 
any of these principles. As Raz says, „The mistake is to think that one
can identify, say, the rights of others, while being completely ignorant 
of what values make a life meaningful and satisfying and what personal 
goals one has in life. Conversely, it is also a mistake to think that one can 
understand the values which can give a meaning to life and have personal 
goals and ideals while remaining ignorant of one’s duties to others”9. 
 To see why the division of morality which right-based justiﬁcations
of toleration presuppose is illusory, I need to demonstrate the falsity of 
moral individualism. Individualism can be described as a moral outlook 
according to which only individual goods can be intrinsically good. If 
true, it would mean that all other goods (public, collective, religious and 
so on) are only of instrumental value and cannot take priority over the 
individual. Individualism, therefore, denies that there exists any external 
moral standard governing individual behavior. Rights are thought to be 
trumps which provide for individuals the sphere of independence and 
personal liberty which is needed for the pursuit of personal goals and 
9  Ibidem, 214. 
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values. The role of government is reduced to the protection of the rights
and liberties of each individual. Toleration towards all kinds of behaviour 
or opinions is expected if these do not interfere with other individuals’ 
rights. 
 I will argue, using the moral theory of Joseph Raz, that individualism 
which does not recognize the intrinsic value of any collective goods is 
not a sound moral conviction, simply because collective goods which 
are intrinsically valuable exist. And consequently, because the existence 
of collective goods cannot be derived from rights alone, rights cannot 
be the principles of objective morality. Therefore, there is no division of
morality into two parts, subjective and objective.
 This conclusion has strong implications for the morality of liberal
toleration. According to individualistic rights-based justiﬁcations of
toleration, we should tolerate behaviour which seems to us to be wrong, 
so long as it does not interfere with the rights of others. This claim is
sound only if rights express those interests of individuals that protect the 
public good. 
II.I
 In his respected book The Morality of Freedom, Raz deﬁnes moral
individualism as follows: „A moral theory will be said to be individualistic 
if it ... doesn’t recognize any intrinsic value in any collective good”10. 
According to this individualistic approach to morality, „collective goods 
have instrumental value only”11.
10  J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford 1988, 198. Raz deﬁnes ‘collective good’ as in-
herent public good. Inherent public goods are general beneﬁcial features of society.
„Living in a society with these characteristics is generally of beneﬁt to individuals... The
beneﬁts I have in mind are the more diﬀuse ones deriving from the general character
of the society to which one belongs. Diﬀerent people beneﬁt from the good qualities
of the society to diﬀerent degrees. But the degree to which they beneﬁt depends on
their character, interests, and dispositions, and cannot be directly controlled by others.„ 
Ibidem, 199.
11  Ibidem, 199. 
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 Raz grounds justiﬁcation of intrinsically valuable collective goods
on the intrinsic value of autonomy. If personal autonomy is an intrinsic 
good, than at least some collective goods are intrinsically valuable12. This
claim might seem to be implausible at ﬁrst glance, because autonomy is
an ideal of personal freedom, freedom to shape one’s individual life as 
one wishes, irrespective of the desires of others or of society. If personal 
autonomy remains in opposition to any kind of paternalism, whether 
religious, cultural, or even moral, how it can be intrinsically related to 
any collective good? 
 To be able to make one’s life autonomous, an individual must have 
the possibility of choosing from a variety of acceptable options. It is not 
possible to become an autonomous person if one lives, for example, on 
a desert island. We can therefore speak about autonomy in two senses: 
as an achievement, when a person becomes a fully autonomous person, 
and as a condition, in which an individual can choose from many 
diﬀerent options. For an individual to have the possibility of achieving
an autonomous life he must live in a society which allows him to choose 
from a ‘suﬃcient range of signiﬁcant options’13. So it follows that „if 
having an autonomous life is an ultimate value, then having a suﬃcient
range of acceptable options is of intrinsic value, for it is constitutive of 
an autonomous life that it is lived in circumstances where acceptable 
alternatives are present”14. As Raz adds, „One cannot have an option 
to be a barrister, a surgeon, or a psychiatrist in a society where those 
professions, and the institutions their existence presupposes, do not 
exist”15. Social conditions which constitute such options are collective 
12  See: ibidem, 203.
13  See: ibidem, 204.
14  Ibidem, 205. Raz distinguishes three categories of intrinsically valuable things: goods 
in themselves, constitutive goods and ultimate goods. Goods in themselves are goods 
which are valuable irrespective of what else exists. Constituent goods are goods which 
are elements of the good in itself. Ultimate goods are goods with ultimate value. That 
means that their value is not justiﬁed by reference to other values. Ultimate goods give
us reasons, and elucidate, why a good is an intrinsic good. Ibidem, 200.
15  Ibidem, 205. 
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goods. For example, a tolerant society with many alternative options or 
a society with a legal profession or with an institution of marriage are 
collective goods – because those beneﬁts are not „voluntarily controlled
by anyone other that the potential beneﬁciary”16.
 If the analysis presented succeeds in showing the intrinsic value of 
some collective goods, we have good reasons to deny the validity of moral 
individualism. If autonomy is a necessary component of human well-being 
and is at the same time an intrinsic good, then it is not possible for one’s well-
being to be independent of the well-being of others or of society, because 
an autonomous life cannot be lead if there are not suﬃcient options for an
individual to choose from. These options are the goods constitutive of an
autonomous life, which is the ultimate good, and their existence is connected 
with the existence of certain social forms and conditions. „Therefore that
notion of an inherent general conﬂict between individual freedom and the
needs of others is illusory. Though an individual’s freedom, understood as
personal autonomy, sometimes conﬂicts with the interests of others, it also
depends on those interests and can be obtained only through collective goods 
which do not beneﬁt anyone unless they beneﬁt everyone”17. 
II.II
  We are in a position to ask whether the existence of collective goods 
which are intrinsically valuable is derivable from rights. If it is not, rights 
cannot remain be ﬁrst principles of an objective morality.
 According to Raz, rights based on the interests of an individual ground 
the duties of others. An individual human being can claim a right if an 
important aspect of her well-being, her interest, is „a suﬃcient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under duty”18. It is important that 
not every interest, however, is a reason for holding some other person(s) 
under duty. There needs to be suﬃcient reason19.
16  Ibidem, 206. 
17  Ibidem, 250. 
18  Ibidem, 166. 
19  See: ibidem, 202.
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 Let’s consider examples of intrinsically collective goods such as a 
beautiful town in a tolerant and cultured society, a society with legal and 
medical and similar professions, a society with the institution of marriage, 
and so on. Is it possible that the intrinsic value of these collective goods 
could be derivable from rights?20. For this to be so, a person would have 
to have a right to the intrinsically collective goods just mentioned. Having 
this right presupposes having an interest in living in such societies. Is 
this kind of interest suﬃcient for holding some other person (s) under
duty? It does not seem so. Even if I do have an interest in living in such 
a society this interest does not seem to be suﬃcient „to establish that I 
have a right to live in such society” and to impose a duty on anyone to 
make my society and environment such. The reason is that rights usually
establish the duty of one person to another and no single person has a 
duty to provide collective goods for another individual. Collective goods, 
as general beneﬁcial features of society, are inherently public, and so
transcend the scope of single individuals. As Raz adds, „It does not follow 
that no one has such duties. I am inclined to say that the government has 
a duty to achieve all these goals or at least to try to do so. But its duty is 
not grounded in my interest alone. It is based on my interest and on the 
interests of everyone else”21.
 It is not only the existence of certain collective goods that rights 
cannot explain, but also the intrinsic good of autonomy, the existence 
of which is a condition of any collective good as well. First of all, rights 
reduce autonomy to the condition of autonomy protected by rights. If 
rights are ﬁrst principles, then the virtue of autonomy, autonomous life for
its own sake, cannot be derived from rights alone. Secondly, in order for 
autonomy to be possible many social forms must exist. If the individual 
had a right to autonomy, it would mean that all other individuals would 
have a duty to provide him with the social conditions necessary for an 
autonomous life. That would, however, be too burdensome for individuals,
therefore, such right to autonomy does not exist22. 
20  See: ibidem, 194. 
21  Ibidem, 202. 
22  See: ibidem, 247. 
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 To summarize. I opposed the claim that there are two independent 
parts of morality. There is only one comprehensive objective morality
which includes personal goals and interests as well as interpersonal 
rights and duties to others. This conclusion is based on two premises.
The ﬁrst says that individualism, according to which the individual’s well-
being can be separated from the well-being of others, is false, because 
intrinsically valuable collective goods exist. The second premise says that
the existence of collective goods is not derivable from rights, therefore 
rights cannot stand for ﬁrst principles of objective morality.
 To justify toleration we need to abandon the reduction of morality 
to rights that are shelters of our individual freedom from the interests 
of others. Rights must be understood to protect not only individual 
interests but, along with those same interests, also the interests of the 
whole society. It cannot be otherwise, because individual well-being is 
connected, through the existence of collective goods, with the well-being 
of others. In order for toleration to be compatible with morality it must 
not diminish collective goods, which are necessary components of each 
individual‘s well-being. 
 Juraj Šúst is a doctoral student at Trnava University. His dissertation is on 
the problem of toleration in current liberal theories. He is also a member of the 
Department of Political Science at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in 
Trnava where he teaches courses on the history of political thought.
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Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw, Poland
The Communitarian Common Good  
and its Aristotelian Orgins
 When one analyzes the condition of contemporary liberal societies, it 
is impossible not to notice their peculiar diversiﬁcation and stratiﬁcation,
expressed in ever more explicit antagonisms occurring in particular social 
structures. Anthropological, ontological, and political issues are disputed 
in the ﬁelds of ethics and morals. The disparity of opinions originates in
the way man is understood, and in particular in how his creative power, 
participation, self-creation and responsibility are understood. A very 
clear example of this dispute is the discussion between liberals and 
communitarians which has now been going strong for over thirty years.
One of the key objectives of the supporters of communitarianism is to 
prove the weakness of the vision of the state oﬀered by various forms
of liberalism. John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, with its deﬁnition of
justice as impartiality, is the starting point for their criticism of this 
doctrine1. Analyzing his proposal, communitarians say that it presents 
man as a being capable of abstracting its ‘self ’ from its personal features. 
This understanding of man supposes that the self precedes the goods 
and goals that every individual has, meaning that there are no goods 
or goals constitutive of man. In liberalism, the only ability that is in 
any way constitutive is the arbitrary ability to choose between values, 
1 According to Rawls, the principles of justice, which determine rights and obligations 
and regulate the distribution of social and economic beneﬁts, should be deﬁned in the
form of a hypothetical agreement made by people who abstract from all aspects of 
their personal beliefs, being directed only by impartiality based on resignation from 
the achievement of individual or group beneﬁts or successes. The two main principles
coming from this project are that all citizens of a state are entitled to equal basic 
liberties, and that only those social and economic inequalities are acceptable which 
are advantageous for the most poorly situated members of the society. See: J. Rawls,. 
A theory of justice, Oxford 1999, 21-26.
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goals, goods and lifestyles; this ability is at the same time the expression 
of the utmost liberty of the individual. A communitarian critique of 
liberalism has formed on the basis of the above analysis, its key claim 
being that there is no unconditioned self standing apart from our goals. 
Every individual is rooted from birth in some history, community, and 
tradition; the objectives pursued by the individual are therefore in some 
way predetermined, and constitutive of the individual. This means that
the individual has certain roles laid upon him, and is obliged to achieve 
certain ends determined by the community in which he, or she, lives. 
Charles Taylor says that an individual’s identity cannot be properly 
understood and identiﬁed without reference to other individuals. This
reference is a language-determined dialogue through which people 
discover not only the meaning of their actions, but also the hierarchies 
of their goal-setting. Only through discovering this hierarchy can an 
individual become truly free. A person can only be free if he is able to 
ﬁnd and achieve community-rooted goals, taking into consideration the
good life of both the individual and the community2. 
 The communitarian views presented are merely a narrow presentation
of the postulate saying that the role of community in human life should 
be emphasized3. According to communitarians, humans can achieve 
fulﬁllment only in a community, because of the values, arising out of its
tradition and history, that it incorporates. However, it is not enough to 
2 See: Ch. Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge 1993, 38-62, and his Philosophical 
Arguments, Cambridge 1996, 171-173.
3 Emphasis on the role of community is a consequence of criticism of the justice concept 
proposed by John Rawls. According to Michael Walzer, nembers of a liberal society 
share no common political or religious traditions. They are able to tell only the story of 
themselves, which is a story of ex nihilo creation, beginning in the state of nature or in 
some primary situation. Everyone imagines himself as an absolutely free, unrestricted 
being, living his own life – and joins the community only to minimize risk. See M. 
Walzer,. The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, Political Theory 18(1990)1, 81-96. 
The contractual nature of social relationships is based on the principle of freedom of 
association determined by free will, not supported by tradition or community history. 
This implies not only freedom to associate with any community of one’s choice, but also 
freedom to quit it.
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be born in a speciﬁc community. One should also identify oneself with
it. To make this so, communitarians propose that the individual’s goals 
should be identiﬁed with the community’s goals. Does this claim have
suﬃcient grounds to be considered? It is obvious that the currently
dominant free market and the competitive principles related to it, being 
the achievements of liberalism and democracy, are contrary to any vision 
of common goals. Yet the communitarian postulate still plays a central 
role in political debate. One of the reasons for the continued vitality of 
this idea is its origin. To emphasize the role of community is nothing 
other than to refer to the vision of a common good, which has its roots 
in antiquity. Communitarians understand the common good either 
as acceptance of, and submission to, the historically formed values of 
a given community, or as the possibility of choosing the community’s 
values through public debate in which as many society members as 
possible should participate4. Another communitarian interpretation 
of the common good is that people seek to belong to a community by 
discovering their own identities on the basis of virtues connected with 
the practices of deﬁned social roles and with the traditions in which
those practices are rooted. The community itself can also be interpreted
as being the common good, based on deep relationships between its 
members who identify with their community and actively pursue its 
positive development. Here it is worth considering the justiﬁcation
of the common good conceived of in this way. What is the source of 
this idea, the key to understanding this postulate and the fundamental 
concepts which constitute it? I will try to demonstrate that this source 
lies in the philosophy of Aristotle, and concretely in its interpretation by 
communitarian philosophers.
 To show the relationship between the Aristotelian and communitarian 
understandings of community we must ﬁrst refer to the notion of human
nature, as the description of the community in which man lives is 
determined by how he is understood. For Aristotle, every individual is 
a politikon zoon – a political animal. Man is endowed with reason, which 
4 See: A.MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, London 1985, 19-26.
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enables him to judge what is right and what wrong, and with speech, 
which enables him to share his sentiments5. These judgments can take
place only within a community whose chief goal is to pursue good, 
understood as the good life of its members.
 Charles Taylor holds a similar view, stating that the human search 
for good is possible only in a society. Man cannot exist as the moral 
subject of his actions outside the community nor pursue his own good. 
According to Taylor, what an individual gains from society is not only 
support in realizing the good, but also the very possibility of seeking it6. 
Understanding the communitarian concept of the realization of good 
requires further reference to Aristotelian thought. Aristotle interpreted 
man as a dynamic being, constantly moving towards something. He 
claimed that anyone „moving towards” must have a deﬁned something
towards which to move, a deﬁnite end. The end determines the way in
which it is approached – Aristotle interprets the telos itself as something 
achieved by an individual in the course of his development. Good is 
therefore to a certain extent determined by man’s pursuit of it, it is not 
something permanent and invariable. Nor should it be identiﬁed with
Plato’s „idea”, as good is closely related to the achievement of a rationally 
chosen end. Taylor is clearly making use of Aristotle in his discussion of 
self-realization through realization of one’s good. Self-realization is always 
related to some end pursued by the individual. The end is connected with
man’s good because it is a point of reference for the individual through 
which he can relate to his rights and freedom. Each man’s freedom of 
choice is meaningful only in the context of a worthwhile goal, which 
individuals can choose. Man can realize himself only through the rational 
choice of superior goods, which order life and make it better. Superior/
higher-order goods constitute man’s identity and cause his activity while 
at the same time imposing on him certain obligations. These are not
absolute obligations, as the order of goods depends to a great extent on 
people, who create it through articulation in language7.
5 See: Aristotle, Politics, 1253a.
6 See: Ch. Taylor, The Nature and the Scope of Distributive Justice, Cambridge 1995, 292-304.
7 See: Ch. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge 1992, 88-101.
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 Referring to the human telos and emphasizing the signiﬁcance of the
function each person has to play in the community, Alasdair MacIntyre 
uses the notion of practice, which means „any coherent and complex 
form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying 
to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially deﬁnitive of, that form of activity”; when practical activity
is conceived thus, human ability to achieve perfection and human 
understanding of goals and goods are systematically enhanced8. Striving 
for perfection in a speciﬁc ﬁeld enhances not only the given practice, but
also the community involved in the practice. Models of perfection, or 
virtues, exist in the practice itself. They are therefore neither arbitrary nor
created by the individual9.
 According to MacIntyre, it is not enough to base understanding of 
virtues on the concept of practice. All goods typical of practices are always 
limited in some way; a goal is needed that will overcome this limitation. 
Such a goal would be the good of an entire life, understood as a unity10. 
MacIntyre claims that not only those qualities that are necessary for 
achieving the goods typical of practices are virtues, but also those that 
contribute to the good of life as a whole, and that are related to man’s 
pursuit of good within the framework of an ongoing social tradition.
 To illustrate other connections between communitarian theory and 
Aristotelian philosophy let us look more closely at the very concept of 
community. According to Michael Sandel, a community is not only 
what individuals have as citizens, but also who they are11. Community 
members do not so much choose to be involved in a relationship with 
others as oblige themselves to belong to a given community. In Taylor’s 
opinion this means that the morality of a given community is not 
determined by the internal voice of individuals but rather is based on 
8 See: A. MacIntyre, ibidem, 187.
9 See: P. Śpiewak, W stronę wspólnego dobra [Towards the Common Good], Warsaw 1998, 
259.
10 See: A. MacIntyre, ibidem, 201-3. 
11 See: M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge 1982, 150.
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those individuals’ identiﬁcation with the community. Taylor understands
this identiﬁcation as a strong interpersonal bond, taking the form of
patriotism. This understanding of community bonds was already present
in the thought of Aristotle, who referred to it as politikos. In antiquity 
politikos was understood as the entirety of social life; it was not limited 
to public activities, but also comprised personal relationships between 
citizens. It was for this reason that Aristotle applied the same criterion 
to moral evaluation of the individual and of the community. Of course, 
Aristotle’s views12 were directly conditioned by the size of contemporary 
states. The Greek city-state, occupying a small area and having by our
standards a small number of citizens, furnished conditions advantageous 
for the growth of numerous personal bonds between all the members of 
the state community. 
 Aristotle held that the state is an educator, because the Greek 
understanding of the notion politikos equated the realm of morality and 
the realm of public life. Michael Sandel similarly excludes the possibility 
of the existence of a neutral state. He claims that politics is of particular 
importance for a community’s life, as it is protects and promotes the values 
of a given community’s values. A procedural state, as proposed by Rawls, 
is not able to secure permanence of civic goods and virtues, as it is not 
able to raise mature citizens, capable of managing their common goods. 
According to Sandel, citizens will only develop such skills with the support 
and involvement of a common ﬁeld, namely the ﬁeld of politics. The
objective is to develop the power of self-government among community 
members through deliberate state action. Participation in community 
life is an expression of individual freedom properly understood. This
12 It seems that Aristotle dedicated 2 books of his Nicomachean Ethics to the idea of 
friendship precisely because of the important role of personal relationships between 
the participants of public life in politics and therefore in ethics. This is the foundation 
for the formation of human associations, meaning that the state owes its origins to 
friendship as well. Friendship and unanimity within the state reinforce the solidarity of 
community members. Citizens of a polis whoare bound by friendship need no justice, 
as they have the same wishes for each other, or engage in mutual exchange. See: K. 
Leśniak, Arystoteles [Aristotle], Warsaw 1989, 86-87.
25
The Communitarian Common Good and its Aristotelian Orgins
understanding of freedom is related to the implementation of a politics 
of the common good, the objective of the entire political community13.
 One of the principal communitarian ideas is that human identity is 
largely constituted by the community and by discovery of the purposes, 
roles and obligations of the human being. However, these obligations are 
not limited to individual members of the community. The community
itself has also certain obligations to its members. Among the most 
important of these obligations is the formation of the civic character 
of its members and making a shared vision of the good life a reality. 
Education was also for Aristotle a principle purpose of the polis. He 
held that virtuous citizens must be the foundation of a state mindful 
of the common good, and that therefore education should be based on 
the perfection and development of virtues in public life14. Education 
must not be limited to teaching which virtues are appropriate in a given 
situation, but must lead to self-knowledge and understanding of one’s 
actions. It must therefore incorporate the virtue of prudence15. MacIntyre 
likewise emphasizes the importance of this virtue. When engaging in 
a practice and pursuing virtue, people order their actions not in regard 
to their own needs or their own concept of good, but are guided by 
their own recognition and understanding of the practice in question, 
and organize their purposes and activities in accordance with that 
recognition. This recognition depends on each one’s degree of familiarity
with the practice, with authorities and role models, as well as on self-
analysis, on the seeking of one’s own identity and role in the community. 
The meaning of a given judgment is therefore related to a unique human
experience, to the context in which it is made, and to the purposes of 
the practice to which the judgment refers, but it is also related to the 
collective experience of the entire community16. All these components 
13 See: M. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 
Cambridge 1996, 4-26.
14 See: E. Podrez, „Aksjologiczne podłoże związków etyki z polityką” [Axiological Grounds 
of the Connections between Politics and Ethics], Studia Philosophiae Christianae 40 
(2004)I, 110-111.
15 See: P. Śpiewak, ibid., 120-121.
16 See: A. MacIntyre, ibid., 232-241.
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that constitute the meaning of an opinion, are combined in the virtue 
called phronesis, prudence. It is the use of prudence, or practical wisdom, 
in debates setting moral standards, that enables the community to pursue 
the common good of its members.
 For a community to enable an individual to pursue his telos, it 
must guarantee some social order, minimizing conﬂicts arising from
individuals’ pursuit of their speciﬁc goals. For Aristotle, the foundation
of such a social order was justice17. This concept is also important for
communitarians in their critique of John Rawls’s principles of justice. 
They notice a certain tension among his principles which appears in
the establishment of speciﬁc legal norms. This tension is due to the
contradiction between an individual’s right to liberty and the principle 
of realizing an individual’s personal talents or preferences. An individual 
entitled to basic liberties and free to choose his life pattern must also 
resign from these liberties in favour of the poorest citizens (through 
serving them with his abilities, funds, or other resources). What is more, 
the individual who is better oﬀ must subsidize even those those who of
their own choice have limited access to social goods18. 
 Summing up, it is clear that it is not easy to characterize the 
communitarian concept of the common good because of the wide variety 
of views in the current of thought under this name. Turning to the work 
Aristotle we cannot not only show the sources of the communitarian idea 
17 According to Aristotle, justice guaranteed correct interpretation of rights on the basis 
of what is just. Because law tends to be too general for particular cases, applying it 
rigorously can bring about consequences quite opposite to those intended. The role of 
justice is to supply for the generality and inﬂexibility of written laws in particular cases.
However, for Aristotle justice in the life of the community is primarily a moral virtue, 
meaning human perfection in relationships with other people. This perfection is based 
on equating other people’s good with one’s own good. In this interpretation, justice is 
a combination of all the other qualities and virtues that refer to human co-existence 
because it is the only virtue that directly refers to interpersonal relations by its very 
nature. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1129a 32-1130a 3.
18 See: W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford 1990 
77-81.
27
The Communitarian Common Good and its Aristotelian Orgins
of the common good, but are also enabled to make structured analysis of 
this concept. Like Aristotle, communitarians tend to present the common 
good on the basis of a speciﬁc concept of man understood as a social
being. Where we were born and where we live not only constitutes our 
identity but also inﬂuences our understanding of values and virtues, in
other words, determines our morals. Any particular understanding of 
our values carries within it implied means of achieving certain goals, and 
thus also the implied essence of those goals. Choosing appropriate goods 
and discovering his goals, man must fulﬁll the roles established for him
by the community. Fulﬁllment of a given role is related to the practice
of its realization, which is rooted in the history and traditions of the 
given community. The concept of practice refers to models of perfection
in performing an activity, and thus allows for the unique role of virtues 
in the realm of social life. Not only do virtues determine the proper 
understanding of practice, but also they also connect practices with the 
project of a good life and the tradition of the entire community.
 The creation and practical implementation of a project of the
good life can be a key purpose of the Aristotelian city-state and of the 
communitarian community only if political and public actions are not 
diﬀerentiated from moral attitude. The concept of a common good can
rise on the foundation of a given social structure only if there is a strong 
relationship between the choice of means used for achieving speciﬁc
purposes and the moral interpretation and justiﬁcation of those means.
If we want to discuss the very idea of the common good, we must accept 
the existence of anethics directed towards the project of the good life 
and also permanently bound to the political realm. The organization of
common social structures, as well as the organization of individuals’ lives, 
must become a coherent whole, similar to that suggested by Aristotle on 
the basis of the politikos concept. When politics is uniﬁed with morals,
common good can on the one hand mean community-guaranteed 
education of its members on the basis of the virtues, and on the other, 
involve active participation of the maximum possible number of people 
in building the stability of and developing the community to which 
they belong and with which they identify themselves. A community 
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should therefore engage in educating its members in accordance with 
its values and the shared concept of the virtue-based life, so that they are 
afterwards capable of taking an active part in the pursuit of the common
good. Education should enhance self-awareness and practical wisdom, 
or prudence. This virtue – phronesis – is indispensable in discussion of 
a community’s shared standards. This common discussion, based on the
historically developed values, practices and traditions of the community, 
is the fullest realization of the community’s common good.
 Krzysztof Wasilewski – teacher of ethics at comprehensive school in Warsaw. 
Phd student at Institute of Philosophy at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, 
a graduate of philosophy and Faculty of Historical and Social Sciences. He is 
interested in philosophy of politics and history of ethics.
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MacIntyre’s view of telos as a critical 
response to Hume’s thesis
Introduction
 The aim of the paper is to present two distinct notions of reason (thus 
also two distinct notions of human nature) with respect to ethics and 
practical conduct. The ﬁrst one – the Humean notion – considerably restricts 
the role of reason in practical conduct while the second one – MacIntyre’s 
neo- Aristotelian notion – allows reason a more signiﬁcant role.
 The paper consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst I will present Hume’s
account of reason and its consequences for ethics and practical conduct. 
In the second, I will try to put forward possible arguments against 
Hume’s thesis and the Humean notion of reason with the help of Alistair 
MacIntyre (and Elizabeth Anscombe) and also to oﬀer an alternative
concept of human nature by MacIntyre. At the end of the second part 
and in the conclusion, I will analyze whether MacIntyre’s notions fall 
prey to Hume’s thesis and whether MacIntyre, in basing his idea of man’s 
ﬂourishing on factual grounds, commits the naturalist fallacy.
Hume’s Thesis
 This statement on morality, or rather, depiction of a certain
questionable relation in terms of language of morals, provoked thought 
and has inspired philosophers and ethicists up to the present day. The
statement was made by David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature and 
it is as striking as it is ambiguous in its consequences for any theory of 
morals:
 „In every system of morality, I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
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reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning 
human aﬀairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to ﬁnd, that instead of the usual
copulations and propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is 
not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible;
but is however, of the last consequence. For, as this ought, or ought not, express 
some new relation or aﬃrmation, ’tis necessary that it should be obserev’d and
explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely diﬀerent from it”1. 
 In short, what is Hume saying here is that the relation among what 
we now call evaluative judgements (what ought/ought not to be) and 
factual ones (what is/is not) is logically dubious at least or, taking into 
consideration the whole text of the Treatise, that the nature of evaluative 
judgements is so distinct from factual ones that there is no way to infer 
logically2 the former from the latter. What is so problematic about these 
‘ought statements’ and why such a harsh conclusion?
 As I see it, the philosophical background of Hume’s consists of two 
main arguments. Each argument is somehow related to Hume’s notion 
of reason and its capacities. Let us begin with a brief analysis of these 
capacities, and then proceed to explication of the arguments.
 In his Treatise Hume introduces two ways in which understanding is 
to be executed, from demonstrative and probable judgements. The former
provide us with information about the abstract relations of our ideas 
(mathematical truths), the latter with about relations of real objects of 
our experience3, more speciﬁcally, their causal relations. However, Hume
1  D. Hume, The treatise on human nature, http://www.philosophia.cl/biblioteca/hume.
htm, 243.
2  Let‘s have two factual sentences from which we infer evaluative ones: „John feels pain” 
„We ought not to cause him pain”. How could that be? The inference is more comprehen-
sive with the implementation of a second premise that „Feeling pain is bad”. However, 
this is an evaluative statement already and it is unclear in what relation this premise 
stands to the ﬁrst one. The case is similar in the inference e.g. that„Robert beats his chil-
dren”. „Robert ought not to beat his children”, which stands and falls upon the comple-
menting premise that „Beating your children is bad”.
3  See: D. Hume, op. cit., 214.
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claims that neither of these can provide us with motivation for action 
when we are deciding what to do. The impulse to act must always come
from passion. All that the above-mentioned capacities of reason can do 
is to inform us and discover the causes and eﬀects among the objects of
the outside world and thus to give us information as to where a feeling of 
either satisfaction or uneasiness may be found. Reason’s capacities are thus 
mostly of instrumental, bur never of motivational use. As Hume points 
out: „Where the objects themselves do not aﬀect us, their connexion can
never give them any inﬂuence; and ’tis plain, that as reason is nothing but
the discovery of this connexion, it cannot be by its means that the objects 
are able to aﬀect us”4. Reason alone (neither demonstrative nor probable) 
is incapable of causing an action and it is Hume’s famous statement that: 
„Reason is, and ought only to be the slave to the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other oﬃce than to serve and obey them”5. 
 Now, this was the ﬁrst part of Hume’s argument: Reason’s capacities
are restricted to a strictly descriptive function having no motivational 
force and leaving this force to passions. 
 Let us now think of language. If I say that „X is made of wood„, 
I make a descriptive statement on how the things in the world are. Using 
Hume’s own term, I can say that I am expressing a ‘belief ’. But if I say 
that „Y is blameable„ and that therefore „We ought not do Y„, (that is, 
I am prescribing an action, I am not saying anything about the world as 
it is), then what I am doing here (and let’s bear Hume’s conclusion about 
the nature of motivation of any action in mind) is, as Kolář comments 
on Hume, expressing a wish; how I would like the world to be. I am 
expressing a ‘desire’6. The problem however is that while the former type
of expression could be confuted empirically7, this is impossible to do with 
4  Ibidem, 215.
5  Ibidem, 215.
6  See: P. Kolář, V. Svoboda, Logika a etika: Úvod do metaetiky, Praha 1997,155.
7  The truth, for Hume, is a matter of copying and forming of adequate representations. 
Falsity of a statement or belief thus „…consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d 
as copies, with those objects, which they represent ”. D. Hume, op. cit., 215. On the other 
hand, a passion: „…contains no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any 
other existence or modiﬁcation ”. D. Hume, op. cit., 215)
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the latter. The question of whether „…desires match with the reality (are
true or false) does not make any sense”8. Or can we quarrel about what 
ought to be?
 This is Hume’s second important conclusion: not only are we
motivated by desires, denying to reason any motivating capacity, but these 
desires are indiﬀerentiable in terms of true/false distinction since only
statements about the relation of our ideas to each other, or about facts of 
existence, can be true or false, that is, statements where demonstrative or 
probable reasoning is applied. The diﬀerence is further stressed by Hume:
„Actions may be laudable or blameable: but they cannot be reasonable: 
Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or 
unreasonable”9. 
 Such conclusions however have serious consequences for ethics and 
the philosophy of action. If our actions are to be motivated solely by 
desires and if, as we have seen, no rational debate concerning desires is 
possible, then neither any action of ours nor any prescriptive/restrictive 
evaluative judgement (what ought/ought not be) is rationally justiﬁable.
In other words, unless we do not agree with others in our passions, we 
lack means suﬃcient to persuade anybody about what ought/ought not
be done. The only thing we are allowed to criticize are the means of
pursuing our goals, but certainly not what goals we pursue (thus leaving 
the question of „what goals to pursue” aside). 
 The limits of such a discussion would probably look like this: you
say that X is made of wood and I’ve veriﬁed empirically that you’re right
and I agree with you. But, you say also that Y is blamable but I’ve found 
nothing blamable in Y and I don’t know what you are talking about. I 
think that you just want Y to be blamable and to discourage people of 
doing it, but you have not convinced me.
 I have brieﬂy sketched brieﬂy sketched the Humean arguments
Humean arguments for the impossibility of the is/ought inference. In the 
next section, I will try to provide counterarguments for these, as well as 
for Hume’s account of reason and passion.
8  P. Kolář, V. Svoboda, op. cit., 155.
9  D. Hume, op. cit., 273.
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Possibilities of MacIntyre’s response to Hume’s thesis
 To present the counterarguments to Hume’s thesis, I will now analyse 
two of MacIntyre’s notions important in this respect. They are the notion
of a functional term and the notion of human ﬂourishing.
 MacIntyre claims that there are terms, and he calls them functional 
terms, on the basis of which it is possible to infer a valid evaluative 
conclusion from factual premises. One of MacIntyre’s reﬂections in
his After Virtue goes like this10: Think of the adjective to be good. We 
understand what we mean by a good watch, or a good farmer. A good 
watch measures time correctly; a good farmer gets the largest amount of 
crop together etc. We recognize these as good according to the function 
they carry out. However, the accomplishment of these functions is being 
carried out in the world of veriﬁable facts. To call someone a good or bad 
farmer is thus a veriﬁable, factual statement. Using such terms, we are
deﬁning activities, which a good farmer ought to do: „…the concept of a 
watch cannot be deﬁned independently of the concept of a good watch
nor the concept of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer; 
and that the criterion of something’s being a watch and the criterion of 
something’s being a good watch – and so also for ‘farmer’ and for all 
other functional concepts – are not independent of each other”11. The
adjective to be good (or bad) primarily deﬁnes a function veriﬁable in
experience. Tell me that this watch does not measure time correctly and 
I can immediately make an evaluative judgement, that this watch is bad. 
At ﬁrst glance, this observation in itself says nothing revolutionary
about the nature of our practical conduct in its complexity. But it does 
at least imply how, in certain circumstances, the is/ought inference is to 
be made. Moreover, it is obvious that the ‘ought’ of the good farmer or 
the good watch is not the moral ‘ought’. Of course, we would be able to 
speak of the moral ‘ought’, if we were able to speak of the good man as a 
functional term, in other words, if we knew the telos of the term man – a 
10  See: A. MacIntyre, Ztráta cnosti, translated from English by P. Sadílková and D. 
Hoﬀman,Praha 2004, 75-77.  
11  Ibidem, 76.
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goal towards which man’s life is aimed. But is this possible? Do we know 
what this function might be and is it possible to back it up with factual 
(descriptive) statements? 
 In her article Modern Moral Philosophy, Elizabeth Anscombe re-
introduces the Aristotelian notion of ﬂourishing: „It would be possible to 
bring out a diﬀerent point by enquiring about the transition from „is” to
„needs”; from the characteristics of an organism to the environment that 
it needs, for example. To say that it needs that environment is not to say, 
e.g., that you want it to have that environment, but that it won’t ﬂourish 
unless it has it. Certainly, it all depends whether you want it to ﬂourish as
Hume would say„12. And, „…there is no necessary connection between 
what you can judge the plant „needs” and what you want. But there is 
some sort of necessary connection between what you think you need, and 
what you want”13 [are my italics, not her’s].
 We can put it like this. Say [in the sense of „let us suppose”] that an 
organism, in order to ﬂourish, needs to be directed towards a certain
telos, to fulﬁl a certain function. It won’t ﬂourish unless this function
is being carried out, and it won’t be carried out unless the environment 
fulﬁls certain criteria.
 The cleverness of this observation, considering Hume’s notion
of reason, consists in an observation that what the organism needs 
is independent of our wanting it to need it (or e.g., our wanting it to 
need something else) or, more importantly for our purposes here, if the 
organism is us, that there is a gap between what we think we need, and 
thus ‘ought’ to do, and what we want. This ‘ought’ however, meets certain
independent factual requirements. 
 MacIntyre further elaborated this notion of ﬂourishing with respect
to humans. His notion of ﬂourishing is Aristotelian, though modiﬁed
to a certain degree and rather complex. I have implied already that 
ﬂourishing consists in the exhibition of a certain function – telos
12  G. E. M., Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in: Philosophy 33(1958)124,
 http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/cmt/mmp.html, my italics.
13  Ibidem, my italics.
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speciﬁc for a particular species. And as MacIntyre maintains, this or that
particular species will not ﬂourish unless it develops distinctive powers
that it possesses qua member of that species14. So I will reduce the 
question to that of what these speciﬁc powers are that we need to develop
in order to be human.
 What is the obvious diﬀerence between the telos of a plant or an
animal and its needs, and the telos of a man and man’s needs? It is precisely 
that above-mentioned tension of our everyday experience, the tension 
between what we want and what we think we need. As MacIntyre writes: 
„…the question ‘Why should I do this rather than that?’ becomes from 
an early age inescapable and it is characteristic of human beings that their 
replies to this question can themselves always be put in question, and that, 
when those replies are put in question, that further question can only 
be answered, rather than avoided or ignored, by evaluating the practical 
reasoning that issued in or was presupposed by their actions”15. 
 Thus, what needs to be secured for us to ﬂourish is a transition from 
our merely having reasons for actions (having desires), to our being able 
to stand back and evaluate our reasons for actions (desires) as good or 
bad, and by so doing to change our reasons for acting and in consequence 
our actions16. 
 MacIntyre has never underestimated the motivating force of desire 
in practical conduct; he stresses that: „The notion of acting without
desire is itself a phantasy and a dangerous one”17. What is at stake here 
is that in order to become fully human we have to be capable of not only 
ﬁnding means for the satisfaction of our passions and desires but also of
transforming these passions and desires using the capacities of reason. 
Thus the question of proper emotional responses is introduced. However,
for me, an obtrusive problem arises here: let us say that I am a perfect 
independent practical reasoner. Does the possibility of me evaluating 
14  See: A. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, Illinois 1999, 64.
15  Ibidem, 67.
16  See: ibidem, 72.
17  Ibidem, 70.
36
Peter Grešša
and eventually modifying and changing my reasons for action make 
me morally good? Does it make me a good human being or is there 
something else still missing? 
 A positive answer to these questions would present a serious challenge 
to Hume’s thesis since, as MacIntyre claims, what ought to be done and 
which necessary characteristics of the environment are to be fulﬁled for a
man to ﬂourish do not depend on his will and can be identiﬁed on factual
grounds (for humans as well as animals)18. On the other hand, to put the 
question of the evaluative ‘ought’ on factual, descriptive grounds would 
mean to commit a naturalist fallacy19. 
 MacIntyre’s answer is, in my opinion, positive, though at the same 
time a little complicated, as it is careful not to commit the fallacy. 
MacIntyre holds that a man becoming an independent practical 
reasoner inevitably acquires virtues in this process. Thus, a man exerting
the powers of independent practical reasoning is inevitably a virtuous 
man20. He possesses the „qualities of mind and character that enable 
18  So for a man to become an independent practical reasoner many factual threats and 
dangers must be avoided. Some of them threaten the ﬂourishing of mere animals, that
is „diseases, injuries, predators, malnutrition and starvation”, some of them threaten 
the child’s linguistic and reason-evaluating capacities, for example „failure to provide 
adequate stimulus to brain activity, mental retardation, autism, anxiety-engendering 
insecurity, conditions that render a child unable to control its aggression, too much fear, 
insuﬃcient hopefulness” etc. Ibidem, 72.
19  The naturalist fallacy is the argument of intuitionist G. E. Moore. The naturalist fallacy is 
committed by those who attempt to reduce the term „good” to an empirically available 
natural quality. 
20  Here the notion of „the others” is of crucial importance. For, as MacIntyre stresses, in 
articulating ourselves adequately (avoiding ego-distortions), we are dependent upon 
what we learn from relevant others and whether we are able to justify our reasons for 
action in front of these relevant others. As he writes: „When adequate self-knowledge is 
achieved, it is always a shared achievement.” A. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 
op. cit., 95) Thus, in order to become independent practical reasoners, we have to exer-
cise e.g. the virtue of honesty and truthfulness to ourselves and to others as well as be 
able to oﬀer sound justiﬁcation of our deliberations and actions. Furthermore, a bond
of receiving and giving is beginsto take place here. For MacIntyre, the character of this 
bond is more that of a caring and mutual friendship than that of a selﬁsh taking of„the
other” as means for fulﬁlment of my personal goals, a mere help to my self-clariﬁcation,
hence adequate self-clariﬁcation presupposes the development of moral as well as in-
tellectual virtues. 
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someone both to recognize the relevant goods and to use the relevant 
skills in achieving them”21. Such a man executes the virtue of phronesis 
or intelligence, that part of reason which, for Aristotle, guides man in 
practical matters, disclosing to him the nature of the good and the bad22 
and such a man will thus make good choices. The independent practical
reasoner is inevitably a good human being. 
 The ﬁnal question is: does MacIntyre commit the naturalist fallacy? 
The answer is rather complicated. On one hand, we can say that the 
naturalist fallacy is elegantly avoided since it is not clear what the virtuous 
man ought to do in each particular case or moral conﬂict with which he
has to cope. There is no stable rule of conduct; rather it is the virtue of
phronesis that enables man to „recognize what goods are at stake in this 
or that particular situation”23 and which rules to follow. What choices 
the virtuous man will make, which goods he will recognize in what 
situations, we are not familiar with. On the other hand, as soon as we 
identify the independent practical reasoner with a good man and we are 
aware of the descriptive background needed for his or her emergence, 
we have in my opinion already commited the fallacy. Thus Marián Kuna
analyses Gomez-Lobo’s argument against Aristotle’s supposed naturalism. 
According to Gomez-Lobo, Aristotle is not a naturalist since his notion 
of man’s function is neutral and descriptive and thus it does not provide 
us with any evaluative judgement. There is a diﬀerence between a man
having a certain function and a man exercising that function well24. 
However, applying this on MacIntyre’s reﬂections won’t work, since
while exercising the function of an independent practical reasoner, we 
are disposed and inclined to make good choices, and we exercise this 
function well. 
21  Ibidem, 92.
22  See: Aristoteles, Etika Nikomachova, translated from Ancient Greek by A. Kříž, Vimperk 
1996, 1140b.
23  A. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, op. cit., 92.
24  See: M. Kuna, Hume on the Limits of Reason in the Realm of the Practical: Some Aristotelian 




 MacIntyre ﬁrst oﬀers an argument on the level of language, showing
that what Hume omits in his theory of morals is the notion of a telos, a 
goal which in fact deﬁnes what its bearer ought to do. Two characteristics
of this telos are important. Firstly, the telos of every species, and thus the 
conditions under which the species will be ﬂourish, is a matter of fact, and
secondly, with the telos being a matter of fact, a distinction between good 
and bad desires can be made and thus reason introduced into the realm 
of practical conduct. Good desires (the virtues) are constitutive of man’s 
ﬂourishing qua human being, since they are helpful in carrying out man’s 
speciﬁc function – the telos. The problem is however with the naturalist
fallacy. Does the fact of carrying out a function, which is objective in the 
sense that we are capable of deﬁning this function in descriptive terms,
make us good human beings? As Gary Watson puts it, one of the problems 
with virtue ethics is that by trying to speak descriptively about human 
nature and its ﬂourishing, it may reduce the judgements about good to
judgements about health, and thus conceive of morality in terms of mere 
health and defect25. As I see it, two alternatives are possible here. Either 
we could understand the telos in descriptive terms, take it as morally 
relevant and thus commit the fallacy, or we can claim that the notion of 
human nature (its function and ﬂourishing) is purely descriptive, similar 
e.g. to the notion of a plant or animal, but that what is morally relevant 
is the exercising of this function well. In both cases, and with respect to 
Hume’s thesis, there is room for doubting that we have said anything 
important on the distinctive nature of evaluative judgements and the role 
of reason in morals. However, MacIntyre’s alternative is still one diﬃcult
to pin down. It seems somehow to occupy an area between these extreme 
positions, standing on the contentious premise that while becoming what 
we are, that is, independent practical reasoners (fully developed human 
beings) we create bonds to others, bonds that are inevitably ethical. This
premise will have to be explored in more detail.
25  See: Identity, Character, Morality, eds. O. Flangan, A. O. Rorty, Cambridge Massachusetts 
1990, 462-463.
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Responsibility as Understood  
by Martin Buber
Introduction
 In the thought of the Jewish author and representative of dialogue 
philosophy, Martin Buber, responsibility is a particularly important, 
broad and complex matter. For the author of „I and Thou” „to live
means to be questioned”1 and, it should be added, to respond with one’s 
life2. The whole of man’s existence, of a fully authentic personal life, is
a dialogue with God, conducted through the medium of the world. Life 
is a continuous listening to His Word, a listening that remains a reception 
of this Word and a responsible answer to it.
 This essay is intended to bring the structure of „responsibility” as
perceived by Buber closer to the reader. I identify weaknesses as well 
as strengths of his approach. I also consider whether Buber’s „concept 
of responsibility” can be used to solve some contemporary ethical 
dilemmas. 
1 M. Buber, Zwischprache, In: Martin Buber, Werke I. Schriften zur Philosophie, 217: Dialog, 
in : M. Buber, Ja i Ty. Wybór pism ﬁlozoﬁcznych, trans. from German J. Doktór, Warsaw 
1992. 
2 For the author „I and Thou” dialogue becomes a model of responsibility. There are 
two elements: drawing somebody’s attention and the answer. (See: J. Gorczyca, 
„O odpowiedzialności w dialogu z Martinem Buberem” [On Responsibility, in dialogue 
with Martin Buber], Forum Philosophicum 1(1996), 47). He derives „responsibility” (die 




 In the thought of the author of „I and Thou” the authentic attitude of
man, the path to the truth of personal existence, is expressed above all in 
man’s readiness to give a responsible response, yet also in his authentic 
engagement with that which is. The very answering, the entering into the
relationship, becomes an experience, an embodiment of the truth3.
 Our path to the truth of our own personal existence and at the 
same time to God’s truth is the attitude of dialogue; it realizes itself in 
us and for us in the encounter with God. A person genuinely seeks and 
addresses God when he is involved in this relation; when he responsibly 
answers His call, His word that is His creation, and interacts with that 
creation, thus establishing a bond. Nevertheless, mere encounter with 
a being, an object, another human or a spiritual entity, does not yet make 
the truth complete. The inherited truth (the truth of our humanity) is
fully realized only by a genuine, fully conscious and intimate relationship 
with God, in other words by prayer. This is how Buber himself states
it: „Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by 
means of every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal
Thou. Through this mediation of the Thou of all beings fulﬁlment, and
non-fulﬁlment, of relations comes to them: the inborn Thou is realised in 
each relation and consummated in none. It is consummated only in the 
direct relation with the Thou that by its nature cannot become It4. 
Responsibility and faith
 Faith is perceived by Buber in a similar way. He views faith as neither 
the acknowledgement as true of some doctrines, nor as conversion, 
3 On truth in Buber’s philosophy see: M. K. Kraszewski, Dwie koncepcje prawdy a dwoistość 
odniesienia człowieka do rzeczywistości. Buberowska krytyka grecko – łacińskiego rozu-
mienia prawdy [Two concepts of truth and the twofold relation of man to reality. The 
Buberian critique of the Graeco-Latin understanding of truth]: master’s thesis, Cardinal 
Stefan Wyszyński University, 2002; see also, M. K. Kraszewski, ’Emet’, Presentations 
2(2005)10, 20-23.
4 See: M. Buber, I and Thou, trans. R.G. Smith, 2nd ed., London, Continuum 2004, 61.
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the turning of an individual or groups of individuals towards the same 
object of worship and their accepting it. According to Buber, faith is the 
expression of man’s authentic loyalty towards being or God, but also his 
willingness to remain in this living bond with reality and God5.
 Outlining his perception of faith, Buber states that every human 
being that is born into the world appears as God’s creation, as a son of 
the living God, as one who is predestined to remain in a special bond 
with the Being of all beings, as one who is destined to realize that bond 
by means of God’s grace given to him and by personal involvement of his 
will and reason. Man as a person realizes that as it were innate relation, 
he realizes that to which he has been called. He becomes what he is 
supposed to become, a person, when he becomes in reality the brother of 
his own brother, when he follows faithfully the guidance of his Creator, 
when he truly „responds” with his life to the him whom he has met on 
the path of life.
The structure of responsibility
 Delving, however, into the issue of responsibility itself and outlining 
its structure, some things cannot be passed over. According to Buber, 
in I and Thou, God, addresses (whom?) every individual person (how?)
without any initial conditions, without asking whether we will even 
accept (what?) responsibility (for what?) for that which He entrusts 
to us. So He does this as though His trust towards us was enough to 
make responsibility an unconditional duty or even a demand, binding 
us absoutely. What is more, the manner in which He does this makes 
our indiﬀerence or refusal mean, on our part, disregard for His trust,
unfaithfulness, falsehood, a fall into guilt, or moral evil6.
 As a ﬁrst note to the above paragraph, it should be said that man’s
‘turning’ towards God has a metaphysical dimension. In this sense 
morality supposes an ontic foundation. As a second note: God’s trust 
5 Further description of faith in the context truth, as perceived by the author of ”Ja i Ty” 
can be found in: M. K. Kraszewski, op. cit., 64-75 and 115-124. 
6 See. J. Gorczyca, op. cit., 45. 
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is ultimately trust in His own creation. God saw and found that His 
Creation was good, as Genesis says, and creation can, which He saw and 
found good, as the Book of Genesis says. Therefore Creation can, having
potential, reveal itself as good.
 The Almighty addresses man with complete trust and, as
a consequence, with a demand for responsibility. He demands that (who?) 
we should be ready to answer (to Whom?) Him in reply (to what?) to His 
word, i.e. whatever meets us in each particular moment. Each moment, 
each situation, appears then to each one as the complete trust of God in 
him and as God’s expectation of his response, proportionate to the gift
he has received, in that situation. In short, man cannot simply remain 
indiﬀerent to these situations but must rather respond to what he meets.
(How?); with either a speciﬁc, decisive and fully conscious action or with
fully conscious inaction. „We make a response to the moment” as Buber 
puts it, „but at the same time we react to it and take responsibility for it. 
We have been entrusted with a newly-conceived particularity of the world 
and we are responsible for it. A dog glanced at you – you are responsible 
for that glance; a child grabbed your hand – you are responsible for that 
touch; a crowd is swarming around you – you are responsible for its 
troubles”7.
 „Responsibility that does not respond to the word is a metaphor 
of morality. Genuine responsibility occurs only when there exists an 
authority to which we are answerable for our actions, whereas ‘self-
responsibility’ becomes real only when our ‘self ’ or ego, to which we must 
answer, is something unconditional. However one who is exercisi real 
dialogue responsibility does not need to name the author of the word to 
which he responds. He knows him in the substance of the word, which, 
insisting and forcing its way in, in the key of some internal depth, reaches 
the core of the heart. One can defend oneself with all one’s strength 
from „God’s” presence and still taste Him in the intimate sacrament of 
dialogue”8. 
7 M. Buber, Dialog, op. cit., 224.
8 Ibid., 224-225. According to Buber, even a person claiming to be an atheist, may „uncon-
sciously but correctly utter You” to the creation, thus providing an answer to the Ancient 
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 Responding then to that word/call coming from the depths of 
particularity, we are simultaneously responsible for (for what or whom?) 
that very particularity to (Whom?) the One (God) who entrusted that 
particularity to us in giving it being. 
 We already know „who” is obliged by „Whom”, „how” and „to do 
what”. We also know „Who” is the one asking, „who” is being asked, 
and that „who” is accountable before „Whom”, and „for what” this 
„who” is responsible. Moreover, we know that giving an answer „to” 
we are also accountable simulataneously „for something” and „before 
Somebody”. Are there are any criteria or gauges („according to what”?) 
of responsibility? According to what norms, rules and principles are we 
answerable for something or answer it? It is noteworthy that in Buber’s 
case there is a certain certain problem with this. As he himself admits, 
Buber distances himself decidedly from „iron” rules or codes of behavior. 
He is strongly in favour of the responsibility of the moment, to which 
none of the universal, common and as it were pre-established codes of 
behavior or ethical standards can be applied. In his view, each and every 
moment of our lives is unique and irreplicable, and that is exactly how it 
should be perceived by us. Responsibility, says Buber, like faith,
 „... is not a catalogue of rules, in which one can always ﬁnd an
indication of how concretely to act in a given moment. For it is only in 
the given moment, and not before, that I learn as far as my abilities permit 
what it is that God is now demanding of me. And even then I cannot ﬁnd
this out except by taking this moment as my own, answering to God for 
it, with full answerability to Him accepted, and on Him founded”9.
of Days (See I and Thou). However, yet another passage from the author of „Dialog” 
reads: „The earth and the heavens are connected with each other. Whoever strives to 
communicate with people disregarding God will not see their word being fulﬁlled” (Id.,
Dialog, op. cit., 222).
9 M. Buber, Die Frage an den Einzelen, In: Das dialogische Prinzisp, Heidelberg 1965, 240-
-248, 7, cited after his, Odpowiedzialność jednostkowa, trans. from German I. Kownacka, 




Some weak points of Buber’s approach
 Considering the excerpt of Buber’s article quoted above, we cannot 
fail to notice that in his understanding of „responsibility” there can be no 
talk of any certainty of the rightness of a personal decision at the point 
at which it is made.„God places me in a situation to which I must ﬁnd
the answer and I cannot expect that he should tell me the answer, even 
in the most general terms”10. He does refer here, it is true, to a peculiar 
„impetuous sense of grace”, a kind of „impulse of the conscience” or 
„a revelation” present in each authentic and calm decision. But this 
feeling cannot, however, give us any certainty about the correctness of 
our choices, as the author himself observes. Our certainty must remain 
an uncertain and very personal certainty. Buber realized that his „concept 
of responsibility” had some limitations, as he once admitted:
 „Both friends and opponents accuse me of neither recognising the 
traditional system of values nor oﬀering any ethical system of my own. It
is true, there is a certain lack here, but is so inseparably linked with my 
whole way of perceiving things that making it good is unthinkable. If 
I were to try to make it good, I would shift the very core of my ideas”11.
 It is diﬃcult not to agree with this statement. Not only does this lack
of „iron” rules in his teaching harmonise with his ideas as a whole, but 
it may also strike us as reasonable and justiﬁed by everyday life. „Purely
formal” adherence even to the Decalogue does not guarantee people 
participation in real life. The literal and scrupulous carrying out of the
prescription of divine or human law does not automatically guarantee 
that a man’s actions are as they should be, it does not give him (or 
us) certainty that that which he does is the best thing for him and for 
others. The present moment is unruly and cannot be limited by a set of
rules, a fact that renders those rules rather abstract, applicable only to 
an imaginary person or to no one12. Moreover strict observance of the 
10 M. Buber, Die Frage an den Einzelnen, cited after Polish trans. Odpowiedzialność jednost-
kowa, 9. 
11 M. Buber, Autobiographische Fragmente, in: Philosophy of Martin Buber, Evaston 1963, 
615. 
12 See: M. Buber, Kształtowanie charakteru [Formation of Character], op. cit., 924.
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Law without „good intentions”, without knowledge of its spirit or the 
principles behind it, often does more harm than good. Morality (or, to
be precise, moralism) can distort the „face” of another human and weigh 
heavily on interpersonal relations. Religion, therefore, (orthodoxy) can 
also distort the face of God13.
 Do the above arguments really necessitate a radical break with „rules” 
and ”dogma” such as that which Buber made? Would this really make 
our approach to God easier? Would it make our path „clearer”, simpler 
and more comprehensible? We need not agree with the author of „I and 
Thou” in this question. However his extreme restraint in moving towards
equating the contents of faith and morality is thought-provoking.
Some strong points of Buber’s „concept of responsibility”
 The above discussion shows that Buber’s „concept of responsibility”
connects inseparably the anthropological, ontological, religious and 
ethical planes. All these planes complement each other in Buber’s 
concept of responsibility, creating an integrated and harmonious whole. 
Consequently, Buberian man does not need to divide his existence into 
separate spheres of religious, moral, political, private and social life. 
This also, in my opinion, deserves to be acknowledged in view of the
increasingly widespread division, in the literal sense, of human existence 
into such spheres. The sad result of these radical divisions is always
a gradual process of marginalisation of one area in favour of another. The
end result is a distortion of that area that has overshadowed or replaced 
the others.
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The experience of self in the philosophy 
of Paul Ricoeur
 Contemporary philosophy has rejected the moderns’ concept of the 
subject. It puts diﬀerently the question of how the person experiences
himself, and bases it on diﬀerent premises.
 What does it mean to experience oneself? To answer this question 
we must ﬁrst determine whether „experience of self ” is knowledge
or experience. We need to consider whether it is an epistemological, 
ontological or ethical category. The aim of the following analyses will be
to draw out the sense of „experience of self ” in Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy 
and to highlight the originality of his thought. 
 Ricoeur does not use the term experience in his deliberations on 
being oneself. He writes about recognizing oneself, returning to oneself, 
or the certainty of being oneself. What does he mean by these? The author
explains that he is talking about „discovering that which is the subject in 
us, that which says I, me, that which can form relationships not only with 
him, with it, but also with you; that is, that which can before it another 
person and which constitutes itself in the ﬁrst person among things”1. 
In trying to understand the expression experience of self it is worth 
asking what that self is. Ricoeur, in his search for a ﬁtting term, rejects
the notion of consciousness, because of the illusion of pure consciousness 
and because it excludes corporality. The notion of the I also raises doubts
in his mind. In Ricoeur’s opinion it is diﬃcult to ponder personal identity
without taking into account the other2. What the philosopher seeks, 
1 P. Ricoeur, „Interrogation et l’engagement”, in Pourquoi la philosophie?, Quebec, 1970, 
cited from Ricoeur, Podług nadziei. Odczyty, studia, szkice [Conformed to Hope. Lectures, 
studies, sketches] selected and translated from the French by S. Cichowicz, Warsaw 
1991, 25. 




namely selfhood, „concerns the best part of oneself, which has often
been called thought or intellect or even soul, namely that in oneself that 
is the most lasting, the most constant, the least changeable with mood 
and desire or twist of fate”3. Writing about recognizing the self, Ricoeur 
talks about the experience of personal integrity, of the endurance of one’s 
own person in time. But before we can interpret experience of self on 
the basis of Ricoeur’s concept some basic terms and principles, and their 
relationships, need to be explained. 
 Ricoeur’s concept of subjectivity is an attempt to reconstruct the 
modern philosophy of the subject, which was based on direct reﬂection.
The modern, autonomous I, the foundation of cognition, asserted its
right to absolute knowledge. Pure consciousness, perfectly sure of 
itself, has however been proven unsustainable. Today the existence of 
a consciousness sure of its reﬂection is considered debatable4. Three
discoveries can be identiﬁed as having contributed to the loss of the self-
conﬁdence that was characteristic of the modern cogito. The ﬁrst was
the discovery of the sphere of the unconscious. Sigmund Freud proved 
that the idea of pure and lucid consciousness is a delusion. Not only the 
ego but also the id and superego make up the I. Secondly, philosophy 
observed that the subject does not exist as a monad. The subject is only
a part of its society, which means that the other, another person, enters 
its consciousness and co-determines its way of thinking. The discovery
of intersubjectivity has eﬀectively undermined the modern idea of the
autonomous I. The third reason for the cogito’s loss of certainty was
Gadamer’s discovery of the totality of determinants in which we are 
enmeshed. Conditioning by tradition, culture and history precludes 
any rational idea of an absolute beginning of knowing. Thinking and
understanding are deeply rooted in language, in a deﬁned conceptual
framework in which the consciousness is shaped5.
3 P. Ricoeur Soi-même comme un autre, cited from O sobie samym jako innym, trans. from 
French B. Chełstowski, Warszawa 2003, 305-306.
4 „The crisis of cogito is connected with crisis of ego. The I – a rule of internal unity, and in-
dividuality of cognition and all human experience at the same time – becomes extreme-
ly debatable. Is the psyche not … rather an arena of many diﬀerent powers, events or
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  Although the premises of the modern concept of the subject, as 
described above, must be rejected, we can still ask about subjectivity. 
Contemporary philosophy asks this question, though it formulates the 
question on a diﬀerent basis.
 In contemporary philosophy the subject does not constitute the ﬁrst
foundation and basis of cognition, direct reﬂection and of a substantial
identity. Ricoeur calls it the humiliated cogito. This metaphor indicates
that this cogito is devoid of certain knowledge about itself; it grasps itself 
in an unclear and indirect way6. The conviction that the knowledge of
the subject is always an interpretation, always indirect cognition, leads 
Ricoeur to replace the I with „selfhood”, „the self ” (le soi). The return to
the self is always as it were an external comprehension7. The originality of
Ricoeur’s thought lies in this, that, in contrast to the modern I, selfhood
is not a primary fact. In order to return to itself the subject must go by a 
roundabout road of analysis and interpretation. The subject is not given
to itself directly, but in the ways in which it manifests itself in the world.
The unity of being oneself cannot be experienced as certain. The sense
of being oneself is always hazy, indeﬁnite, is a matter of faith and
attestation and not of knowledge. „Attestation is neither a kind of mental 
experience, nor does it concern something that can be directly seen, 
checked, observed; it has nothing in common with the veriﬁcation of
objective knowledge nor with any theoretical cognition in general”8. 
Ricoeur associates attestation with the Aristotelian category of being-
true, saying that „the being-true it expresses has to do with the self; it does 
this through the objectifying mediations of language, action, narrative, 
even acts …, which we deﬁne as a unity only in a symbolic way, indicating some central,
stable and internally consistent keystone?” M. Kowalska, Wstęp. Dialektyka bycia sobą, 
[Introduction. The dialectic of being oneself ] in: Ricoeur, O sobie samym jako innym, op. 
cit., viii.
5 See: G. Lubowicka, Sumienie jako poświadczenie. Idea podmiotowości w ﬁlozoﬁi Paula
Ricoeura [Conscience as attestation. The idea of subjectivity in the philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur], Wrocław 2000, 9-26.
6 See: K. Blamey, Oneself as Another , P. Ricoeur, trans., Chicago 1994, 4.




and the ethical and moral predicates of action”9. The object of attestation
is the being-true of our selves. Attestation has an epistemological and 
ontological dimension because trueness refers to our way of being. On the 
plane of action, attestation takes the form of conﬁdence in the possibility
of speaking, acting, speaking of oneself and of good conduct. It can be 
described as the certainty of being oneself in acting and in suﬀering, the
certainty that each of us has of existing as an identical being. Experience 
of oneself is not a form of cognition but rather an experience of certainty. 
In the modern tradition cogito was presented as able to know itself, to 
acquire knowledge of itself, whereas in Ricoeur’s thought experience of 
self is an experience of certainty as to the unity of one’s being. 
 In the author’s opinion the „experience of self ” in Ricoeur means the 
experience of one’s own identity and subjectivity. Identity is constituted by 
stability and permanence in time, whereas subjectivity is tied up with the 
problem of the potential to act. The categories of identity and subjectivity
write themselves into the dialectic of permanence and the moment, life 
and act. The subject of the following pages will be the experience of
identity.
 Who is the subject? This question is essentially about deﬁnition of
the subject’s identity. „Identity, i.e. the way in which the subject preserves 
continuity in time, simultaneously determines the subject’s way of being, 
and the way in which this subject can understand, assimilate itself. The
formation of an identity is (…) also a way of answering the question who? 
Self is a way of being ourselves. Self is an ontological category”10.
Up to the present day, identity was understood as sameness, and it was 
considered to be substantial. Ricoeur however speaks of two kinds of 
identity, and so of two diﬀerent ways of the subject enduring in time
– idem identity and ipse identity. Idem identity is deﬁned as sameness, it
concerns numerical identity, recognition of a thing as the same as itself. 
Identity in this sense corresponds to the operation of identifying. Idem 
identity also has the sense of quality identity, so it means an extreme 
9 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 302.
10 G. Lubowicka, op. cit., 34.
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similarity. However, change will always endanger identity if the basis of 
similarity is not an immutable structure. In the case of humans or animals 
this basis would be the stability of the genetic code. Ricoeur, though, 
is searching for a basis-of-identity characterizing personal, and not 
biological, identity. He wants a form of endurance in time that will not be 
a substance-category schema: a form that will be a reply to the question 
who am I? Ricoeur gives two patterns of the endurance of persons in 
time: character, and the keeping of a promise. Endurance of character 
expresses both idem and ipse identity, whereas keeping a promise 
conﬁrms endurance of the self. By ‘character’ Ricoeur understands „the
set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized”11. The notion
of disposition is associated with another term describing character, 
habit. These concepts (disposition and habit) give character a temporal
dimension, endow it with history. Each habit becomes a permanent 
disposition and constitutes a character trait, that is, a distinguishable sign, 
by which a person is recognized. The concept of disposition is connected
to with identiﬁcation with values, norms, ideals, patterns, and heroes.
Thus that which is other forms the character. At the same time identifying
with, for example, a particular value, induces us to faithfulness, and thus 
to preservation of the self. By the same token, the two kinds of identity 
(idem and ipse) so coincide that it is impossible to think idem identity 
without thinking ipse. Character has an ethical and evaluative aspect. 
A person is recognized by his preferences, judgements and appraisals. 
Nonetheless, despite the coincidence of these two kinds of identity, it is 
necessary to distinguish between them12.
 Idem identity, which has a substantial dimension, is replaced by ipse 
identity in the sense that the constancy and unchangingness of the subject 
have their origin in ethicality. Ipse identity is being oneself, it is something 
to be done, it is not given. It should be conceived of as the keeping of a 
promise. Promise-form is a pattern of stability over time, but entirely 
diﬀerent from character-form; it is rooted in faithfulness to the given word.
11 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 121.
12 See: Ibidem, 115-123.
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„Keeping one’s word epxresses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, 
as character was, within the dimension of something in general but solely 
in the dimension of who”13. He remains himself who remains faithful to 
committments made, regardless of physical and psychological changes.
 Personal identity combines in itself two kinds of identity: being the 
same and permanence of self. It consists of two models of endurance in 
time: the character model and the promise model. The relation between
sameness and selfhood has the character of a complementary dialectic.
Being oneself, that is, being conscious and subjective, maintains itself 
in time as the ipse identity does. Constancy of self is the only testimony 
to personal being. Being oneself is a speciﬁc way of being, endurance in
time, the pattern for which is the promise, faithfulness to commitments. 
Faithfulness to one’s word illustrates this model of identity which, because 
it becomes a reply to question who?, is possible only for the person. The
promise is a symbol of endurance in time, because it connects three 
temporal dimensions, the past, the present, and the future. So identity 
acquires an ethical character, because constancy and unchangingness 
over time are understood as moral constancy, faithfulness to self. 
 The person is a being with its own history and is conscious of this.
History is directly connected with issues of time, and that which connects 
the category of time with that of person is the concept of identity. In 
Ricoeur’s opinion time, and more precisely, the consitution of human 
time, can be shown only in narrative form. Human action creates a story. 
But only a plot joins unconnected events into a train of events. Because 
characters and action are woven into the plot simultaneously, the narrative 
identity of each character is derived from the shape of the story14. Thanks
to the plot a set of heterogenous causes and events becomes a logical chain 
of events, connected by unity of sense15. Literary narrative is the ﬁrst
source of patterns of self-understanding. A reader can recognize himself 
in one of the character from the story. Moreover, thanks to literature we 
can learn how to „tell” ourselves. Our experiences in ﬁction, with their
13 Ibidem, 123.
14 See: P. Ricoeur, Filozoﬁa osoby [Philosophy of the Person], translation from French by M. 
Frankiewicz, Kraków 1992, 40 (the author has been unable to identify the original).
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ethical dimension, dispose us to ponder ourselves. The world of text and
reader are interlaced. The connection between literature and life is realized
on the plane of identiﬁcation with a character. Identiﬁcation is an element
of character, so „[t]hrough the aspect of identifying with the hero, the the 
literary narrative contributes to the narrativization of character”16.
 After describing the two kinds of identity singled out by Ricoeur, it is
worth considering how the person experiences his continuity and lastingness 
in time. How does a person maintain his own identity throughout his whole 
life, combining experiences from the past, present and undetermined future 
far distant from each other? A constitutive element of identity is narrative 
identity. Literature is a treasure trove of mental experiments, showing 
connections between sameness and being oneself. Narrative reasoning ﬁnds
an application initially in stories, in which intriguing situations point the 
reader to the question of identity. A characteristic feature of every narrative 
composition is the synthesis of consistency, the rule of order that directs 
the course of events, and inconsistency, understood as random incidents 
or changes of fortune;17 narrative is a continuous search for identity. 
Story permits the joining of variability and instability to endurance in 
time. Narrative structure creates a dynamic identity, combining opposing 
categories of identity and variety18. 
 Human life is likewise a story. „Life is the story of this life, trying to 
ﬁnd a way to tell of it”19. The person searches for his own identity in a
story about his life, because „to understand oneself means to be able to 
tell stories about oneself that are comprehensible and that can be accepted 
by others”20. Narrative structure combines action with a person, in the 
sense that the answers to the questions who? what? why? where? when? 
with whom? form a whole coherent story21. 
15 See: David Pellauer, The Course of Recognition, P. Ricoeur, trans., Cambridge, Mass. 2004, 
ch. II. 
16 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as another, op. cit., 159n.
17 See: Drwięga, op. cit., 141.
18 See: P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 140, 143.
19 P. Ricoeur, Filozoﬁa osoby, op. cit., 58. 
20 Ibidem.
21 See: M. Drwięga, op. cit., 143.
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 The relation between narration and the recognition of self springs from
the concept of the narrative unity of life with which Alistair MacIntyre’s work 
deals. The person, in the history of his life, preserves his identity, correlated
with the identity of the history itself. „A person understood as a person from 
a story cannot be separated from his own experiences; he is involved in the 
dynamic identity of the story told. This story creates a personal identity, the
person’s narrative identity, building it from the story told”22. The coherence
of the history is shaped by the identity of the character, which manifests itself 
in his predictability. „It is indeed in the story recounted, with its qualities of 
unity, internal structure and completeness ..., that the character preserves 
throughout the story an identity correlative to that of the story itself”23. The
concept and internal unity of life have the character of a narrative programme. 
The narrative unity of life presents human existence in its entirety. Man is 
continually searching for consistency between that which seems best for his 
life as a whole with his individual choices. „First, because our aim of a „good 
life” and our particular choices a sort of hermeneutical circle is traced by 
virtue of the back-and-forth motion between the idea of the „good life” 
and the most important decisions of our existence. ... This can be likened to
a text in which the whole and the part are to be understood in terms of the 
other”24. The person, making particular choices, interprets and judges them
in reference to the overall project of his own existence.
 Narrative unity gets its importance from the function played by story 
in establishing the connection between the judgements applied to actions 
and the valuing made of characters. The narrative story about a life
constitutes a basis for aspiration to the good life. „How, indeed, could 
a subject of action give an ethical character to his or her own life taken as 
a whole, if this life were not gathered together in some way, and how could 
this occur if not, precisely, in the form of a narrative?”25 Man judging his 
conduct becomes a person from the story of life. Searching for consistency 
between ideals and particular resolutions, man is continually exerting 
22 Ibidem.
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himself in interpretation of his actions and himself. Self-interpretation 
becomes a source of self-esteem when a person is convinced that there is 
consistency between his life ideal and his particular decisions.
 The narrative function therefore has ethical implications. It is not
about life, but about the good life. The narrative component of self-
understanding requires ethical terms. Every story carries with it diﬀering
ways of judging actions and characters. Every story is set in a land of 
good and evil, is a form of making use of practical wisdom which consists 
of judgements in the categories of good and duty. 
 The categories of identity and story are closely connected to each other
because they both have a temporal character. Identity is a continuity and 
unchangingness over time, whereas the story combines three temporal 
dimensions in one whole. The story is not only a retrospective reﬂection
on life. Among the facts recounted there are projects, expectations, 
attitudes towards the future. „Narrative also treats of care, therefore if we 
take into account the beginning, care and projects, and the end, we can 
speak of narrative unity of life”26. 
 The person experiences himself as a whole, in fullness, which, for man,
is his life. For life to become such an entirety, human history needs to be 
told, it needs narration. The story about one’s life causes consciousness of
one’s own existence. Thanks to conscious participation in his own life the
person experiences himself, senses his own presence. If our life is revealed 
as ours, we realize that we are responsible for it. Freedom gives rise to 
obligation, a duty to act excellently. „…Apart from particular duties man 
has a duty towards himself, which is to lead a perfect life. … The origin (of
good) is in ourselves, in our action”27. Man participating authentically in 
his own life is conscious of obligations to himself. „I” becomes identical 
with my life. I cannot separate myself from my history.
 The experience of oneself understood as an experience of the
preservation of self in time combines retrospection and prospection. 
Recognition of self is made in time, it reaches into the past and the future. 
The person experiences himself as being the same through memory and




promise. The ﬁrst concerns the past, the second the future. Through
memory, that is, the ability to remember and recall, man is able to 
experience himself as the same in the dimension of character, of habits, 
values, and ideals. Promise, in turn, concerns the future. To promise means 
to commit oneself to action in the future. To keep one’s word is to do 
tomorrow what is promised today. The promise enables the continuation of
human action, and consequently the endurance and continuity of the self. 
Both categories deﬁne the temporal character of the experience of self. The
present is always at the same time the present of the past, that is , memory, 
and likewise the present of the future, namely expectation28.
 The experience of self as preservation of identity includes temporal
dimension. The person experiences himself as the same in diﬀerent
moments of his life. The ability to gather particular actions around the pole
called self is precisely the experience of self in time. The discovery of self
becomes a process, developing in time; as long as the person exists it is never 
ﬁnal. It is identity continually formulated. „Narrative identity constitutes
an expression of our selves if we analyze our deeds and decisions critically, 
analyze our life with regard to the realization of our self in it, with regard 
to the coming to be of ipse identity or to aspiration to it”29. The originality
of Ricoeur’s thought consists in the fact that identity is presented in moral 
categories. Identity is moral stability. Formulating identity consists in the 
aspiration to unity of self through the ordering of one’s life. The innovation
over modern concepts is the inclusion of the category of life in the ﬁeld of
experience of self. Man achieves harmony with himself by understanding 
his life as a coherent whole of deﬁned signiﬁcance.
 Karolina Dominik – Phd student at Institute of Philosophy at Cardinal 
Stefan Wyszyński University. She has M A degree in philosophy and education. 
She is interested in modern philosophy, especially in the ﬁeld of subject and
identity. 
28 See: P. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, ch II.
29 G. Lubowicka, op. cit., 226.
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The role of the other (l’autre) in the 
constitution of subjectivity and identity  
in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur1
 The problem of the other, of its role in the process of the constitution
of subjectivity is the central issue in the dispute over the subject that is 
prominent in contemporary philosophy. Many quite diﬀerent concepts
are related to the way in which the subject is understood. To bring the 
problem into focus we can think of it as having two opposing sides. On 
one side we have the modern tradition of the absolutization of cogito that 
has its source in the philosophy of Descartes and was continued by Kant, 
Fichte and Husserl, and on the other, the demystiﬁcational critique that
was provided by three ‘masters of suspicion’ (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud). 
This critique was presaged in Hume’s work, though he began with
diﬀerent ontological and epistemological premises. Hume considered
the idea of personal identity critically and came to desubstantialize the 
subject. This desubstantialization returns with the appearance of the 
postmodernists (J. Derrida, J-F. Lyotard, G. Deleuze and M. Foucault). 
Of course, putting the matter like this involves a sweeping generalization 
because every concept of the subject contains an ambiguity2. Being aware 
1 Ricoeur treats the concept of the other, l’autre, or of otherness, l’altérité, as a metaca-
tegory which comprises three meanings of otherness. He identiﬁes otherness as, ﬁrst,
the otherness of another person; otherness in this sense is inherent in the relation of 
intersubjectivity. Next, otherness represented by the experience of one’s own body, le 
corps propre, or better, of the ﬂesh, la chair, as the mediator between the self, le soi and 
the world. Finally, the otherness that attests to itself in the relation of the self, le soi, to 
itself, soi-même, which is conscience.
 The term „other” used in the title of this article refers only to the ﬁrst sense of otherness, to
the otherness of another person; this is due to the necessarily limited scope of the article.
2 On ambiguity in philosophies of the subject one might consult the work of Agata 
Bielik-Robson and Małgorzata Kowalska. A. Bielik-Robson, Na drugim brzegu nihili-
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of the plurality of philosophies of the subject, we have to ask what way we 
should go in order to be able to speak about the subject3.
 Ricoeur is one of the contemporary thinkers to have thought carefully 
about how to develop a new formulation of subjectivity. He asks how 
one can deﬁne the subject with its ambivalence; a subject which is not
taken as a foundation and an immediate identity, but is regarded as being 
identical and nonidentical at once. For the purpose of ﬁnding a new
formula that would allow the expression of the subject with its ambiguity, 
Ricoeur employs dialectic and elaborates an appropriate meaning of it 
by critical reference to Hegelian dialectic. The dialectic that is proposed
by the French philosopher is contained in the expression „oneself as 
another”, soi-même comme un autre. This formula refers on the one hand
to the Hegelian dialectic of the Same and the Other, and on the other 
hand introduces new philosophical content to these two notions.
 Ricoeur’s interest in the issue of the subject ﬁrst appears in the two-
volume work Philosophie de la volonté4. Considerations of the problem 
of the self are continued in De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud and Le 
conﬂit des interprétations. Essais d’herméneutique I5. In these two 
books Ricoeur enters into discussion with the psychoanalytical and 
structuralist critique of the concept of „subject’. In his early works he 
had not yet arrived at formulating expressis verbis the concept of the 
zmu. Filozoﬁa współczesna w poszukiwaniu nowego podmiotu, [On the Other Bank of 
Nihilism. Contemporary Philosophy in Search of the New Subject] Warszawa 1997 and 
M. Kowalska, Dialektyka podmiotu, [The Dialectic of the Subject] in Podmiotowość i 
tożsamość [Subjectivity and Identity], ed. by J. Migasiński, Warszawa 2001, 32-40.
3 See: M. Kowalska, op. cit., 33. 
4 P. Ricoeur, Philosophie de la volonté. Le volontaire et l’involontaire, Paris 1950; English 
translation: Philosophy of the will. Part I: Freedom and Nature. The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary, transl. from the French by E.V. Kohák, Evanston 1966. P. Ricoeur, Philosophie 
de la volonté. Finitude et culpabilité, Paris 1960; English translation: Philosophy of the 
Will. Part II: Finitude and Guilt, Book I. Fallible Man, transl. from the French by Ch. Kelbley, 
Chicago 1965, Book II. The Symbolism of Evil, trans. from the French by E. Buchanan, 
Boston 1969. 
5 P. Ricoeur, De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud, Paris 1965. P. Ricoeur, Le conﬂit des interpré-
tations. Essais d’herméneutique I, Paris 1969; English translation: Freud and Philosophy: an 
Essay on Interpretation, trans. from the French by D. Savage, New Haven 1977. 
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dialectical subject. The polemic with Freudian psychoanalysis leads the
author of De l’interprétation to the conclusion that the subject ought to be 
considered within the dialectical relationship between the conscious and 
the unconscious. The framework of the dialectical manner of thinking
the subject, which is particularly present in the work devoted to Freud, 
ﬁnds thorough explication in Ricoeur’s last works: Soi-même comme un 
autre and Parcours de la reconnaissance. Trois études6. Ricoeur’s proposed 
dialectical subject cannot be regarded as being ultimately nothing more 
than a facile eclecticism. It is important to see that he takes the existing 
philosophical critique into account and, deriving inspiration from and 
reinterpreting established notions, problematizes the thought of others 
in order to follow it to its conclusion, and then go beyond it. 
 Ricoeur’s investigation of the comprehension of otherness is 
conducted as a polemical discussion with four thinkers: Hegel, Husserl, 
Heidegger and Lévinas. The theoretical framework within which Ricoeur
elaborates his approach to subjectivity is delimited by the Hegelian 
philosophy of dialectical movement, the Husserlian concept of the 
constitution of the other self (being nothing more than an analogue of 
ego: in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation), the Heideggerian distinction
of two manners of being, Dasein i Vorhandenheit, and passivity which 
surpasses the intentionality of consciousness, as presented in Lévinas’s 
thought. 
 Proposing the formulation of a new concept of the subject, the author 
of Soi-même comme un autre begins by breaking with the established 
language of ontology. Ricoeur points to the Platonic opposition of the 
notions „the Same”, du Même and „the Other”, de l’Autre7 as that which 
determined the sense of identity and otherness. As the opposite of identity 
understood in the sense of being the same, du Même, he propounds a 
dialectic of two diﬀerent meanings of identity. This dialectic reﬂects the
6 P. Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, Paris 1990; English translation: Oneself as Another, 
trans. from the French by K. Blamey, Chicago 1992. P. Ricoeur, Parcours de la recon-
naissance. Trois études, Paris 2004; English translation: The Course of Recognition. Three 
Studies, trans. from the French by D. Pellauer, Cambridge 2005. 
7 See: P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 317.
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scholastic distinction between two irreducible senses of identity. Thus
there is identity as sameness8 which is expressed in Latin as idem, French 
mêmeté, German Gleichheit, and on the other side, identity as selfhood, 
which is expressed in Latin as ipse, French ipséité, German Selbstheit. The
term idem concerns unchanging structure. Identity in the sense of ipse 
makes no assertion about an unchanging core of the personality. 
 Otherness can take one of two diﬀerent meanings, depending on
which modality of identity it refers to. If it relates to identity understood 
as sameness, la mêmeté, the otherness of the other-than-self remains only 
as an antonym of „same”9. The otherness which is paired with selfhood, 
l’ipséité, which is the one suggested in the title Oneself as Another, Soi-
même comme un autre, is not (or not merely) the result of comparison. 
The otherness that is postulated by Ricoeur constitutes the very selfhood
of oneself, l’ipséité du soi-même. 
 „Oneself as Another suggests from the outset that the selfhood of
oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be 
thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we 
might say in Hegelian terms”10.
 In the paper Identité narrative11 Ricoeur states that the diﬀerence
between idem and ipse cannot be reduced to a merely grammatical, 
epistemological or logical diﬀerence, but that it is above all an ontological
diﬀerence. The question of selfhood, l’ipséité, belongs exclusively, as 
one can read in Heidegger’s Being and Time12, to the area of problems 
8 This expression is used by David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature. The critique of 
personal identity that his work contains pertains to identity in the sense of idem. 
9 See: P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 3. 
10 Ibidem.
11 Ricoeur’s paper „Identité narrative” appeared in Esprit in 1988, three years after the pub-
lication of the third volume of his Temps et récit and two years before that of Soi-même 
comme un autre. English translation: Narrative Identity, in On Paul Ricoeur. Narrative and 
Interpretation, ed. and trans. from the French by D. Wood, London–New York 1991. The 
conclusions in the paper from 1988 are close to those on which Ricoeur settles in the 
latest work Soi-même comme un autre. 
12 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. from the German by J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson, Oxford 1962, 15-17.
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connected with Dasein, which is a being that is capable of asking itself 
about its own being. The notion of ipse, l’ipséité, as Ricoeur states, has the 
same status as the Heideggerian notions Being-in-the-world, Care and 
Dasein-with. It is understood as one of the existentials that are inherent 
in the very Being of Dasein, just as categories in the Kantian sense belong 
to the Being of das Seiende that is described by Heidegger as present-at-
hand and ready-to-hand. The rupture between selfhood, ipse, l’ipséité and 
sameness, idem, la mêmeté reﬂects a more fundamental rupture which 
separates Dasein from beings that are present-at-hand and ready-to-
hand. It is only Dasein of which one can predicate being itself, ipse, le 
soi. Hence of beings that are present-at-hand and ready-to-hand one can 
predicate merely identity understood as sameness, idem13.
  In Soi-même comme un autre Ricoeur states that the modality 
of identity understood as idem is not equivalent to there being an 
unchanging base of qualities. To indicate some invariable element one 
does not need to postulate the presence of hypokeimenon. Referring to 
Locke’s thought, that is to the statement concerning the occurrence of the 
primary qualities of an object, which do not change, and its secondary 
qualities, which are changeable, one can posit identity on the basis of the 
presence of unalterable qualities.  
 The distinction between two senses of identity is introduced by
Ricoeur for the ﬁrst time in the ﬁnal fragment of the third volume of
his Temps et récit, which is entitled Conclusions. La premiére aporie 
de la temporalité: l’identité narrative. By establishing this distinction 
he attempts to solve the aporia created by the need to take one of two 
stances. The ﬁrst stance posits a subject identical with itself, un sujet 
identique à lui-même, through the diversity of its diﬀerent states. The
second stance, which is present in Hume’s and Nietzsche’s critiques, 
concerns the elimination of the identical subject, un sujet identique that is 
nothing more than a substantialist illusion, whose demystiﬁcation brings
to light a manifold of cognitions, emotions and volitions14. Ricoeur’s 
13 See: P. Ricoeur, Narrative Identity, op. cit., 191-192.
14 See: P. Ricoeur, Temps et récit. Le temps raconté, vol. III, Paris 1985, 443 ; English transla-
tion : P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Narrated Time, vol. III, trans. from the French by K. 
Blamey and D. Pellauer, Chicago 1988, 246.
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intention is to situate the discussion concerning identity within the area 
delimited by subjectivity understood as selfhood, l’ipséité15. Grounding 
the investigation of subjectivity on this plane of consideration leads of 
itself neither to an assertion about a substratum (an unchanging base of 
qualities – hypokeimenon) that would justify the act of predicating the 
identity of the subject, nor an elimination of the identical subject. 
 The liberalisation of the understanding of identity in the sense of idem 
is connected with the concept of selfhood, le soi, which is the dialectic of 
idem and ipse that Ricoeur introduces in Soi-même comme un autre. In 
Ricoeur’s intention, identity in the modality of idem, which is an element 
of the dialectic, cannot be understood as a substratum. It indicates some 
immutable element in the selfhood, le soi, whose presence allows one to 
maintain the self, ce maintien de soi, in time. That is why Ricoeur uses
the expression le soi-même. Although it appeared in the third volume 
of his Temps et récit, it is in Soi-même comme un autre that it acquires 
its justiﬁcation, which is based on two dialectics: the dialectic of idem, 
la mêmeté, and ipse, l’ipséité, and the dialectic of selfhood, l’ipséité, and 
otherness, l’altérité.
 In the Fifth and Sixth Studies of Soi-même comme un autre Ricoeur 
claims that within selfhood, l’ipséité, one does not deal with absolute 
variability or otherness. When we speak of ourselves we can point to both 
change in some of our features and the presence of some invariant that 
guarantees the permanence of the self in time. Ricoeur attemps to ﬁnd an
invariant which allows one to justiﬁably predicate the identity of a person
but which does not lead to a substantialist understanding of the subject. 
 Subjectivity understood as selfhood, l’ipséité, avoids making a dichotomy 
of self-sameness, le même, and the other, l’autre, in that its identity rests 
on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity 
15 Ibidem, 443. « La dilemme disparaît si, à l’identité comprise au sens d’un même, idem, on 
substitue l’identité comprise au sens d’un soi-même, ipse ». English translation : « This 
dilemma disappears if we substitute for identity understood in the sense of being the 
same, idem, identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-name, ipse ». P. Ricoeur, 
Time and Narrative, 246. 
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arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text16. Subjectivity 
comprehended as selfhood, l’ipséité, contains an invariant whose presence 
both refers to identity in the sense of being the same, idem, and undergoes 
the process of variation. Hence it avoids any attempt to reduce personal 
identity to the identity in the sense of being the same, idem. That is why
Ricoeur uses the expression „oneself as self-same”, soi-même, which is 
connected with selfhood, l’ipséité.
 The self, le soi, which is present in every Study of Soi-même comme 
un autre and which is a nominalized form of the reciprocal pronoun soi, 
is used by Ricoeur in order to maintain a distance from the use of the 
personal pronoun „I”, „Je”, which is present in philosophies of the subject. 
„The I” is posited absolutely. The expression „self-same”, soi-même that 
links „self ”, soi, and „same”, même, demonstrates that it is the relation 
between the dimension of stability and that of instability that constitutes 
identity. The essence of the relation of self-same, soi-même, lies in the 
fact that one cannot think the self of the person without considering 
the ‘same’. Identity in the sense of idem, which ﬁnds its conceptual
articulation in numerical identity, qualitative identity and uninterrupted 
continuity between the ﬁrst and last development stages of a person17, 
16 See: P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Narrated Time, op. cit., 246. See also P. Ricoeur, Oneself 
as Another, Fifth and Sixth Study, 113-168. The postulate of deriving dynamic identity 
from narrative composition is related to the notion of narrative identity. The narrative 
theory to which Ricoeur devoted three volumes of Temps et récit is a good tool with 
which to account for the problem of change and discontinuity inherent in personal 
identity. Narrative constitutes the absolute correlation between character, un personna-
ge, and action. The dynamic identity that derives from narrative conﬁguration: the art of
composition mediating between concordance (the principle of order, that presides over 
a plurality of events (what Aristotle calls ‘the arrangement of facts’) and disconcordance 
that is the reversals of fortune: synthesises the categories of identity and diversity. In the 
sequence of a story the identity of the character is comprehensible through the opera-
tion of emplotment. The identity of the character remains correlated with the identity of 
the very story for emplotment originates in the common development of the character 
and that of the story. Ricoeur adopts Frank Kermode’s axiom which says ‘Developing a 
character is recounting more’. In the investigation of the constitution of the subject, the 
notion of narrative identity serves to mediate between sameness, idem, and selfhood, 
ipse. The dialectic of sameness, idem, and selfhood, ipse, that is implicitly contained in 
the very notion of narrative identity, makes a signiﬁcant contribution to the constitution
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does not suﬃce to account for personal identity. This is because it does
not explain the very manner in which one can predicate the permanence 
in time of the self, taking into account its psychophysical change and 
avoiding reference to the notion of substratum.
 If we intend to speak about subjectivity understood as maintaining 
the self we must have recourse to the dialectic of same, idem – la mêmeté, 
and self, ipse – l’ipséité. To demonstrate this dialectic, which incorporates 
the ambiguity of identity, Ricoeur introduces the expression „identity 
of the self ”, l’identité du soi, which is connected with the phrase „the 
self-same”, soi-même. The ambiguity of identity, l’identité, pertains to 
the title Oneself as another, Soi-même comme un autre, in terms of the 
partial synonymy between „same”, même, and „identical”, identique18. 
This partial synonymy between „same”, même ,and „identical”, identique, 
refers to the extents of these two notions, which do not overlap. Every 
use of adjective „same”, même, functions as a comparison19. Its contraries 
are „other”, „contrary”, „distinct”, „diverse”, „unequal”, „inverse”. In the 
Introduction The Question of Selfhood Ricoeur writes: 
 „The weight of this comparative use of the term „same” seems so
great to me that I shall henceforth take sameness as synonymous with 
idem-identity and shall oppose to it selfhood, l’ipséité, understood as 
ipse-identity. To what extent is the equivocalness of the term „same” 
reﬂected in the title Oneself as Another, Soi-même comme un autre? Only 
indirectly, inasmuch as „oneself ”, soi-même is only an emphatic form of 
„self ”, the expression même serving to indicate that it is precisely a matter 
of the self, le soi. This is because it incorporates diversity, variability, discontinuity and 
instability (which may seem to be contrary to the narrative in the domain of sameness-
identity) into permanence in time.
17 See: P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 111-139. 
18 See: Ibidem, 2-3.
19 Ricoeur refers to the Robert dictionary which at the head of entries under the adjective 
„same”, même, places absolute identity, l’identité absolue (the same person, one and the 
same thing). „Same”, même, understood as sameness signiﬁes numerical identity. Other
applications of the adjective „same”, même, pertain to simultaneity, la simultanéité (in 
the same time), similarity, la similitude (analogical, similar) and equality (the same quan-
tity). See: P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit.,3.
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of the being or the thing in question. (There is thus hardly any diﬀerence
between le souci de soi [care of the self] and le souci de soi-même [care 
of oneself] aside from the eﬀect of emphasis I have just mentioned.)
Nevertheless, the tenuous thread that connects même, placed after soi, 
to the adjective même, in the sense of identical or similar, has not been 
broken. Reinforcing is still marking an identity”20.
 In this sense idem-identity, la mêmeté, is indirectly reﬂected in
oneself, soi-même. There is no analogical ambiguity of the term même, 
„same”, in English or German, where „same” cannot be confused with 
„self ”, nor der, die, dasselbe, gleich with Selbst21.
 If one wants to follow Ricoeur’s contribution to the discussion on 
subjectivity one must not overlook the ambiguity of the term même. What 
is most signiﬁcant here is the application of même, „same”, in the sense of 
identical, identique, which in the expression soi-même, „oneself ”, marks 
the second element of the dialectic of l’ipséité, „selfhood”, and la mêmeté, 
„sameness”. In other words, the phrase „same”, même, understood as identical, 
identique, indicates a certain connection between the past and present of a 
person that enables one to recognize him or her as being on the one hand 
identical, même, and on the other as being not merely the same, as is implied 
by the ﬁrst element of expression soi-même. The negation of the possibility
of approaching personal identity as idem-identity, la mêmeté, is inherent in 
the very soi. This is because, as Ricoeur states, le soi, the self, is constituted by 
two dialectics, namely the dialectic of selfhood and sameness, l’ipséité and la 
mêmeté, and that of selfhood and otherness, l’ipséité and l’altérité.
 The connection between the past and the present that is signiﬁed
in the expression „oneself ”, soi-même, cannot be apprehended as an 
identity in the sense in which Hume and Parﬁt use it. In Ricoeur’s eyes
their criticism of the relation of identity is based on two premises. First, 
they reduce the notion of identity to just one of its two modalities, that 
of idem, and secondly, they believe that identity implies the assertion of 
some unchanging core of the personality. The criticism made by Locke,




Hume and Parﬁt is aimed at the substantialist view of identity. The
relation of identity that Ricoeur proposes using the phrase „oneself ”, soi-
même, holds up not because Ricoeur asserts a substratum but because of 
other models of permanence in time which can be summed up in two 
expressions: character and keeping one’s word22.  
 The diﬃculty of Ricoeur’s concept of subject and identity that is 
expressed in the phrase „oneself as another”, soi-même comme un autre, 
lies in the very shift from the initial distinction between idem-identity, la 
mêmeté and ipse-identity, l’ipséité, to the formula „the identity of the self ”, 
l’identité du soi. Ricoeur intends to go beyond the traditional understanding 
of identity, that is, beyond idem-identity, la mêmeté. The term „identity”, 
l’identité, which is used in the formula „the identity of the self ”, l’identité du 
soi, belongs to the language of idem-identity which the French philosopher 
tries to avoid, whereas le soi, which is translated as „the self ”, contains the 
dialectic of idem and ipse postulated by Ricoeur. The whole formula „the
identity of the self ” l’identité du soi, can be predicated of a person, that is, 
of one whose way of being pertains to ipse-identity, l’ipséité.
  The very purpose of introducing two modalities of identity is to aﬃrm
from the outset that one must not reduce selfhood, l’ipséité, to sameness, 
la mêmeté23. The critical investigation that we ﬁnd in the philosophy
of Hume, Locke or in contemporary analytical philosophy concerns 
the validity of applying the notion of identity understood as sameness, 
idem. Ricoeur aims not merely at establishing the distinction between 
the two senses of identity but, crucially, at going further, at conducting 
an investigation of subjectivity in the domain of identity understood as 
ipse. In the ﬁnal fragment of the third volume of Temps et récit the idem-
identity is described as a substantial identity24.
 Ricoeur modiﬁes his standpoint in his work, Soi-même comme un autre, 
and he upholds it in Parcours de la reconnaissance, where the modality of 
22 An analysis of two models of permanence in time, character and keeping one’s word, is 
carried out by P. Ricoeur in Fifth and Sixth Study of Oneself as Another, op. cit., 113-168.
23 See: P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 116. See also P. Ricoeur, Narrative Identity, op. 
cit., 189.
24 See: P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Narrated Time, op. cit., 246.
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identity in the sense of sameness, idem, is no longer deﬁned as substantial
identity. «Attestation  can be identiﬁed with the assurance that each person
has of existing as the same in the sense of selfhood, comme un même au 
sens de l’ipséité”25. Idem-sameness, which is an element of the dialectic, 
signiﬁes the presence of some invariant in the selfhood, le soi, and, as the 
author of Soi-même comme un autre asserts, this does not necessarily mean 
that one holds a substantialist view of subjectivity.
 The formula soi-même comme un autre itself, introduced by Ricoeur 
for describing the subject, is diﬃcult, perhaps impossible, to translate
without some of its full meaning being lost. Kathleen Blamey, who 
translated Soi-même comme un autre, proposes the phrase „oneself as 
another”. But this formula fails to reﬂect the very gist of the concept of
dialectical subject which says that a person is oneself, soi-même and 
simultaneously also another. 
 Ricoeur explores the problem of the presence of otherness within the 
structure of selfhood, l’ipséité, on phenomenological and ontological planes 
of consideration. On the ﬁrst plane, otherness expresses itself through
the various experiences of passivity that are intertwined in multiple ways 
in human action. Passivity is the counterpart to otherness and it becomes 
the very attestation of otherness, la passivité devient l’attestation même de 
l’altérité26. The term „otherness”, l’altérité, is reserved for the ontological, 
speculative plane of consideration. Ricoeur intends to move from exploring 
passivity-otherness on the phenomenological plane, where it manifests itself 
on various levels of experience (on linguistic level, on the level of praxis, on 
the narrative and ethical levels), to deﬁning otherness as a metacategory on
the speculative plane. In other words, Ricoeur attempts to elicit the degree 
of lived passivity proper to these various levels of experiences and thence to 
identify the kind of otherness that corresponds to each on the speculative 
plane.27 In this paper we will take „otherness” to refer to the „otherness” that 
belongs to the meaning of selfhood.
 The dialectic of selfhood, l’ipséité, and otherness, l’altérité, consisting 
in the fact that otherness, l’altérité, belongs to the tenor and ontological 
25 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 298; Soi-même comme un autre, op. cit., 346.
26 See P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 318; Soi-même comme un autre, op. cit., 368.
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constitution of selfhood, l’ipséité28, oﬀers an alternative to the opinion
in which the self, le soi, is treated as a ﬁnal foundation. For Ricoeur, this
dialectic is the ultimate structure of the self, la structure ultime d’un soi. 
It both keeps a distance from the over-valuation of the subject found in 
the cogito philosophies and defends the subject from the undervaluation 
found in the anti-cogito philosophies, where cogito suﬀers ontological
disintegration and fracture. 
  Subjectivity understood as „oneself as another”, soi-même comme un 
autre, an eﬀect of two dialectics, opens up a new path for philosophical
investigation. Ricoeur’s concept of a dialectical subject brings new 
understanding of cogito, that is, cogito which holds itself at an equal 
distance from self-apology and negation, and to which the shortest path 
leads through otherness. One may say that this is a cogito stricken with 
otherness, that is therefore far from the autonomic and self-positing ego29.
 The diﬃculty of comprehending Ricoeur’s concept of the dialectical
subject has its source in the formula soi-même comme un autre, which is 
quite problematic. The very phrase le soi, „the self ”, gives a great deal of 
trouble to anyone attempting to give an account of it, to give, for example, 
a synonym. Ricoeur claims that le soi, „the self ”, contains the two dialectics 
which provide the full explication of the human being. That is why the
phrase le soi, „the self ”, is present in every Study of Soi-même comme un 
autre. It cannot be reduced to the „I”, je. Furthermore it does not mean 
the same as the expression l’ipséité. The expression l’ipséité pertains to 
the formula l’identité du soi which is also troublesome, for its ﬁrst part,
l’identité, turns to the language of idem-identity, hence to the modality of 
identity that for Ricoeur cannot be predicated of any person. 
 Adriana Joanna Warmbier – Phd student at Jagiellonian University 
Institute of Philosophy, a graduate of philosophy and polish studies, a student 
of „Artes Liberales” Academy (Interdepartmental individual studies in the 
humanities).
27 See P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., 319.
28 See: Ibidem, 317.
29 See: Ibidem, 11-16.
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The category of care and the role  
of felings in Virginia Held’s ethics
 In ethics, there are two basic moral categories, goodness and value. 
The former is the oldest and most elementary moral concept. The
later, relatively young, is distinct from the economic concept in which 
value is understood as a price or equivalent of labour or commodities 
expressed in the form of currency. However, in the last decade the Anglo-
American feminist movement began a dynamic development of ethical 
theory concentrating on the concept of care. One of the representatives 
of this movement is Virginia Held, who developed a theory of the moral 
interpretation of care. She does not include in her theory the notion 
of goodness, and the idea of value is not signiﬁcant. In the following
deliberations I discuss the ethics of the feminist movement as well as the 
concept of care understood as an ethical category and the role of feelings 
in the concept, and ﬁnish with an assessment of these matters.
What is the ethics of care?
 In the last twenty-ﬁve years the idea of care in ethical reﬂection
appears more and more often. The growing popularity of the concept is
to a large extent due to Carol Gilligan’s book In a Diﬀerent Voice1. The
book polemicizes with Lawrence Kohlberg’s psychological research into 
moral development. Kohlberg’s unfavorable assessment of the moral 
development of women became the inspiration for Gilligan’s own studies. 
The research that she conducted led her to the assumption that women,
led by various cultural reasons, follow an ethics of care that emphasizes 
relationship and responsibility. As stated by Gilligan, Kohlberg’s 
1 See: C. Gilligan, In a Diﬀerent Voice, Cambridge 1982.
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systematization uses criteria which are closely connected with the way 
men experience morality. These criteria are directed at justice and they
give emphasis to rules and rights. It can be safely asserted that it was 
Gilligan’s book that initiated systematic academic research into the ethics 
of care. These studies have been conducted primarily in the United States.
It was Gilligan who brought the very term into scientiﬁc circulation.
 Within the ethics of care the so-called maternal movement was 
developed. The main representatives of the movement are Virginia
Held and Sara Ruddick. They stress the inequality that exists in social
relationships, for example between the young and the elderly, customers 
and professionals, students and teachers. Into these relationships they 
introduce the attitude that exists in a good relation between a mother 
and a child, or more broadly speaking between a parent and a child. 
This is done to balance the moral qualities in the relationships. The
purpose of the operation is to do away with relationships based on a 
contract, relationships that can be reduced to the inequality between a 
person who is dependent on others, subject to power and a person who 
is autonomous, independent, who has power over another2. The author
intends to demonstrate a moral reality in which the ﬁrst thing that we
experience is relationship with others. These relations are not based on
equality. On the contrary, they reveal dependency among people. The
ﬁrst relationship of dependency that anyone experiences is that of care: if
one did not experience this relation one would not survive on one’s own 
as a child. 
 According to Held, the most precise deﬁnition of care was presented
by Diemut Bubeck. Care is the experience of another person’s needs. The
key element of comprehensive action is face-to-face interaction between 
carer and cared-for. The very nature of the experience of need makes it
impossible for the person in need to be aware of the need itself3. This
distinguishes care for or care about someone form care supplied as a form 
2 See: R. Tong, Ethics: Feminist, in: Routledge International Encyclopedia of Women, t.2, ed. 
Ch. Kramarae, D. Spender, New York, London 2000, 618.
3 See: Diemut Bubeck, Care, Gander, and Justice, Oxford 1995, 129.
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of service. In this context, preparing a meal for a child is a form of care 
for someone, whereas preparing a meal for a husband, who is a very good 
cook, is a form of service. A characteristic feature of care is the fact that 
care is always accompanied by the relation of dependence. This feature is
extremely important and should be strongly emphasized. 
 Care is undoubtedly a form of labour but at the same time it is 
something more. The labour of care is a relation and it cannot be replaced
by machines the way other forms of labour are. Care is a practice that 
includes the work of care-giving and forming standards by which the 
practice of care can be evaluated. Care must also be concerned with itself. 
It involves not only the eﬀectiveness of its eﬀorts to meet the needs but
also the motives with which it is delivered. This description aims to show
how a good care relationship should be sought. If a relationship between 
two people is based on domination, exploitation, distrust or hostility the 
relationship becomes a bad one. A good care relation can be noticed by a 
person who provides it, in relation to themselves and to the person who 
needs care. It is greatly signiﬁcant that the horizons of moral behavior
include the ideal of care, which is the relation between parent and child. 
It is essential in contacts with close relatives as well as in social life. So in 
fact, a good relation of care is connected with balancing or in other words 
harmonizing care for one’s needs and the needs of others. 
 What is the moral criterion of a balanced care relation? According 
to Sara Ruddick, an author often referred to by Held, there are two
sources of normativity. The ﬁrst one is described by Nel Noddings. She
draws attention to the fact that memories connected with taking care 
of somebody and memories of being taken care of stimulate a feeling of 
commitment. Memories of our best moments, when we were taken care 
of and when we took care of others evokes a feeling of compulsion or 
obligation (I have to). It is similar in the relation to negative memories, 
when I oppose certain attitudes. This is connected to memories of
pain caused by loss of something or fear of something, and to positive 
memories connected with something enjoyable or pleasant. The second
source of normativity is the acceptance of „practical identity”, as it is 
termed by Christine Korsgaard or „ideal self ”, a term introduced by Nel 
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Noddings. Korsgaard argues that the person who tries to understand 
himself becomes a person capable of care for others and at the same 
time person who can be cared for. In Nodding’s concept, normativity is 
connected with a certain concept of nature concerning self-reﬂection. In
Korsgaard’s approach self-reﬂection is replaced by reﬂection of choice to
be. We must be clear that this theory has nothing to do with action and 
rationality, as in Kant. The concept of a person who morally evaluate
actions is identiﬁed with an understanding of self as a person who enters
the relationship of care, values it, and exercises himself in the ability of 
caring.
 According to Sara Ruddick4, memories are deep feelings which 
form the basis of identity. Ruddick stresses that comprehension of 
these memories is neither permanent nor evident. She claims that 
the psychological record of recalled memories can become a point of 
reference in the form of „improved morality”. The change in thinking
and the creation of the development of „practical identity” or the „ideal 
caring self ” should lead to the reduction of self-deception and self-
degradement. Thoughts should be aimed at forgiving and self-forgiving.
All this should lead to the creation of new perspective for memories. 
These recurrent memories related to the ideal relation of care create a
new identity. „Ethics” understood as the consciousness of experiencing 
enters into the reciprocal play of memory and identity. According to Sara 
Ruddick, ethics of care places all our memories in a new perspective, 
changing our identity and our behavior. The author gives the example
of a person who tries to imagine himself as a citizen of a kingdom of 
care, a person who treats himself and others as people whose basic moral 
duty is to care and be cared for. She says however that it is a metaphor 
which awaits development and implementation by everyone engaged in 
this project.
4 See: S. Ruddick, Care as Labor and Relationship, in: Norms and Values. Essays on The Work 
of Virginia Held, ed. J.G. Haber, M. S. Halfon, New York/Oxford 1998, 21.
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 There are two signiﬁcant objections to be made to the proposals of
the ethics of care. The ﬁrst objection concerns the foundations of this
ethics. It was developed on the basis of psychological research and thus 
the terminology it requires diﬀers from the language used in philosophy,
and especially in reference with to the categories of care and need or, as 
suggested by Ruddick, in reference to memories. One might ask if this is a 
philosophical ethics or a psychology of morality. The doubt is reinforced
by the strong accent placed on emotional experience and engagement in 
the relationship of care as a necessary condition of a good relationship. 
However, it seems that Held understands the problem at least in part. For 
example, in her early works she uses „self ” in speaking of the person; 
in her most recently published work this has been replaced with the 
word „person”. Importantly, she consciously speaks about the need for 
normative indications for our behavior, which we can obtain through the 
ethics of care. This seems to me an essential element that allows the ethics
of care to be accounted part of a philosophical movement rather than a 
psychological one. In the latter, analyses concentrate on experience and 
its descriptions, and not on answering the question of how we ought to 
act, as in the ethical concept proposed by Held.
 The second objection is to the relativism into which Held falls, and
the consequent abandonment of two basic ethical rules: generalization 
and lack of contradiction. This is due to the fact that evaluation of each
individual care relation is not conducted in connection with general 
norms, but in the context of the needs and experiences of the two elements 
of the relation, the care-giver and the one cared for. This conviction may
conﬁrm the emphasis on the practical dimension of care or the practice
of care. It suggests that the ethics of care aﬀects particular relations and
people. It seems to me that from the methodological perspective the 
ﬁndings of Dieter Brinbacher5 in his ethics of responsibility for future 
generations are similar to the ﬁndings of the representatives of Held’s
ethics. He discusses the relation between ideal norms, which aﬀect
5 See: D. Birnbacher, Odpowiedzialność za przyszłe pokolenia, trans. B. Andrzejewski, P. 
Jackowski, Warszawa 1999, 10-17.
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ideal subjects and practical norms, which aﬀect non-ideal subjects. This
relation would appear to correspond to an ideal model of parents’ care for 
children, as suggested by Held. It also corresponds to the practice of care 
that veriﬁes our actions in relation to the ideal model mentioned above.
In a similar manner Birnbacher accuses abstract principles of being too 
general, indeterminate in content and rigid. However, he stresses that 
„practical norms without ideal norms would be arbitrary whereas ideal 
norms without practical ones would be isolated from reality”6. Thus the
ethics of care proposed by Held seems not to be relativist. This does not
mean that the objection would not be valid in the case of other authors 
belonging to this school of thought.
 In conclusion, the ethics of care suggested by Virginia Held appears 
interesting, but it requires further development. Objections to the 
connections of the ethics with psychology are not well-founded enough 
to disqualify it, nonetheless terms such as care and need require further 
philosophical working out. The methodology used, though it has certain
faults, does not seem incorrect. As I have attempted to show using 
Birnbacher’s work, similar solutions are used by other ethicists. The
form of ethics developed by Virginia Held, with its category of care and 
the important role of feelings, is an interesting proposal, especially for 
cultures in which rationality and the autonomy of the individual are 
excessively esteemed.
 Andrzej Waleszczyński – Phd student in the Faculty of Christian Philosophy of 
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. Teacher of ethics and social aﬀairs
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 The degradation of natural environment is one of the most pressing
problems in today’s world. Due to humankind’s intensive technical 
activity, in many places on the globe irreparable damage has been 
incurred and many species of animals and plants have become extinct. 
Other negative changes include a distinct rise in the average temperature 
and the occurrence of phenomena such as the smog or the hole in the 
ozone layer, the increase in the level of noise and signiﬁcant – sometimes
irreparable – pollution of certain areas. The development of science and
technology has brought the desired progress, but only along with certain 
side eﬀects, harmful for humans themselves and for the environment.
The situation requires decisive action – not only targeted at minimising
and preventing the dangerous and harmful eﬀects of human activity, but
also targeted at drawing new norms and standards that will help us avoid 
repeating the same mistakes – and bringing about the same threats – in 
the future. These norms should not be limited to the spheres of economy
or law, they should also have ethical foundations. The environmental
ethics stems from the realisation of dangers threatening the natural 
environment. The discipline addresses the problems of humans’ relation
to environment and speciﬁes the norms dealing with this relation.
 Even though environmental ethics is actually quite a young discipline, 
it has already oﬀered interesting solutions to many problems connected
to humans’ relations to natural environment. Diﬀerent solutions are
proposed in line with the guiding ethical principles and with the 
stipulated methods of protection of these principles. Good examples of 
this tendency are the ethical systems of Hans Jonas and Albert Schweitzer. 
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For both philosophers life is the most precious value. They both attempt
to deﬁne norms that would protect life in all its diversity. But even though
they both choose the same value as the chief protected one, they still 
opt for diﬀerent solutions. How signiﬁcant are the diﬀerences between
their approaches? Are they signiﬁcant enough to view the two systems
as mutually opposing? Or can these diﬀerences be regarded as nothing
more than colouring that does not change the inherent similarity of the 
two concepts? The article aims to present the chosen diﬀerences and
similarities between the two ethics of life protection – Schweitzer’s ethics 
of reverence for life and Jonas’s ethics of responsibility for life. 
 Both thinkers regarded life as the fundamental and absolute value, 
the value that demands the utmost protection and care and that continues 
to be the most precious regardless of the external circumstances. But 
Schweitzer and Jonas diﬀer as to the methods of protection of life.
Whereas Schweitzer puts stress primarily on reverence for life, Jonas 
attaches key importance to responsibility for life. Still, Schweitzer also 
stresses the role of responsibility for life and Jonas likewise talks about 
reverence for life. For both of them reverence and responsibility are 
not the appropriate methods of life protection as they in turn propose 
diﬀerent methods of life protection as more appropriate.
 Both thinkers come from the broadly deﬁned biocentric school of
thought within environmental ethics. They both notice the special value
of life and the need to protect all its manifestations. Regardless of the 
level of complexity of the given life form, every organism is worth to 
be protected and no being should be annihilated or threatened with 
injury. Every biocentric ethical system, as a system that goes beyond the 
limits of the world of human relations, needs to address the question of 
the human beings position in the ethics. The biocentric ethical systems
often fall into the pitfalls of anthropocentrism. This also happens in the
ethical systems of Schweitzer and Jonas: they both err in the direction 
of anthropocentrism. What makes them diﬀerent them however is their
attitude to humans.
 When Schweitzer demonstrates enormous reverence for the human 
being, and recognises the human beings’ privileged position in the chain 
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of being, he also recognises the role of the human being as the subject 
who realises the ethics of reverence and at the same time he views the 
human being as an entity that deserves the reverence. 
 Jonas on the other hand, while he still recognises the human being’s 
position in the chain of being, endeavours to appreciate other forms of 
being, sometimes at a cost of under-appreciating the human being. Jonas 
is being anthropocentric, but he tries to hide his attitude by presenting 
at the same time a vigorous critique of anthropocentrism. Declaratively 
speaking, his system is anti-anthropocentric, but in reality it is distinctly 
anthropocentric. 
 Furthermore, in the case of Schweitzer the ethics of reverence for live 
is also the ethics of particular cases. Schweitzer never oﬀers readymade
solutions, especially in the cases of conﬂict of interests, when attempts
to preserve the life of one being can threaten another being. In such 
circumstances, it is necessary to carefully analyse every particular case 
in point, because Schweitzer does not oﬀer a readymade solution. Every
being and every speciﬁc situation give us an opportunity to implement
the ethics of reverence, and the reverence is due to particular beings.
 And for Jonas in turn it is not the responsibility for a single being, 
but for the nature as a whole, for all living beings and for all humankind 
that becomes the fundamental principle. In his case, the ontologisation of 
life, nature and humankind had led to the loss of care towards individual 
human beings. There is no notion of responsibility for individual human
beings, only for humankind as a whole. Jonas’s ethics places people at 
large before individuals. Jonas clearly spells out that it is permissible to 
sacriﬁce the life of an individual in order to save humankind, and not
the other way round. The loss of value of an individual in order to save
humankind and obey its laws creates the grounds for accusing Jonas of 
anti-humanism1 that counters the achievements of modern humanism. 
The ontologisation of organic life and humankind, that legitimises the
predominance of the object of responsibility over the subject, forms the 
foundations of Jonas’s anti-humanism.
1 Such accusations are voiced by L. Ferry czy Ch. Boissinot among others.
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 Both thinkers recognise the insuﬃciency of the extant ethics. Jonas
presents his concept as an entirely new proposal that goes signiﬁcantly
beyond the extant ethical paradigms. Jonas creates his theory with 
conviction that it constitutes a totally new ethical paradigm. According 
to him, the extant ethics erred in the direction of anthropocentrism. It 
could not go beyond the scope of inter-human relations. Furthermore, in 
his critique of the extant ethics he stresses that it does not link up with 
ontology and is based on utopian principles. He is critical of humankind’s 
blind trust in technology, of humankind’s unawareness of its negative 
eﬀects and of its lack of ability to cope with the enormous development
of technology. Jonas condemns the extant ethics while at the same time 
he stresses that his own ethical system oﬀers a new paradigm that was not
– and could not – be present in the extant ethical concepts. 
 Schweitzer on the other hand is much more cautious in his critique. 
He condemns the civilisation strongly, perceiving its weaknesses and the 
threats posed by unlimited progress of technology and inappropriate 
use of the beneﬁts that the technology has to oﬀer. But the main butt of
his criticism is the scope of ethics, which he deems too narrow and too 
anthropocentric. His ethics of reverence for life encompasses all forms 
of being. According to Schweitzer „slowly in European thought comes 
to the notion that ethics has not only to do with mankind but with the 
animal creation as well”2. In fact, he claims that ethics should encompass 
all living organisms and life in all its forms. Schweitzer does not announce 
the creation of a new ethical paradigm, but he draws the attention to the 
narrow scope of the extant ethical systems and opts for their broadening 
by moving from the reﬂection limited to the sphere of human-to-human
relations to the inclusion of all manifestations of life. His approach is 
not limited to the critique of the extant ethical systems: he also proposes 
a new approach, the ethics of reverence. He thus formulates the main 
message of his philosophy: „I am life which wills to live, in the mids of 
life which wills to live. Therefore I am obliged to respect life”3.
2 J. Charles (ed.), Albert Schweitzer: An Anthology, Boston 1960, 269.
3 H. Gaertner, Albert Schweitzer, Cracow 1978, 31. 
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 Both these ethical systems are absolute in that they do not recognise 
any compromises or departures from the principle of life protection. 
Albert Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence is directed at everyone. Everyone 
should discover the reverence for life inside them and demonstrate it 
in their actions. Jonas’s ethics is also directed at everyone, but it is the 
politicians who are especially predestined to realise it4. It is linked to the 
observation that responsibility stems from power and hence, the greater 
the power, the greater the responsibility.
 An important element of the concept of politicians’ responsibility is the 
time horizon of responsibility. Namely, in Jonas’s system the responsibility 
is directed towards the future, it becomes the responsibility for the future 
generations, for something that does not yet exist, but that demands to 
be put under appropriate care and protection5. And Schweitzer in turn 
opts for reverence for life in the present. His ethics is fully realised in the 
present, and its subject is life that exists in the present. 
 In the above section of the paper I have pointed out several diﬀerences
between the theories of Jonas and Schweitzer. Their diﬀerences in the
approach to the ethics of life, as indicated above, are mostly linked to 
the methods of life protection. They are not related to the fundamental
principle, which is the protection of life in all its manifestations. 
Consequently, I would like to argue that the two ethical systems are 
similar in essentials, and the diﬀerences between them are only of
secondary importance. 
 Both the ethical systems are directed at all humankind and both 
thinkers with for their concepts to be universal – they want them 
to become the creed of every man and woman on the planet. Even 
though both systems are the ethics of life protection, they both take 
into account respect, responsibility and the methods of life protection, 
they diﬀer widely in the proposed methods of spreading the message.
The abovementioned diﬀerences refer more to the qualities of the
4 The concept of politicians’ special responsibility was inspired by Max Weber’s concept 
of the responsible politician.
5 Similarly to the concept of Max Weber. 
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philosophical system than to its essence. What makes the two systems 
diﬀerent is mostly methodology.
 Schweitzer points out to ethical intellectualism as a way towards 
reverence for life. According to him, the ethics of reverence can only come 
from inside of the human being. It is born inside, as a result of reﬂection
about the world and about life. „World- and life-aﬃrmation must be the
products of thought about the world and life”6. The reﬂection leads the
human being from a naïve aﬃrmation of life towards a deeper aﬃrmation
that spurs him/her towards ethical actions and is the foundation of 
reason-based ethics. And the reason-based ethics in turn contributes to 
the ethical progress of humanity and can play an important role in the 
civilisation that is threatened by chaos. 
 The reﬂection leads to an aﬃrmative attitude towards life, that is
inherently linked with reverence for life. Only the aﬃrmative attitude
can lead to reverence for life, it is also the sole attitude in which the 
reverence can be expressed. Philosophical and religious traditions that 
opted for the negation of the world could not relate to the world in a way 
that would permit the implementation of „love thy neighbour” principle 
in the ethical system. The aﬃrmative attitude allows for the discovery
and realisation of the wide range of new approaches, proposed within the 
paradigm of reverence for life. The new ethics has many aspects. „Just like
the white beam of light consists of multi-coloured rays, so reverence for 
life includes all the components of ethics of love, kindness, sympathy in 
suﬀering and in joy, peace-seeking attitude and the capacity to forgive”7. 
These speciﬁc elements of the ethics of reverence for life can only be
realised when an aﬃrmative attitude towards life is maintained.
 When Schweitzer stressed that ethics of reverence for life stems from 
reﬂection, he proposed a link between the intellectual sphere and the
sphere of morals, thus demonstrating a sui generis ethical intellectualism. 
But still, the foundation of actions is not scientiﬁc reﬂection but rather
elementary reﬂection. This reﬂection „starts from a fundamental
6 A. Schweitzer, The Decay and the Restoration of Civilisation, translated by C.T. Campion, 
London 1961, 8.
7 A. Schweitzer, Życie, Warsaw 1964, 52.
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questions about the relations of man to the universe, about the meaning 
of life and about the nature of goodness”8. This reﬂection is deeper than
a reﬂection that is limited to the explanation of phenomena perceived
by the senses. It aims at answering the most fundamental questions 
and as such it is a sapiential reﬂection. This type of reﬂection can lead
to mystique, which can prove useful in the endeavours to discovery the 
reverence for life and the will to live. Mystique can deepen the ﬁndings of
reason, it can also help to fully understand and experience the reverence 
for life, empathy, will to live, aﬃrmative attitude and the love for all living
beings. If reﬂection is the starting point for Schweitzer, it is a reﬂection
open to mystique, or a reﬂection that is complemented by mystique. The
re-valuation of mystique does not mean a departure from rationalism, 
but Schweitzer claims that the weakness of rationalism lies in its lack 
of depth (and it is the mystical experiences that can add depth to our 
perception). Schweitzer’s „reﬂection” is similar to the contemplation of
a theory which was a characteristic feature of ancient philosophy. 
 According to Schweitzer, every thinking human being can discover 
the overwhelming importance of reverence for life. Schweitzer believed 
that thanks to the use of elementary reﬂection for thinking about human
beings and their situation in the world, every person will discover his 
main message. In his theory, it is the reﬂection that becomes the key
to the discovery of reverence for life. Therefore, the reverence for life is
born inside. It is also inherently connected with the aﬃrmative attitude
towards the world, and the aﬃrmative attitude is both the source and the
expression of reverence. 
 Conversely, for Jonas it is fear, anxiety and awe that are the starting 
points. In his theory, Schweitzer’s systematic doubt is supplanted with 
the systematic fear. Jonas opts for heuristics of fear, for a tool of inspiring 
fear. And it is fear that would enable the presentation of possible results 
of technology in such a way as to inspire further anxiety about to the 
future possibilities of the existence of life on earth. Consequently, fear 
would become the stimulus for taking up responsibility and for initiating 
8 J. Charles (Ed.) Albert Schweizer, op. cit., 4. 
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actions targeted at life protection. Why fear? Because the experience of 
evil is more potent than the experience of good, and because the notion 
of good is more prone to be taste-speciﬁc. The discreet presence of good
can pass unnoticed, but the presence of evil cannot be ignored. A good 
example of this situation is the fact that we usually only appreciate our 
health when we lose it. Consequently, also in the matters of future life the 
experience of fear can be a motivating feeling. 
 Careful „dosing” of fear becomes an important issue, for, according to 
Jonas, we should aim more at a motivating fear than at a paralysing anxiety. 
Naturally, a paralysing anxiety can fail to elicit the desired response; it can 
completely incapacitate a human being and disable his/her capacity for 
making decisions. This is why a new academic discipline, the so-called
comparative futurology, is expected to deliver data that would help us 
estimate possible results of our actions. The possible results would in turn
be communicated to people in a way that would engender justiﬁed fear,
but not pathological anxiety. The estimates generated by comparative
futurologists would become the tools of éducation sentimentale, which 
would be instrumental in transmitting the fear to larger groups of people. 
 Fear would spur people into action. The choice of fear as a tool is
an important element of Jonas’s ethical system. He maintains that in 
order for ethics to be realised, it is necessary to commit the will. This
can only be accomplished by the introduction of emotions into ethics. 
This does not mean that ethics should not be based on intellectual
justiﬁcation (suﬃce to say that the principle of responsibility itself is 
based on rational foundations). But still, these rational foundations are 
not a suﬃcient argument for the implementation of the theory. A well-
constructed theoretical part connected with a psychological factor 
targeted at stirring the will is also essential. It is the commitment of the 
will that inﬂuences the implementation of ethics. There is no theoretical
justiﬁcation that would be equally eﬀective as will. When it comes to the
principle of responsibility, the psychological component is the feeling of 
responsibility, born out of fear of annihilating the future generations. 
 Whereas Schweitzer demonstrates ethical intellectualism as a way of 
arriving at the ethics, Jonas opts for heuristics of fear. The methodologies
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of Schweitzer and Jonas are fundamentally diﬀerent. The two viewpoints
diﬀer at least with respect to three important qualities.
 The ﬁrst diﬀerence is the provenance of the components. While
ethical intellectualism comes from the inside and is a result of reﬂection
and of an inner thinking process, the feeling of fear is external. The
fear is caused by speciﬁc tools, and consequently, even though fear is
experienced internally, it has to be attributed to external factors. 
 The second important diﬀerence is the factor that justiﬁes the ethics.
Schweitzer designates reason as the tool for discovering reverence for life 
and describes a connection between the moral and the intellectual sphere 
by indicating that it is reason that gives the ﬁnal justiﬁcation and validity of
ethics. Schweitzer demonstrates ethical intellectualism based on the belief 
that the arguments for protecting life come from reason. Jonas on the other 
hand points to the volitional factor as an argument for taking up the ethics 
of responsibility. Jonas’s ethics however is not based solely on feeling, it also 
makes use of rational foundations, but it is only the emotional „colouring” of 
the rational foundations that causes his ethics to be implemented. Reason alone 
and reﬂection alone are not suﬃcient for the implementation of the ethics, it 
is emotions that are instrumental for triggering action. Emotions complement 
the rational foundations of this ethical system, just as in Schweitzer’s theory 
mystique complemented the ethics of reverence. Both thinkers allow both 
rational and non-rational factors into their systems, but there is one diﬀerence.
Whereas in Schweitzer’s view the reason alone is suﬃcient, in Jonas’s view it is
emotions that turn out to be the most important. In Schweitzer’s view mystique 
is a supplementary tool that helps to deepen the revelations of reason, but it 
Jonas’s view it is the reason that is supplementary, preparing the ground for the 
essential element of ethics – for emotions. 
 The third important diﬀerence is the eﬀect of the diverse
methodologies utilised by both thinkers. According to Schweitzer, the 
reﬂection on the human beings’ place in the world leads to the aﬃrmative
attitude. This attitude is on one hand a way of developing the ethics of
reverence for life, and on the other it is a method of manifestation of 
that same ethics, it is its eﬀect. Jonas, through his use of heuristics of fear
leads humans towards the experience of fear and anxiety. The experience
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of fear is the eﬀect of using Jonas’s methodology and it is also the source
of feeling of responsibility.
 In spite of all the diﬀerences discussed above, both the ethical systems are
largely similar. First of all, both theories assume the same goal – the protection 
of life in all its diversity. They also both choose the way of reverence and
responsibility (while of course they diﬀer as to the relative importance of
these two values: Schweitzer stressed the fundamental role of reverence and 
Jonas puts emphasis on the role of responsibility). They diﬀer with respect to
the speciﬁc solutions that would ensure the protection of life. Both thinkers
are the representatives of broadly deﬁned biocentric ethics. They both fall in
the pitfalls of anthropocentrism, but they diﬀer in their attitude to the human
being. While Schweitzer makes the human beings the subject of reverence, 
Jonas makes them the subject of critique. Schweitzer’s ethics focuses on 
individual beings and Jonas’s ethics focuses on life/humankind as a whole 
rather than on individual beings. Both thinkers see the inadequacy of the 
extant ethics and they particularly criticise the limiting of ethical reﬂection to
anthropocentric matters (while only Jonas presents his thinking as a wholly 
new ethical paradigm). Both systems are absolute and targeted at everyone, 
while Jonas stresses the special role of politicians in the realisation of the 
imperative of responsibility. Jonas’s ethics is directed towards the future, 
because it advocated responsibility for future generations, and the ethics of 
reverence only relates to the present. The above discussion presents some
diﬀerences in the methods of life protection envisaged by both thinkers.
Nonetheless, both ethical systems are essentially similar and they rely on the 
same principle. The main diﬀerence lies in methodology as both systems, in
spite of their fundamental similarity, assume completely diﬀerent tools for
spreading their message. 
 Dominika Dzwonkowska – a doctoral candidate in the Faculty of 
Philosophy at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (UKSW) in Warsaw. 
She graduated summa cum laude in philosophy (M.A., 2005) and environmental 
protection (M.A., 2006). She had been the recipient of a scholarship for acade-
mic excellence awarded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education for two 




Jagiellonian University Institute of Philosophy, Cracow, Poland
„All animals are equal”: do we need  
the new ethics?
 One of the problems arising with the development of civilization is 
that of deﬁning the ethical subject, a role traditionally limited to human
beings. Advancements in ﬁelds such as medicine are one of the factors
which contribute to the large-scale extermination of animals, not only for 
the purpose of human survival, as in the use of animals in medical expe-
riments, but also for the purpose of entertainment and pleasure. On the 
other hand, thanks to the development of science we now have greater 
knowledge of animal organisms than we did in the past; we know their 
psychological and physical features (e.g. feeling pain). With an increasing 
„awareness” of animals comes a demand from many for a more human 
treatment of animals.
 For some of these people, it is not enough to demand the elimina-
tion of animal suﬀering; they demand that animals no longer be treated
as objects, and they propose changing the human – animal relationship 
from one of subject – object (of proprietary character) to one of subject 
– subject. Some scholars advocate treating animals as one would a per-
son (this usually applies to animals which are most similar to the human 
species)1 or at least treating them as ethical subjects without comparing 
them to humans. For some people it is not enough to expand the concept 
of a person since such expansion is precisely a sign of species discrimi-
nation. „In searching for an honest and consistent ethic, if one believes 
that humans have rights, we ﬁnd that there are no legitimate grounds for
1 e.g. Great Ape Projects, an international organization foundend in 1993 by Paola 
Cavalieri and Peter Singer (who also edited a book of the same name). They advocate 
for the subjecthood of great apes, and an United Nation Declaration of the Rights of 
Great Apes that would confer basic legal rights on non-human great apes. Singer holds 
that this does not contradict the equality of all animals.
88
Żaneta Oczkowska
rejecting rights for all other animals” write Matthew Ball and Jack Norris 
in their manifesto2.
 One of the most active philosophers in this ﬁeld is Peter Singer, a
creator of theory as well as an activist of the animal liberation movement. 
Singer is not the ﬁrst scholar to apply the concept of moral standing to
animals but his book is widely considered, within the animal libera-
tion movement, to be the founding philosophical statement of its ideas. 
According to Singer we need an entirely new ethics. This new system
would apply not only to human beings but also to animals, and would 
thus raise some new important questions. Who, would be the subject of 
this new ethics? What would be its main principle? Is the aim of this eth-
ics, full equality between animals and people, achievable? Do we really 
need a new ethics? Would it be the best way of protecting animals?
 In 1975 Singer published a book entitled Animal Liberation3, the 
book which manz call the bible of the liberation movement. Singer him-
self became very important for any organization ﬁghting for animals’
rights. What is interesting is the fact that Singer himself does not expli-
citly say anything about equal rights in the legal sense. Singer’s ambition 
is to create a brand new ethical system, which would include not only 
human beings but also animals, and within which animals would be tre-
ated as rightful ethical subjects (not mere objects, or even subjects, of our 
relation).
 As he himself states, Singer does this not from any particular feeling 
of sympathy for animals. As he says, many people who declare „love for 
animals” are at the same time tyrants in their relation to animals because 
they impose their own view of life on them. Morever, they do not mind 
taking part in imposing suﬀering on animals, perhaps not directly but by
eating meat or wearing leather shoes. 
 Today, at least in theory, we may say that the principle „men are born 
equal and remain equal” is respected since discrimination is prohibited 
2 See: M. Ball, J.Norris, Beyond Might Makes Right, www.veganoutreach.org/advocacy/bey-
ond.html.
3 P. Singer Animal Liberation , Harper Perennial, 2001, ﬁrst edition 1975.
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by law. At the same time we can ask what the grounds of human equality 
are. The most straightforward answer is similiarity. How, then, shall we
treat this principle in the context of animals? (Should someone consider 
the problem of animal equality to be misconceived, comic, or unjusti-
ﬁed, let him recall cases such as the history of women’s struggle for equal
rights, a matter which was also controversial, and equally so, not long 
ago.) The acceptance of animal equality is, in Singer’s opinion, the logical 
consequence of demanding equality for women, or African Americans 
in the US, or for any another minority social group. No reasonable man 
denies that there are a lot of diﬀerences between people and animals.
Neither does Singer. But in his opinion, if we start to analyze the problem 
of equality we have to admit that racism and sexism are simply evil. 
 When we talk about equality we do not mean equality in an empirical 
sense. Human beings do obviously diﬀer when it comes to their sensibil-
ity, intelligence, sex and race but this diﬀerence is not suﬃcient reason
for granting them diﬀerent rights. Equality is an ethical idea, not a factual
statement. The consequence of the application of the equality principle
is an admission that we respect everyone’s interests without regard for 
their abilities. „The basic principle of equality does not require equal or
identical treatment, it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration 
for diﬀerent beings may lead to diﬀerent treatment and diﬀerent rights”4. 
We should therefore demand diﬀerent treatment for pigs and for babies,
or for handicapped people. We do not demand voting right for animals; 
likewise, children do not have this right, for the simple reason that they 
are incapable of understanding the signiﬁcance of voting.
 There is one very important point here. Singer does not use the cate-
gory of rights in regard to animals. In his opinion it is a very convenient 
shortcut used by the opponents of animal equality who say that only 
a conscious, autonomous creature can be a subject of rights. Animals do 
not have these properties. If we talk about rights, we face the problem 
of responsibility. It sounds quite nonsensical when applied to animals. 




bility) has to be rational. Only the human being is recognized as rational, 
and on this premise, only the human being has a special position in the 
world of nature and the right to govern another species. This attitude, de-
ﬁne as moral anthropocentrism or speciesism, is very often attributed to
Immanuel Kant5. Some philosophers defend Kant and argue that Kant’s 
attitude toward animals is in fact very similar to that of the defenders of 
animals6. 
 Utilitarianism is the most commonly favoured philosophy among tho-
se animal status theorists who are not Kantians. It is not uniform, and not 
every version serves the contemporary postulates of animal equality. 
 For many utilitarians Jeremy Bentham is the „godfather” of the ani-
mal liberation movement. Bentham gives strong arguments not only 
against injustice to animals and against indiﬀerence to their suﬀering,
but also against man being accorded a special status on the grounds of 
being rational. According to Bentham the basis of our relationship with 
animals is not the ability to reason or speak, but the ability to suﬀer. In
this way Bentham broadens the idea of the moral and ethical subject.
Bentham writes:
 „The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by 
the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the black-
ness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned 
without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be 
recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, of the 
termination of os sacrum are reasons equally insuﬃcient for abandon-
ing a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace 
the insuperable line? Is is the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of 
discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more 
5 Singer’s interpretation of Kant is much too simplistic. Kant is not the only philosopher 
„guilty” of speciesism.
6 See: P. Łuków Kantowskie obowiązki wobec przyrody –człowiek a pozostałe zwierzęta, 
in: Świadomość środowiska, ed. Włodzimierz Galewicz, Kraków 2004, 64.
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rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant or a day 
or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what 
would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk?,
but Can they suﬀer?”7.
 Singer builds his conception mainly on Bentham’s views, but we can 
not pass over the standpoint of another very important utilitarian phi-
losopher, J.S. Mill, and his concept of qualitative diﬀerences between plea-
sures, which undermines Betham’s arguments. Mill distinguishes higher and 
lower pleasures and in his opinion there is a fundamental moral diﬀerence
between animals and human beings. Mill stated this diﬀerence bluntly: „It 
is better to be an unhappy human being than a happy pig”. Mill disagrees 
that ability to suﬀer should be singled out as an important moral feature.
The character and quality of experience are indeed important, as is the
posession of a capacity to feel in some way that other species do not. 
 Thus not every kind of utilitarianism is helpful in defending animal
equality. We can even state that some utilitarian theories can in fact lead 
to speciesism. Only by rejecting diﬀerentiation of the quality of pleasures
and narrowing utilitarianism to Bentham’s views are we able to include 
animals as the subjects of our moral sensibility. 
 „The capacity for suﬀering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having 
an interest at all, a condition that must be satisﬁed before we can speak
of interests in a meaningful way.(...) The capacity for suﬀering and enjoy-
ment is, however, not only necessary, but also suﬃcient for us to say that
a being has interests -an absolute minimum, an interest not suﬀering”8. 
 Singer follows Bentham’s criterion of the capacity to suﬀer, and makes
it a necessary and suﬃcient condition of inclusion in an ethical system,
which allows his ethical system to consider all creatures sharing with this 
characteristic to be equal subjects. Only the being who can suﬀer has an
interest in it and no diﬀerences can be identiﬁed in the extent of suﬀering
7 J. Bentham, Introduction to Priciples of Morals and Legislation, cit. P. Singer Animal 




– every suﬀering counts equally. This criterion excludes inanimate nature 
from ethical protection. A stone or a tree does not suﬀer so they have no
interest in becoming an ethical subject, but, it should be noted, neither 
would every representative of the animal world be granted this status.
 Science seems to be the only instrument by which the boundary be-
tween who or what can and cannot become an ethical subject is estab-
lished. Singer is imprecise and somewhat arbitrary in regard to what (or 
who) is able to feel pain. The problem lies not just in the practical use
of the rule, but also in its theoretical justiﬁcation. The ethical principle
of minimizing suﬀering brings many dilemmas and many controversial
consequences for both animals and human beings. Let us take a look at 
some of them.
 If the criterion of respecting somebody’s interest is suﬀering, then
what about animals which, as the result of medical experiments (for in-
stance genetic engineering) do not have the ability to feel pain? Do we 
have a right to kill them? Following this train of thought, human beings 
whose brain is damaged in such a way that they can feel no pain co-
uld also be killed and it would not be considered a negative action in 
the ethical sense. More importantly, we have to ask if they would still be 
ethical subjects. The answer is ‘no’. Thus Singer’s ethical sphere would be
extended to some animals, but at the same time it would exclude some 
human beings. 
 Yet another side of this problem is that science is imperfect, or in-
complete. Our knowledge of the living organism and its ability to feel 
pain may change. So in fact man judges the ability to suﬀer by using his
own instrument, science. This could be considered anthropocentrism.
 This brings us to the most important objection to Singer’s standpoint,
namely that it leads to speciesism in the same way as the traditional eth-
ics based on the understanding of the moral subject as rational does. 
Admittance to the moral community is by being judged to be suﬃciently
similar to human beings in some way, in this case the ability to feel pain. 
It is a human point of view to refer to matters important exclusively to 
human beings. Singer writes: „To avoid speciesism we must allow that 
beings who are similar in all relevant respects have a similar right to life 
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– and mere membership in our own biological species can not be a mor-
ally relevant criterion for this right”9.
 Does Singer not trap himself?  Doesn’t his rule lead, not to equal-
ity, but to equalization of animals and human beings in accordance with 
human standards? By looking for human features among other species 
we do manifest a kind of anthropocentrism. Gary Francione criticizes 
Singer’s proposed new ethics for this reason. He writes: 
 „Unfortunately for the present time, the welfarist position of Peter 
Singer is informing the movement. This position claims that advocates
should support any measure that „reduces suﬀering.” This theory has had
disastrous practical results. Nearly any proposed change, such as giving 
an extra inch of space to a battery hen, or eating only non-crate veal, can 
be portrayed as reducing suﬀering. Singer’s theory allows large, multi-
-million-dollar animal welfare organizations to come up with moderate 
campaigns and then to demand that we all jump on the bandwagon be-
cause this will „reduce suﬀering.” Under Singer’s theory, it would make
sense for animal exploiters to make things as horrible as they can for 
animals in order to be able to „reduce suﬀering” and thereby make small
concessions to activists. That is precisely what the exploiters are doing,
with McDonalds’ so-called „improvements” being a perfect example of 
the problem. And the „movement” is buying into this because Singer has 
declared that these insigniﬁcant changes will „reduce suﬀering”10. 
 Francione accuses Singer of being speciesist himself because the rule 
of suﬀering is one drawn up in a human perspective. „How „like us” do
these animals have to be before they get „promoted” in this hierarchy?11 
He proposes instead just one right suitable for animals: the right not to 
be property. An ethical system of this kind should be based simply on the 
ability to feel, without any speciﬁcations.
 Some people believe that the life of every being is sacred. Many of 
them are opponents of abortion and euthanasia. In Singer’s opinion, it 
9 Ibidem, 19.
10 An Interview with Professor Gary L. Francione on the State of the U.S. Animal Rights 




would be more accurate to describe this view as „the sanctity of human 
life”, because the followers of this principle do not usually oppose the 
killing of nonhuman animals12. For Singer this is a sign of hypocrisy and 
speciesism. 
 Where does this criticism of Singer’s lead us? For Singer killing a 
mouse or causing one to suﬀer for a higher human interest (for instance,
in medical experimentation, for the purpose of rescuing human life) is 
reprehensible, but killing an infant with serious brain damage, in the 
name of minimizing suﬀering, is not. Singer writes „It is not arbitrary
to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, 
of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so 
on, is more valuable then the life of a being without these capacities”13. 
The life of animals, which have these capacities developed more than an
intellectually disabled human being, is more valuable than that of that 
human being. It is one of the most radical consequences of opposition 
to speciesism and to the defenders of human life. The question is wheher
Singer really accepts this view or is trying rather to show his opponents 
its consequences. 
 In both Animal Liberation and Rethinking Life and Death: The
Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics Singer announces with satisfaction the 
collapse of western ethics based on Christian values, ethics with a strong 
belief in the special position of the human being in the world of nature 
and the doctrine of the sacredness of life from conception until natural 
death. Singer regards the rules of the old ethics as incoherent and out of 
date due to medical development, and he postulates the creation of more 
ﬂexible moral rules which would be adaptable to progressive technology
and knowledge.
 Singer does not accept any of the current ethical systems, except 
Bentham’s. The creators of these ethics were not interested in the treat-
ment of animals, or worse, under pretended concern were in fact spe-
ciesist. So, as Singer states, we need to accept new principles of ethics, 
12 See: P. Singer, Animal Liberation, op. cit., 17-18.
13 Ibidem, 20.
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principles of the moral equality of human beings and animals. Only in 
this way we will be able to end the tyranny of human beings.This view is
debatable.
 One of the problems is the legitimacy, justiﬁcation and fairness of the
main ethical principle. Another problem is understanding the ideas and 
using them in practice. These problems make it harder to treat Singer’s
system as sound one. Some of the consequences of using the principle in 
practice are disturbing, especially when it comes to the human species.
 However, the most important question is whether this system does 
in fact better protect the rights of animals. It would seem that we can 
take care of animals and of the whole of nature without any new ethical 
system, especially without one with such a controversial principle of the 
moral equality of human beings and animals. It also seems that we do not 
have to give up the idea of reason and culture.
 It is undoubtedly important that Singer pays attention to the question 
of the treatment of animals. Our relation with animals is a measure of our 
humanity. Singer’s view is a voice in a broader discussion, but it is not the 
crucial one.
 Żaneta Oczkowska – philosopher, lawyer, Phd student at Jagiellonian 
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Double eﬀect reasoning and the question
of surgical separation of conjoined twins
Introduction
 The aim of the paper is to outline the moral debate over the surgical
separation of conjoined twins, speciﬁcally looking at the case of Jodie and
Mary, whose destiny was determined not only by their body’s structure, 
but also by medical intervention1. I will analyse the cardinal issue of this 
case, the question of whether the doctors’ intervention, which sacriﬁced
Mary’s life to save Jody’s, can be justiﬁed. As a possible solution to this
Solomonic dilemma I analyse the principle of double eﬀect reasoning
which I think can, when properly applied, lead us to a justiﬁcation of the
act of surgical separation of Mary and Jody. To this end, I ﬁrst explain
the case of the named conjoined twins, then I brieﬂy deﬁne categories
like body, identity and separateness in relation to the body shape of the 
conjoined twins. I then introduce the principle of double eﬀect reasoning
(DER) and going into its details use it in determining the question of the 
moral permissibility of the separation. 
Jodie and Mary
 Jodie and Mary were born as conjoined twins to Maltese parents in 
Great Britain, in 2000. The predictions for their future were bleak. The
girls were captives in a very tragic form of the human body; medicine 
stated from the beginning that they could not survive in their sad 
condition. 
1  I say „their body’s structure” on purpose, because as will become clear I argue against 
the view that conjoined twins are „just two entangled singletons”.
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 „…Mary was incapable of respiration, with a heart too underdeveloped 
to pump blood through her body. In addition, she suﬀered serious
anomalies of the brain. Had she been born a singleton, she would have 
died at birth. While Mary’s heart and lungs were virtually useless, Jodie’s 
were strong and healthy, and because of their conjoined circulatory 
system, Jodie’s organs kept both girls alive”2. 
 Now, the question was: is it legal, moral, permissible, to bring Mary’s 
life to an end and so to save Jodie’s? The parents refused the separation
and decided to give their children’s lives into the hands of God3. Surgeons 
however were strongly recommending an operation to separate the 
girls, and that is why the case appeared before the Court of Appeal. The
decision of the three law lords was a justiﬁcation of the separation of the
twins, despite it being a lethal act which resulted in Mary’s death4. 
 Before I proceed to my attempt to answer this question, I need 
to have a closer look at the category of „human body”, since it is very 
important when discussing the problem of conjoined twins. We must 
see how we understand the human body and, consequently, the human 
form of conjoined twins, as diﬀerent understandings can obviously lead
to diﬀerent reasoning in making decisions concerning their separation.
2  A.K. Suziedelis, Conjoined twins: The ambiguity of double eﬀect reasoning, Medical Ethics 
& Bioethics, 8(2001)3-4, 3. 
3  David B. Waisel stands up for the decision of the parents. He understands the doctors 
and their motivation, but the last word in the case of separation should belong to the 
parents. „And although the argument that separation is Jodie’s sole chance is emotion-
ally powerful, that argument does not permit overruling parents. Indeed, parents are 
permitted to forgo chances for their children in the absence of convincing risks and 
beneﬁts.” D.B. Waisel, Moral Permissibility as a Guide for Decision Making About Conjoined 
Twins, http://www.anesthesia-analgesia.org/cgi/reprint/101/1/41.pfd, 42. Annas also 
points out the neglect of parental consent. He says, „I would like to have had the parents 
agree to the separation (since giving Jodie a chance to live at the cost of cutting Mary’s 
life short does seem the lesser of two evils), but I do not believe the case for separation 
is so strong that it demands that the authority to make the decision about the medical 
case of their children be taken away from the parents.” G.J. Annas, Conjoined Twins – The 
Limits of Law at the Limits of Life, The New England Journal of Medicine, 334(2001)14, 
1108. 
4  „The trial-court judge concluded that separation was in the best interests of both chil-
dren and that separation was not a case of killing Mary but one of passive euthanasia in 
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Body
A. Physical separateness of a body is not a necessary attribute 
 At the beginning of the debate over what the human body is, there is 
a general assumption that the „normal” form of the human body includes 
being physically separated from other bodies. If we understand body only 
according to this rigid model of physical separateness our chauvinistic 
view may mean we fail to recognize other human forms, and our chance 
of understanding them could be low. Can we name precisely the necessary 
attributes of a normal human body?5. I fear we cannot draw a line between 
the features that are necessary characteristics of the human body and 
those which would lead one to say that a body possessing them is to be 
treated as defective. „The fact that being conjoined is statistically of low
probability is not enough to make it a defect”6. If we cannot make this 
distinction, it is diﬃcult to say what is still normal, and what no longer
is, what is out with normality, in regard to the human body. Bratton and 
Chetwynd (inﬂuenced by Foot, Millikan) argue:
 „The evolution of a species is, however, related to an environment.
Our point is that the human environment, within which we evolve, 
has, through medical science and public health, changed characteristics 
which her food and hydration would be withdrawn (by clamping oﬀ her blood supply
from Jodie)”. G.J. Annas, op. cit, 1104. The judges reached this decision, but the argu-
ments they provided were very diﬀerent. While Lord Justice Alan Ward accused Mary of
killing Jodie and thus making a decision to kill Mary justiﬁable homicide, a case of„quasi
self -defense”, Lord Justice Robert Brooke argued that Mary was self-designated to a 
very early death and he argued for the doctrine of necessity, which he believed justiﬁes
the necessary defense of the lesser evil, and Lord Justice Robert Walker supported and 
developed this argument using the doctrine of double eﬀect reasoning and stressing
that although Mary’s death was necessary it was not intentional but was an inevitable 
consequence. See: M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, One into two will not go: Conceptualizing 
conjoined twins, Journal of Medical Ethics, (2004)30, 279-285; http://www.hartpub.co.uk/
updates/pdfs/cl-med.pdf.
5  I believe that the „one brain – one body” model cannot be the answer, because then we 
would be not able to explain such cases as split brain, multiple personalities, schizo-
phrenia etc. 
6  M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, op. cit., 282.
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which would have been so disadvantageous as to preclude the survival 
of an individual long enough to reproduce. Such characteristics may still 
be disadvantageous, but they do not rule out survival and reproduction. 
Thus the standards for humans are determined in part by developments
in human societies and sciences”7.
 To talk about conjoined twins, we need ﬁrst to be aware of the fact
that body shape is not something which must strictly ﬁt the only model
expected by a society inﬂuenced by cultural assumptions. Bratton and
Chetwynd write that Alice Dreger „argues that the body is a ﬂexible
concept that cannot be pigeonholed into a discrete category”8. They
develop her idea and point out that „we singletons cannot conceive of 
conjoined life and so also have a distorted view of it. We do not see things 
as they are, but as we are”9. 
 I must also stress that if we want to talk about conjoined twins, we 
have ﬁrst of all to liberate ourselves from our prejudices and stereotypes.
We should not take as a starting point the idea that conjoined twins are 
deformed human beings. After coming to this awareness we can begin to
discuss their identity, dignity and best interests. 
B. Conjoined twins as two persons in one body
 „Persons who bear names as Jodie or Mary, are separate individuals 
both in nature and in ordinary perception”10. Are these twins two 
singletons in one continuum of skin? Is only Jodie a person and Mary 
merely her parasitic part? Are they both persons sharing one body? 
The relation between Mary and Jody is the source of the diﬃculty in 
understanding their status and their rights and duties. Diﬀerent decisions
about their separation were proposed because of the lack of the „standard 
deﬁnition” of the relation.
7  Ibidem, 282.
8  Ibidem, 283.
9  Ibidem, 283.
10  M. Y. Barilan, One or two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins from 
Malta. Journal of Medicine&Philosophy, 28(2003)1, 28.
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 To treat Mary as a parasitic twin of Jody is not possible, as although 
her brain was badly damaged she was born with all the features of human 
kind, so we do not need to take this possibility into consideration11. In 
this paper I argue that conjoined twins12 are two people in one body (and 
not two people with their own bodies). When I say human body, what 
I have in my mind is the concept of some complex, which possesses all 
the features typical of the human species and which exists in one spatio-
temporal reality. So by this deﬁnition, I understand conjoined twins as
one complex body, which must be treated as one complex, and not merely 
as two bodies tied together by skin. As Barilan writes in his article, „The
Maltese was individuated from its mother and from all other people, but 
Jody had not been individuated from Mary prior to the operation”13. 
I also support the understanding of the conjoined twins as two persons 
in one body. If they were to be considered as two bodies, they would have 
to have been separated, as two bodies usually are. Knowing they were not 
distinct from each other, we cannot say that they were two bodies „just” 
tied together. There is a general tendency to argue that in spite of the
occupation of one body by two persons, the doctors can identify precisely 
which organ belongs to whom, and that for this reason we should see 
conjoined twins and their personalities as two singletons. Nevertheless, 
I lean towards the opinions that say conjoined twins cannot be seen as 
two singletons each occupying and having a right over „its own” part of 
11  If we considered Mary to be parasitic, then we would be forced to make this conclusion 
also about people with brain death or in a vegetative state, and about people with very 
low levels of intelligence, and this I assume we do not want to do.
12  The understanding of the body shape of the conjoined girls is also about the way we 
use language, how we understand the reality. To designate twins like Mary and Jody as 
„conjoined twins” can be misleading. There are some calls for reconsidering the use of 
this term (referring to the politically incorrect analogical term „siamese twins”), because 
the word „conjoined” naturally evokes the idea that something separate was subse-
quently con-joined, but this is not true about these twins, as they were joined from a 
very early stage of their prenatal development and were born in one body. 
13  Although Barilan indicates their common body in this idea, realizing there are two 
persons occupying it, he uses the pronoun „was”, when talking about the girls. I would 
prefer to say „their body was”, and „the girls (Maltese) were„ (still talking about the pre-
operation state). M. Y. Barilan, op.cit., 30.
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the body. „Being conjoined twins is a unique experience indeed. It is not 
adding one person to another, but an altogether diﬀerent form of human
existence”14. Bratton and Chetwynd, under the inﬂuence of Dreger, state
that. 
 „This view seems to make a case for considering conjoined twins as
two individuals, psychologically separate, part of whose individuality is 
constituted by being conjoined. That is to see them as essentially, rather
than accidentally joined. This may encourage viewing their situation
not as one in which each twin is a problem for the other, to be solved 
by contractual style negotiation, but where they both face a common 
problem and in which they have joint interests”15.
 We can proceed to the question of the relation between the conjoined 
twins themselves, between them as personalities, only if we are aware 
of their relation to the body and try to understand it. The judges of the
Court of Appeal based their decisions on the common assumption that 
the relation between the girls is one of competition over a body and 
they strongly favoured the stronger (Jody) „competitor”16. This opinion
follows from their assumption that Mary and Jodie are two bodies mixed 
together by an anomalous development and predestined to a tragic end. 
I am not going to analyze here the judges’ decisions about the surgical 
separation of Mary and Jodie and their statements, I want only to show 
that the basis of their judgments is very weak and of doubtful validity, if 
we (in contrast to the judges) treat the twins as two persons in one body, 
which they are not supposed to compete over, but to share. As Annas 
says, „The problem is that once the twins are separated verbally, it is only
a matter of time before they will be separated surgically”17. I do not want 
14  Ibidem, 33.
15  M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, op. cit., 283.
16  Especially Lord Justice Alan Ward, who accuses Mary of sucking Jodie’s life-blood treats 
Mary as being parasitic and killing her sister. He goes even further in his argumentation 
and he also „knows” what Jodie would have said to Mary, if she had had the ability to 
speak: „Stop it, Mary, you are killing me”. G.J. Annas, op. cit., 1007. This claim seems to me 
terribly audacious, and I cannot see any good grounds for making it. 
17  G.J. Annas, op. cit.,1107.
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to seem to argue for not separating the conjoined twins, I merely hold that 
their separation should be required not for reasons such as a chauvinistic 
model of the „normal” human body, the „repair” of abnormality, or the 
separation of two individual bodies, but in the best interests of both the 
persons involved, and to solve the situation of one body over which neither 
has a privileged right. 
C. Identity
 Thinking about the conjoined twins, I cannot bypass the question
of their identity. This problem is a broad one, but I will brieﬂy outline
my view on the continuity of the individuation of the twins, before 
the operation and after it. As I deﬁned the body of the twins and their
relation to it, I argued for the opinion that until they are separated, their 
physical identity is common and not that of „one body + one body”. The
„after-operation” identity may be a controversial issue. Are the doctors
creating new people? Or are the separated twins a continuation of their 
„pre-operation” state? 
 „Conjoined twins are not separate and never have been. If we separate 
them, we should at the very least recognize that we are creating two new 
separate entities from two who were one, and that in doing so we are 
removing from each of them part of themselves”18.
 The other extreme opinion would be the idea that the separation
could be understood as an act of restoration of the Maltese, but this is 
not very plausible, as the life conditions of the conjoined twins were so 
poor that they would have died without the operation. 
 We could look at this (physical) identity issue also from the point of 
view which proposes that the only one of the twins to be a candidate for 
continuity of identity is Jodie, as it was only she who had the potential to 
develop after the operation.
 I espouse the view that both girls were the continuations of their pre-
operation state and I see them neither as totally new creatures, nor as 
merely restored ones. I believe that a part of their biological history is 
18  M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, op. cit., 284.
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deeply tied to the identity of the one body they shared, and that they are 
both equal candidates for continuing on their own the process of identity 
development identiﬁcation they used to follow together. In this case,
I would see a manifestation of Parﬁt’s theory, which says that identity
does not have to be a one-to-one relationship or an all-or-nothing one19. 
I believe that human beings living in one body in a conjoined condition 
can survive as two persons after separation. If we admit that survival and 
consequently identity can be a matter of degrees, as Parﬁt argues, we may
have an answer to the question of the identity of conjoined twins. 
Back to the question of separation
 Now I return to the issue I outlined at the beginning. Analyzing and 
deﬁning the core category of the conjoined twins, their body, let us try to
answer the question of whether the separation of Mary and Jodie, which 
ended Mary’s life, was justiﬁable. I am not going to go into the details of
judges and their arguments, as they had only a little in common, but I will 
proceed to the doctrine of double-eﬀect reasoning (hereafter as DER),
which Lord Justice Walker partly applied, and I will attempt to show that 
the reasoning behind DER in this case depends on the way the body of 
the conjoined twins and the relation between them are understood. If an 
action leads to and causes serious harm as an unintended side eﬀect, and
it also achieves a good end, the whole action may be justiﬁed because of
principle of double eﬀect. There are some conditions that must be fulﬁlled
when applying this principle. 
 I have drawn on the summary of these eﬀects from the New Catholic 
Encyclopedia:
1. The act itself must be morally good or at least indiﬀerent.
2. The agent may not positively will the bad eﬀect but may permit it. If
he can attain the good eﬀect without the bad eﬀect he should do so.
The bad eﬀect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary.
19  See: D. Parﬁt, Personal Identity, in: Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology, ed. T. Crane, K. 
Farkas, New York 2004, 560-577.
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3. The good eﬀect must ﬂow from the action at least as immediately (in
the order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) 
as the bad eﬀect. In other words the good eﬀect must be produced
directly by the action, not by the bad eﬀect. Otherwise the agent
would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.
4. The good eﬀect must be suﬃciently desirable to compensate for the 
allowing of the bad eﬀect20. 
 There are some voices which say that DER cannot be applied to the
case of conjoined twins, because not one person but two are involved. 
I suppose this argument is answered if we treat conjoined twins (those 
which are, like Mary and Jodie, strongly biologically joined)21 as 
a complex, as one body, as I have described above. 
 If we look more carefully at the reasoning behind the separation of 
Jodie and Mary, we see the following; two innocent lives would have been 
lost if the doctors had not intervened. The doctors did all they could, and
so they saved Jodie. As a result of the same operation which saved Jodie, 
Mary died. If we want to justify the separation, we have to analyze the 
intention of the doctors and the results achieved. Following DER and its 
criteria, we can conclude that 
a.) the act of saving the innocent life of Jodie is morally good 
b.) the bad eﬀect, Mary’s death, is neither wanted nor intended. Nobody
wishes to kill Mary for the sake of saving Jodie. If there had been 
a diﬀerent solution in this heartbreaking case, competent doctors
would have certainly chosen it.
c.) Jodie was saved by separation from, not by the death of, Mary. 
Although Mary’s death was foreseeable, it could not have been 
prevented, as it was a necessary side eﬀect (not intended).
d.) the good eﬀect is suﬃciently desirable to compensate for the bad
eﬀect, as the innocent life of Jodie was saved, which had every chance
of developing. 
20  See: New Catholic Encyclopedia, 4(1967), http://www.trosch.org/phi/dbl-eﬀt.htm.
21  By strong biological fusion doctors understand cases of conjoined twins which share 
vital organs (heart, brain, lungs) and the separation of them is rarely possible if both are 




 The case which I have tried to present is so complicated that it cannot
be wholly presented in such a limited paper. Many other problems, 
responses, views and opinions emerge from all the particular issues I have 
analyzed, but it was not my aim to present them even in summary form. 
My intention was to outline the discussion over the moral dispute of the 
separation of the conjoined twins Mary and Jodie that lead to Mary’s 
death. First I needed to deﬁne the „body” category, and subsequently that
of physical identity, in order to present a view within which justiﬁcation
of the separation is actually possible. With no concept of „body”, 
especially of the body of conjoined twins, we could not comprehend the 
problem of their separation, as it is strongly dependent on the notion of 
the body. I presented the position that holds that conjoined twins should 
be treated as two persons in one body and that the relation between 
them should be seen as one of unity and solidarity, and not one of rivalry 
and competition (over the body). On this basis, I attempted to provide 
a possible explanation of the justiﬁability of the separation of Mary and
Jodie, which I built up on the doctrine of double eﬀect. This brings me
to conclude that the act of separation can be justiﬁed, since the moral
good was achieved without recourse to immoral means, although it 
had an unavoidable side eﬀect, Mary’s death, which was not intended,
although foreseen. And was the separation, justiﬁed in this way, still the
best solution in their case and in the best interest of both of them? I do 
not suppose there could have been a better decision than to operate. 
What I try to underline is the source of the reasoning behind this act. 
I realize that there are thousands of questions and that a decision like 
this is never easy, but in my (vitalistic?) opinion, I cannot imagine doing 
nothing when an innocent life might be saved, though it require a grave 
sacriﬁce.
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Economics vs. Ethics
 The entrepreneurs dealing with the way the companies function and
the economists responsible for the system regulating macroeconomic 
processes often face moral dilemmas related to the company’s
management. Adequate recognition of the conﬂicting values is necessary
in order to solve these dilemmas. The conﬂict between moral and
economic values seems to be the most interesting one1. 
 The assumptions, the methods and the goals of ethics do not
agree with the assumptions, the methods and the goals of economics. 
Philosophers of morality try to present a variety of ethical values and 
hope that such values will point to the direction of moral improvement of 
man. They try to show what we should not do, which ways of behaviour
are better and which are more ethical. We may therefore describe ethics 
as a theory of moral values and moral behaviour. It tries to analyse the 
conditions of ethical behaviour and of being subject to moral judgement 
and norms, of moral responsibility. It deals with the assessment and norms 
for human behaviour and looks for the ﬁnal justiﬁcation of morality and
its principal norms2. On the other hand the economy focuses mainly 
on production and exchange and is therefore mainly interested in their 
maximisation. It is an empirical science, which means that it analyses and 
experiments with the questions related to the production of goods and 
with the services which fulﬁl human needs. It analyses how the society
1  See: K. Sosenko, Kwestia zastosowania etyki w ekonomii, in: Etyka biznesu, ed. by J. Dietl, 
W. Gasparski, PWN, Warsaw 1997, 273.
2  See: A. B. Stępień, Wstęp do ﬁlozoﬁi, KUL, Lublin 1989, 97.
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takes economic decisions on what, how and for whom to produce3. Being 
a social and empirical science it is interested in actions and behaviour of 
people who are connected with management. 
 Many economists believe that because of the fundamental diﬀerences,
the economic activity of man should not be and is not subject to moral 
norms. At this point, we may use M. Friedman’s frequently quoted phrase: 
”the business of business is business”4, which means that whenever we 
consider the economic activity of man there is no place for ethics. The
only exception is the situation in which „ethics” improve productivity 
and proﬁts of a company5. Here we are not able to conduct a thorough 
analyses of the arguments of those who criticise such view, but let us 
only say according to Cz. Porębski, that there is no internal conﬂict
between ethics and economics, on the contrary they are connected by a 
relationship of strong conditioning6. Furthermore, we wish to emphasise 
that where there is economic activity there is a need to refer to the notion 
of responsibility. 
Philosophical idea of responsibility
 Under the inﬂuence of World War One the idea of responsibility
started to replace the idea of duty which was frequently used before that 
period. It tuned out that the second term does not correspond to the spirit 
of democracy and spreading idea of freedom. J. Jackson writes that the 
notion of duty, „points to some necessity — to something that we have to 
do or that we have to avoid doing”7. It is associated with an image of some 
dictate that limits the free will of man. Furthermore, the philosophy of 
the 20th century discovers a two-way relationship between freedom and 
responsibility. It is described in the following way: there is no freedom 
3  See: D. Begg, S. Fischer, R. Dornbusch, Ekonomia, PWN, Warsaw 1993, 28. 
4  M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Proﬁts, The New York 
Times Magazine (1970)13 September.
5  See: Cz. Porębski, Czy etyka się opłaca? Zagadnienia etyki biznesu, Cracow 2000, 24-25.
6  See: Cz. Porębski, Co nam po wartościach?, Cracow 2001, 192.
7  J. Jackson, Biznes i moralność, translated from English R. Pucek, Warsaw 1999, 134.
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without responsibility and there is no responsibility without freedom. 
According to J. Filek, if there is no responsibility without freedom and at 
the same time there is no freedom without responsibility, then we see that 
this relation is not only mutual but probably much more deeper8.
 The term „responsibility” is also better at emphasising mutual
relations. „Duty” suggests one-way obligation. After H. Jonas, the
philosophers point to the change in the relationship between the man 
and the nature9. Until recently the nature was the refuge for the man, 
now it needs man’s protection. The man, including homo oeconomicus, is 
responsible for its survival. 
 The generality of the notion of responsibility also works to its
advantage. It means that it may be analysed both in personal and 
general terms. Responsibility in the personal sense emphasises direct 
attitude of man towards another man or of man towards things. General 
responsibility stresses man’s responsibility for the world he lives in. At 
this point we do not aim at more general analyses of the related problems 
(especially those associated with the general responsibility), we only 
point to the fact that in the light of general responsibility we may perceive 
a company as a special kind of moral subject responsible for the world.
 The idea of Corporate Social Responsibility, which is the subject
of the following parts of this paper, is an attempt at appealing for the 
responsibility in the economy. Its supporters stress that it takes into 
account both praxeological (eﬀective and economical) and axiological
(ethical) issues10. Realising the complexity of the subject we limited our 
considerations to presenting deﬁnitions of the discussed concept, hoping
that together with the example presented in the following parts it will 
lead its better understanding.
8  See: J. Filek, Pytania do odpowiedzialności, Znak (1995)10, 27.
9  See: Cz. Porębski, Co nam po wartościach?, op. cit., 192
10  See: W. Gasparski, Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu: argumenty przeciw i za, in: 
Annales 7(2004)1, 40.
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What is CSR?
 It is impossible to ﬁnd one deﬁnition which would say what CSR is
and what CSR is not. In the literature dealing with the subject we may 
ﬁnd some attempts at conveying the essence of this concept. For example,
The Green Paper deﬁned CSR as „a concept whereby companies integrate
social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”11. This
deﬁnition presents CSR as an important strategic issue. While preparing
its strategy a company places social interests and environmental 
protection among its goals. Moreover, being „socially responsible means 
not only fulﬁlling legal expectations, but also going beyond compliance
and investing „more” into human capital, the environment and the 
relations with stakeholders”12. It is not enough for a company to limit 
its actions to fulﬁlling formal and legal requirements. First of all, it has
focus more on investing in human resources, environmental protection 
and keeping good relations with its stakeholders. According to J. Filek, it 
means a voluntary engagement into shaping of the internal and external 
environment of the company13. 
 Going beyond legal duties is also stressed in another deﬁnition, which
states that CSR „refers to management’s obligation to set policies, make 
decisions and follow courses of action beyond the requirements of the 
law that are desirable in terms of the values and objectives of society”14.
In the papers of World Bank we may ﬁnd a deﬁnition which according to
J. Filek is taken much further in the direction of company’s social duties15. 
This deﬁnition presents CSR as „a commitment of business to contribute
11  Green Paper. Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 2001, 4.
12  Ibidem, 6.
13  See: J. Filek, Społeczna Odpowiedzialność Biznesu. Tylko moda czy nowy model 
prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej?, Cracow 2006, 4.
14  D. Mosley, P.H. Pietri, L.C. Megginson, Management: Leadership in Action, New York 1996, 
166.
15  See: J. Filek, Społeczna Odpowiedzialność Biznesu. Tylko moda czy nowy model 
prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej?, op. cit., 5.
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to sustainable development working with employees, their families, local 
communities, and society at large to improve their quality of life that are 
both good for business and good for development”16.
 A deﬁnition by A. B. Carroll is one of the broadest and at the same
time one of the most frequently quoted deﬁnitions of CSR. It consists
of four parts and includes four types of responsibility. „The social
responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given 
point in time”17 – writes Caroll.
 Such attempts at deﬁning the essence of CSR are based on the
concept of a company focusing on the interests of stakeholders. The
ﬁrst of the „principles for business”18 (Principle 1. The Responsibilities
Of Businesses: Beyond Shareholders toward Stakeholders) accepted 
during the round-table conference in Caux in 1994, mentions the need 
for broader perspective on business activities of companies, so that 
companies do not focus only on the interests of their shareholders but 
also on the interests of all stakeholders. „Businesses have a role – we 
read in Principles for Business – to play in improving the lives of all 
their customers, employees, and shareholders by sharing with them 
the wealth they have created. Suppliers and competitors as well should 
expect businesses to honour their obligations in a spirit of honesty and 
fairness. As responsible citizens of the local, national, regional and global 
communities in which they operate, businesses share a part in shaping 
the future of those communities”19.
 Discussing CSR as an everyday business practice we may say that it is 
fulﬁlled on two levels: internal and external. The internal level includes
human resources management. We may point to the question of equal 
rights for the employees, improvement of the communication between 
16  What Does Business Think about Corporate Social Responsibility? Part I, World Bank, 2005, 
11.
17  A. B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, Academy 
of Management Review 4(1979)4, 500.
18  Principles for Business, Caux Round Table, 1994.
19  Ibidem.
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the employees and the managers, employee participation, perspectives 
for further development and improving qualiﬁcations, fair payment,
supporting the employees in their attempts to combine family duties 
with work and staﬀ training. Furthermore, the internal level encompasses
ethical programs for the employees, safety and hygiene of work, adapting 
to changes, environmental protection and corporate governance20. 
 On the external level a company should focus on the issues which 
concern local communities, which, among others, means the broader 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations and other local 
partners, engagement in philanthropic activities, social eﬀects of business
activity, creation of new jobs for the disabled, civic engagement in social 
investments21. The company should also respect human rights and deal
with the global aspects of the environmental issues.
Implementation and development of the CSR Strategy  
– Case study22
 Further on, our aim is to outline keystones and the way of 
implementation of a good Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Strategy based on sound long run win-win partnership with the company 
stakeholders.
 At the beginning, we would like to deﬁne the basic concept of CSR
used in this paper. Under CSR Strategy we understand a mean through 
which a company is endorsing sustainable development consistently. 
Sustainable development is based on the approach of acceptance the 
triple-bottom line strategy of economical, environmental and social 
values. „In its deﬁnition, sustainable development integrates equal
shares of the economic, social and environmental dimensions”23 Coline 
20  See: B. Rok, Odpowiedzialny biznes w nieodpowiedzialnym świecie, Warsaw 2004, 20.
21  See: ibidem.
22  The study was prepared in the Framework of the Research Program No.: MSM 
6138439909 „Governance in the Context of the Globalized Economy and Society”.




Ruwet in Zaccai. By the term stakeholders we would quote the deﬁnition
mentioned by McWilliams and Siegel24 and adopted from Freeman who 
„asserts that ﬁrms have relationships with many constituent groups and
that these stakeholders25 both aﬀect and are aﬀected by the actions of the
ﬁrm”.
 In our paper, we are examining the way of implementation and 
subsequently CSR Strategy already in operation within the company. 
We are also comparing the concept with the academic point of view of 
several academics and thereafter deducing our results.
 Our thesis is then as follows. Main key stones of the CSR Strategy 
implementation are:
§ to implement the CSR Strategy into the whole company and within 
daily operations;
§ to ﬁnd mutual triple-bottom values between the company and its
stakeholders;
§ to let the company’s stakeholders know about the values;
§ to act transparent and responsible; not only for one year but 
continuously.
 Company, we are focused on, has adopted the general accepted triple-
bottom line strategy of social responsibility and is still managed by one of 
the founder’s descendant26. The CSR organization is showed in the chart
bellow.
24  A. McWilliams, D. Siegel, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective, 
The Academy of Management Review, 26(2001)1, 117-127.
25  In our concrete case stakeholders are: Employees, Customers, Communities, 
Shareholders, Suppliers and Factory Workers, Non-governmental Organizations, Media, 
Government Entities, Business Colleagues.
26  The name of the descendant is Jeﬀrey Schwartz. He is president and CEO of the case
company.
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Chart 1: Company’s CSR organization. 
Resource: Company’s 2006 CSR report.
Company CSR Organization
 The CEO has a CSR Board Committee above him with which he
consults the CSR vision. The vision ﬂows through Corporate Culture
Oﬃcer in order to spread the ideas among all employees and so start
fulﬁlling the vision from inside the company. It is the role of Corporate
Culture Oﬃcer that the corporate values, including values referring to
CSR, are incorporated within all company levels. Then, Vice President
of CSR has in his responsibility relations which are more connected to 
the stakeholders (surrounding of the company). Company considered 
three – with stakeholders mutual – core areas as essential values. They
are deﬁned as follows: environmental stewardship, global human rights
and community involvement. All these are pursued in transparency and 
accountability for couple of years and they are presented to the public by 
the company.
 On the operational level, there are Key Performance Indicators = 
KPI used in the company in order to see how the ﬁrm is doing in above
mentioned three key areas. The Key Performance Indicators are all of
quantitative nature (hence objective) and they are speciﬁc for each key
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area e.g. total metric tons of carbon emissions within the environmental 
area, or hours employees spent serving in the community within the 
Community Involvement key area27.
 Motto ´Make it better´ is rooﬁng eﬀort of all operations within the
key areas. The emphasis is given on long-term lasting CSR concept
incorporation in every decision and within the Organizational Culture 
together with monitoring and keeping up with the changing landscape. 
Although the company started the CSR Strategy concept in late nineties28, 
it started couple of activities concerning all three key areas much earlier, 
e.g. partnership with the City Year organization29 started in 1989, Path of 
Service Programme launched in 199230.
 However, company declared social issue awareness long time ago; 
its drivers to continue behaving in responsible manner are customers 
who are concerned about social responsibility. It derives the fact from 
the increasing media interest in social responsibility matters. Company 
have the vision of future dialog with their customers based on shared 
values and a mutual interest in the well-being of the world around31 them. 
According to its experiences our case company believes that thanks to its 
long-term transparent acting and lasting tendency towards sustainable 
development it is gaining appreciation and trust from its customers.
Global Human Rights
 Our case company is dealing with over 100, 000 workers in more 
than 30 countries of the world. Although it has not a direct inﬂuence on
workers everywhere, it developed a concept of monitoring human rights 
27  Key Performance Indicators, their objectivity and to which rate they are useful by CSR 
assessment might be a good idea for further research.
28  The ﬁrst CSR Report is dated to the year 2000, www.timberland.com.
29  It will be depicted further.
30  The Path of Service™ programme based on the idea that „employees are oﬀered 16
hours of paid leave to perform service in their communities every year”. Quoted from: 
http://www.timberlandonline.co.uk/.
31  Timberland’s 2005 CSR Report, 13.
118
Lenka Drličková, Paweł Urgacz
standards. First of all the company is choosing their suppliers according 
to what extend the supplier shares the same values as the company and is 
willing to operate under the standards of the company’s Code of Conduct. 
Values and standards embodied in the Code of Conduct are based on the 
employment which:
§ „Is voluntary and free of harassment and abuse
§ Prohibits child labour, and
§ Meets standards for free association, labour hours, compensation, 
health and safety, and environmental compliance”32.
 One thing is to agree on some standards, another one to maintain 
the desired level of state. Hence, the company developed its own way 
of assessment instead of doing only external audit. Where is the 
diﬀerence? While auditing, auditor plays a role of controller, whereas
pursuing assessment means collaboration between the case company 
and its suppliers. They based their assessment concept on consulting and
partnering with their suppliers and left the policing style of assessment.
At the operational level this evolved into participatory approach to the 
employees and to informal conversations.
 The implementation consisted of three steps: ﬁrstly to train assessors
and assessed, secondly a time to adjustment was needed and ﬁnally to
continue to train, to educate and improve. The assessment was prolonged
from half a day to two to ﬁve days and the rest of the year was constituted
for the remedy of possible failures33.
 As stated in the CSR Report from 2006 and as we described above, 
the company continues to shift the focus from reactive to proactive; from
policing to collaboration and partnership; and from management to 
worker. This approach is not as revolutionary as it could seem. Carroll34 
has already compiled several writers who provided conceptual schemes 
describing the ´social responsiveness continuum´. This term stands for the
strategy behind business (managerial) response to social responsibility 
and social issues35.
32  Timberland’s 2005 CSR Report, Our Code of Conduct, 15.
33  See: Timberland’s 2005 CSR Report, 18.
34  See: A. B. Carroll, op. cit.
35  See: ibidem.
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Chart 2: Stages of Social Responsiveness
Resource: Carroll36
 The chart above shows one of the responsiveness concepts. Ian
Wilson’s concept (1974) declares four possible business strategies – 
reaction, defence, accommodation and pro-action. The reciprocal arrow
underneath the four strategies represents the continuum from doing 
nothing to doing much within social issues. We can see our case company 
is shifting from the left-hand side to the right-hand side of the chart by
shifting from audit based reacting style to active assessment style of the
responsiveness.
Environmental Stewardship
 Environmental Stewardship is based on innovations and employees´ 
stimulation to better environmental awareness. The stimulation is
pursued in two forms. First one, in form of awards for employees with 
good ideas in accordance of sustainable development; the second one is 
of ﬁnancial nature, in form of bonuses for driving a hybrid vehicle. There
are innovations developed in terms of energy reduction (e.g. diminishing 
of green house gas emissions), balanced natural resource consumption 
(e.g. renewable energy from solar panels) and in terms of extending 
usage of nature friendly chemicals – related to products produced e.g. 
usage of water-based adhesives are continuously replacing solvent-based 
adhesives. Behind all innovation there is the target ´how to make sure that 
what’s being innovated isn’t harmful´.
36  See: ibidem.
120
Lenka Drličková, Paweł Urgacz
Community Involvement
 Company perceives herself as a part of the community. Hence, 
there were established activities which fulﬁl needs of the company
closest surroundings. Just for a quick view we mention few examples 
like: forty hours for community per year paid by the company, Earth 
Day, Partnership with Community based organisations37 or charitable 
contributions.
 All these three key areas could not function if there were no 
transparency in all actions and good public relation management. 
Therefore, transparency and PR belong to principal activities in the
company CSR Strategy, as it is shown in the Chart No.: 1 on previous 
pages.
 Implementation of CSR may be a popular mean of diﬀerentiation
strategy by allowing managers to simultaneously satisfy personal interests 
and to achieve product diﬀerentiation38. And as the authors further 
present, the diﬀerentiation may be used as comparative advantage only if
it is eﬀectively communicated to costumers, so the customer may evaluate
the diﬀerent product formed by eﬀective CSR Strategy. Hence the product
gains so called CSR feature which represents the diﬀerentiation mark
from other products.
Conclusions
 We can conclude fol lowing outcomes from the company 
documentation examination and relevant articles we gone through. The
company realized a long-term consistent and transparent acting39 in order 
37  Already above mentioned City Year Organization [www.cityyear.org]. It „is an 
international organization whose mission is to build democracy through citizen service, 
civic leadership and social entrepreneurship. A critical element of the mission of City 
Year is to train youths to become citizen leaders, with a lifelong commitment to leading 
active, thoughtful and eﬀective civic lives”. Quoted from: Timberlands‘ 2005 CSR Report,
55.
38  See: A. McWilliams, D. Siegel, op. cit.. 117-127.
39  It started by examples mentioned above e.g.: since 1989 lasting partnership with City 
Year organization, The Path of Service program launched in 1992. 
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to handle in trustful and social responsible manners. Furthermore Jones’ 
observations are telling „ﬁrms that contract (through their managers)
with their stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation will 
have a competitive advantage over ﬁrms that do not”40.
 In the case company, there is the social responsible strategy present 
in the whole company. As Townsend reasons the strategy should be 
within all operations and departments, not only in the CSR department 
(Townsend, 2007). Therefore, we would suggest placing the CSR board
committee also over the general manager within the organizational 
structure as shown above on Chart 1 and follow the case study concept.
Furthermore, the competitive advantage is also gained by adding 
a unique „CSR characteristics” to the product. That means a feature
which is in accordance to the CSR-strategy endorsing the sustainable 
development. This might have no impact on the company turnover when
there is no appropriate communication and advertisement provided to 
the customer41. There are various ways of communication. Company
can either communicate their opinion and position through all types of 
advertisements (surely CSR Reports or CSR rankings count too), related 
newspaper and magazine articles or joining the networks like CSR and 
Sustainable Forums or Associations42.
 We understand the above mentioned suggestions are relevant to 
rather big market players who take advantage of economy of scale and 
hence can invest to implementation of CSR Strategies. Also, the CSR 
concept is rather interesting for retailers than production and B2B 
companies because retailers are pushed not only by the state but also 
encouraged by their responsible and aware end consumers. However, we 
consider the responsible behaviour within the business reality as a great 
challenge for all types of companies.
40  T. M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics, The 
Academy of Management Review, 20(1995)2, 422.
41  See: A. McWilliams, D. Siegel, op. cit., 120.
42  E.g. „World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the UN Global Compact, the 
International Business Leaders Forum and similar local bodies. Investment rankings 
and monitors: the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, Corporate Responsibility Index.” In: 
www.biggerthinking.com
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20.  Teologia duchowości, pod red.  
J. M. Dołę­gi, Episteme 20(2002) AUM, 
Olecko 2002, s. 260.
21. Ziemia kolneńska na przełomie  
XX i XXI wieku, pod red. ks. J. L. 
Grajew­skiego, ks. J. Sokołow­skiego, 
Episteme 21(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, 
s. 348.
22. Od kosmologii do ekofilozofii, pod 
red. J. M. Dołę­gi, Episteme 22(2002) 
AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 332.
23. Ks. Józef Łu­piń­ski, Dzieje grekokato-
lików w Królestwie Polskim po powstaniu 
styczniowym, Episteme 23(2002) AUM, 
Olecko 2002, s. 258.
24.  Jarosław­ Poteraj, Polskie instytucje 
finansowe. Kreacja rynków i procesy 
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konsolidacyjne, Episteme 24(2002) 
AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 288.
25. Unia Europejska. Geneza – rozwój 
– perspektywy, pod red. J. M. Dołę­gi, 
Episteme 25(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, 
s. 496.
26. Współczesne dylematy diagnostyczne 
i metodyczne w opiece i wychowaniu, 
pod red. J. Nikitorow­icza,  
K. Saw­ickiego, T. Bajkow­skiego, 
Episteme 26(2003) AUM,  
Olecko 2003, s. 278.
27. Biskup Edward Eugeniusz Samsel 
(1940-2003), pod red. J. M. Dołę­gi  
i A. Skow­roń­skiego, Episteme 27(2003) 
AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 384.
28. Kardynał Marian Jaw­orski, Wybór 
pism filozoficznych, Episteme 28(2003) 
AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 333.
29. Konteksty podmiotowej świadomości, 
pod red. E. Podrez i R. Monia, Episteme 
29(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, 
s. 230.
30. Ochrona œrodowiska i edukacja  
ekologiczna w Unii Europejskiej  
i Polsce, pod red. Z. Ciećki  
i J. M. Dołę­gi, Episteme 30(2003) AUM, 
Olecko 2003, s. 244.
31.  Pedagogika – wczoraj, dziś i jutro, 
pod red. J. Plachy i J. K. Zabłockiego, 
Episteme 31(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, 
s. 210.
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32. Mieczysław­ Markow­ski, Pierwowzory 
uniwersytetów, Episteme 32(2003) AUM, 
Olecko 2003, s. 406.
33. Biskup Ełcki Edward Eugeniusz Sam-
sel, pod red. J. M. Dołę­gi,  
A. Skow­roń­skiego i J. Sokołow­skiego, 
Episteme 33(2003) AUM, 
Olecko 2003, s. 402.
34. Ks. Janu­sz Aptacy, Antropologia 
Oliviera Clémenta, 34(2004) AUM, 
Olecko 2004, s. 245.
35. 25 lat Pontyfikatu Jana Pawła II, 
pod. red. ks. Jerzego Sikory, Episteme 
35(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004,  
s. 432.
36.   Ziemia olecka na początku XXI wie-
ku, pod. red. Józefa Krajew­skiego i Woj­
ciecha Gu­zew­icza, Episteme 36(2004) 
AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 364.
37. Jarosław­ Poteraj, Procesy konsolida-
cyjne. Raiders & Targets w polskich insty-
tucjach finansowych, Episteme 37(2004) 
AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 800.
38. Kultura religijna Kurpiowszczyzny, 
pod. red. ks. Mieczysław­a Ozorow­skiego, 
Episteme 38(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, 
s. 212.
39. Ks. Krzysztof Stę­pniak,  
W poszukiwaniu Kościoła idealnego. 
Życie i dzieło Tadeusza Żychiewicza 
(1922-1994), Episteme 39(2004) AUM, 
Olecko 2004, s. 280.
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40. Mieczysław­ Markow­ski, Uniwersytet 
Krakowski w kontekście środkowoeuro-
pejskim późnego średniowiecza  
i wczesnej nowożytności,  
Episteme 40(2005) AUM,  
Olecko 2005.
41. W słubie Bogu i ludziom. 
Ks. Czesław Jakub Domel (1932-2004), 
pod. red. ks. Wojciecha Gu­zew­icza, 
Episteme 41(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, 
s. 192.
42. Ochrona środowiska i edukacja 
ekologiczna w regionie: Gmina Turośl 
i Wigierski Park Narodowy, pod. red. 
Józefa M. Dołgi, Edw­arda Grotta  
i Mariana P. Krysiaka, Episteme 
42(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005,  
s. 254.
43. Waldemar Św­iątkow­ski, Das  
Beziehungsgefüge von Sünde und Schuld 
auf dem Hintergrund der  
Konzilsaussagen des Vaticanum II, 
Episteme 43(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, 
s. 276.
44. Przestę­pca i skazany nie tracą 
godności osoby, pod. red. W. Woźniaka, 
Episteme 44(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, 
s. 212.
45. Ks. Jan Lucjan Grajewski (1949-
-2004), pod red. ks. J. Sokołow­skiego, 
Episteme 45(2005) AUM, 
Olecko 2005, s. 212.
46. M. P. Krysiak, Z dziejów parafii 
Turośl, Episteme 46(2005) AUM, 
Olecko 2005, s. 202.
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47. Profesor i przyjaciel. Ks. Edmund 
Przekop (1937-1999), pod red.  
ks. W. Gu­zew­icza, Episteme 47(2005) 
AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 176.
48. Brat Zenon Żebrowski – kurpiowski 
Apostoł Japonii, pod red. ks. J. Aptacego, 
Episteme 48(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, 
s. 256.
49. Ks. Józef Łu­piń­ski, Dzieje grekokato-
lików w Królestwie Polskim po powstaniu 
styczniowym, pod red. ks. W. Gu­zew­icza, 
Episteme 47(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, 
s. 269.
50. Jan Paweł II Wielki, praca zbiorow­a, 
Episteme 50(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, 
s. 605.
51. Indeksy pię­ćdziesię­ciu tomów  
Episteme, pod red. W. Kalinow­skiego, 
Episteme 51(2006) AUM, Olecko 2006, 
s. 182.
52. Wojciech Kalinow­ski, Seelsorger 
in Polen. Polnische Priester auf dem 
Prüfstein des II. Vatikanischen Konzils, 
Episteme 52(2006) AUM, Olecko 2005, 
s. 376.
53. Zielone Płuca Polski i Europy. Ścieżki 
współpracy Polski, Białorusi i Litwy, pod 
red. J.M. Dołę­gi i J. Siedleckiej­Siw­u­dy, 
Episteme 53(2006) AUM, Olecko 2006, 
s. 284.
54. Henryk Luft (1877-1934). 
Działalność architektoniczna  
i budowlana, pod red. J. Sokołow­skiego, 
Episteme 54(2006) AUM, Olecko 2006, 
s. 174.
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55. Ks. Stanisław­ Biały, Wybrane zagad-
nienia bioetyki, Episteme 55(2006) AUM, 
Olecko 2006, s. 398.
56. Tożsamość i odrę­bność w Zjed-
noczonej Europie. Obrazy krajów­ i 
stereotypy narodow­e w­ literatu­rze 
anglo­ i niemieckoję­zycznej, pod red. 
G. Moroza, M. Ossow­skiego, J. Sztachel­
skiej, Episteme 56(2006), AUM, Olecko 
2006, s. 265.
57. Rozmaitości ekofilozofii, pod red. 
A. Skow­roń­skiego, Episteme 57(2006), 
AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 413.
58. Dariu­sz Śleszyń­ski, Interakcja źród-
łem osobowego rozwoju. Uję­cie feno-
menologiczno-egzystencjalne, Episteme 
58(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007,  
s. 430.
59. Mieczysław­ Gogacz, Życie społeczne 
w duchu Ewangelii, Episteme 59(2006), 
AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 235.
60. Ks. Jerzy Popiełuszko – mę­czennik  
19 październik 1984, pod red.  
J. Aptacego, Episteme 60(2006),  
AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 376.
61. Ks. Wojciech Gu­zew­icz, Parafia 
Mikaszówka 1907-2007, Episteme 
61(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007,  
s. 221.
62. Diagnostyka wytrenowania zawodni-
ków różnych dyscyplin sportowych, pod 
red. Zbigniew­a Jastrzę­bskiego, Episteme 
62(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 209.
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63. Adam Mariu­sz Filipow­icz, Koncepcja 
duszy w pismach Tertuliana, Episteme 
63(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 272.
64. Wartości i styl życia Polaków, pod 
red. W. Klimskiego, Episteme 64(2007), 
AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 418.
65. 50 lat kapłańskiej służby, pod red. 
J. Sokołow­skiego, Episteme 65(2007), 
AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 540. 
67. Oblicza miłości. Wokół encykliki 
Benedykta XVI Deus caritas est, pod red. 
ks. J. Kotow­skiego i ks. W. Now­ackiego, 
Episteme 67(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, 
s. 196.
68. M. P. Krysiak, Stygmatyk z Wykrotu 
orę­downikiem Matki Bożej, Episteme 
68(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 210.
69. H. Czajew­ski, W cieniu mojego 
Anioła Stróża, Episteme 69(2007), 
AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 314.
70. Badania naukowe Wszechnicy  
Mazurskiej w Olecku (1), pod red.  
I. Chrząścika, Episteme 70(2007), 
AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 176.
71. Teoria i praktyka wychowania 
fizycznego i sportu na różnych etapach 
przygotowań, pod red. Z. Jastrzę­bskiego
Episteme 71(2007), 
AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 180.
72. Ks. Marian Szczę­sny (1942-2006), 
pod red. ks. W. Gu­zew­icza,
Episteme 72(2007), 
AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 250.
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73. Andrzej Szw­arc, Piłka nożna. Gra 
jeden przeciwko jednemu, Episteme 
73(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 92.
74. Jørgen Veisland, The Outcast. 
Twisting the Plot in Six English 
Novels, Episteme 74(2008) AUM, 
Olecko 2008, s. 128.
75. Ks. Wojciech Tu­row­ski, Prze-
powiadanie o Maryi w tajemnicach 
Chrystusa..., Episteme 75(2008) 
AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 452.
76. Ks. Robert Śliw­ow­ski, Królowa 
Młodzieży. Sanktuarium Matki Bożej 
Płonkowskiej jako miejsce kultu maryj-
nego w diecezji łomżyńskiej, Episteme 
76(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 230.
77. Miejsca magiczne w literaturze 
anglo- i niemieckoję­zycznej, pod. 
red. G. Moroza i M. Ossow­skiego, 
Episteme 77(2008) AUM, Olecko 
2008, s. 420.
80. Marek Haliniak, Filozofia polityki 
ekologicznej, Episteme 80(2008) 
AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 294.
81. Główne problemy współczesnej 
etyki, pod red.: K. Dominik,  
D. Dzw­onkow­skiej i A. Waleszczyń­­
skiego, Episteme 81(2008) AUM, 
Olecko 2008, s. 228.
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Biblioteka Pomocy Naukowych EPISTEME:
1.  Jacek Tomczyk, Skrypt do ćwiczeń z antropologii. Czę­ść I: oste-
ologia, BPN Episteme 1(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 128.
2.  Skrypt do ćwiczeń z antropologii. Czę­ść II: badania i opis 
osobników żywych, pod. red. A. Siniarskiej i J. Tomczyka, BPN 
Episteme 2(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 136.
3. Wojciech Kalinow­ski, Priester au­s Masu­ren. Au­sw­ertu­ng 
der Priesterbefragu­ng 1995 in der Diözese Ełk, BPN Episteme 3 
(2007) AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 150.
Tomy Episteme w przygotowaniu:
Kurpiowskie teksty literackie. Antologia, pod. red. Jerzego Sikory.
Ocalić od zapomnienia: Dwór w Grabowie (1417-2006), pod red. 
J. Krajew­skiego.
Jubileuszowy Myszyniec – Centrum Kultury Kurpiowskiej im. bp. 
Edwarda Samsela.
Problemy nauk filozoficznych, pod red. J. M. Dołę­gi.
Główne kierunki pedagogiki, pod red. J. Niemca.
Główne kierunki psychologii, pod red. J. Bieleckiego.
Wybrane zagadnienia teologii biblijnej, pod red. A. Ołow­ia.
Parafia pw­. św­. Bru­nona z Kw­erfu­rtu­ w­ Łomży, pod. red.  
J. Sokołow­skiego.
Dzieje parafii Kozioł, pod. red. J. Sokołow­skiego i S. Banacha.
Człowiek jako miejsce spotkania antropologii i teologii. U źródeł personalizmu chrześcijań-
skiego Wincentego Granata (1900-1979), pod red. M. Brzeziń­skiego.
Ekologia w Biblii, pod red. A. Najdy.
 P.T. Au­torów­ tekstów­ prosimy o kontakt z redaktorami pow­yższych tomów­ lu­b z J. M. Dołę­gą na 
adres redakcji.

